“h a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation c arr ying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the U”
“concerned itself, during most of the perio d to be covered in this report, primari ly w ith informat ion *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter-”
“CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal organization were to be taken at face value) th at its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying t”
“ced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did no t even concern itself t o any app recia ble exte nt with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countrie”
“on was considered a "line" organi- zation, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal o rganization were to be taken at face value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a ”
“was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during mos t of th e per iod to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Divi”
“lodg ed the so-called Soviet CI Group, whi ch was in many re spects a competitor of t he CI S taff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Ru”
“value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinc tion was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable able extent with the counterintell”
“ed to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was act ua lly a misnomer, because the organ i- zati on carrying this name did n ot even conce rn i tself to an y appreciable extent with t he counterintelligence function of the Agency o”
“cts a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in th is report , primarily with information *This area co mponent du ring the period of this repo rt was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974”
“onsidered a "line" organi- zation, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal organizat ion were to be taken at face value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer”
“centrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-cal led Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with informati”
“most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component dur ing the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990”
“CEPRET CEACITHE ULURLI wlluitf! By way of explanation, we can illustrate the ineffectual coordination with a case involving a long-term Soviet pene tration in the Agency. A very important staff agent was unmasked by virtue of information supplied by the aforemen tioned”
“n te lligence organs of the USSR, and as such w as ine vit ab ly somewhat redu nda nt s ince the sam e field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there was during most of the period with which we are concerned a substanti”
“lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It c oncerne d itself, during most of the per iod to be co vered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Rus”
“function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of the”
“rily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet R us sia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. L NW 65990 Docld:32375547 Page 7 SECRET وس بکه 104-10211-10004 SECRE”
“to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actual ly a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable able extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a wo”
“a misnom er, because the organi- zation ca rrying this n ame did not ev en concern itself to any ap preciable able extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Divisio”
“tually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carry ing thi s name did not even concern itse lf to a ny ap preciable able extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB ”
“using DD/P assets to trace leads concerning CIA employees. This is probably a necessary assist to the Office of Security but should be handled with the utmost of discretion and security. It' would * *‘be very seriously damaging to the efforts’ of the CI Staff if it ever bec”
“iet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld :32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redunda nt, since the same fie ld was the major pre”
“counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, du”
“en used inter- changeably. L NW 65990 Docld:32375547 Page 7 SECRET وس بکه 104-10211-10004 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant since the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Nev”
“90 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intel ligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant, since the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there was durin”
“eriod to be covered in this report, primarily with i nformation *This area component d uring the per iod of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:3240”
“elf, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area c omponent during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. L N”
“ity for the tragic turn of events. I bel ieve that I might have employed better perception by f ollo wing developments in Denver more closely. ¡I deeply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose. I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to our S”
“e two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on th e intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant, since the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Neverth”
“pt our internal security and intelligence organizations. Contrar y to the tempo of the times ma ny y ears ago, there is hardly an intellierce oמ- eration or an internal security case which does not have direct or in rect international ramifications. The course of events and the b”
“ormation *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russ ia Divi sion (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counteri”
“this name did not even concern itself to any ap preciable able extent with the co unterintellig enc e function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group”
“SECDET SENSITIVE The strength of CIA's counterintelligence unit was cut almost in half to eighty-nine; and by December 1974 the on-board strength of our counterintelligence personnel. officer and clerical, was down to seventy-seven, a total comprising 1.7 per cent of Ope”
“rated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodg ed the so-cal le d Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information”
“I m ight have employed better percept ion by following devel opments in Denver more closely. ¡I dee ply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose. I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to our S.I.S. history, and I think I can speak with some ”
“te nt with the counterintelligence f unction of the Agency on a wo rldwide basis. R at her, it conce ntrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It ”
“13-00000 Tage=257 the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in making a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report’s content. 2 Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive’ large numbers of this type of report ever”
“h some authority i n stat- ing that never in cur history has this nation been faced with prester se- curity threats from communist intelligence services who, through police state organizations, have developed unusually sophisticated capabilities to strike at our vulnerabilities o”
“contact with Soviet personnel.) As a result of this reluctance, the informa tion obtained by the CI staff generally originated with the State Department’s Office of Security. SECRET SENSITIVE A 3 NY 50955 DocId:32105622 Page 4”
“f the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during th e period of this report was known as Soviet Ru ssia Divisi on ( 1952-1966) and S oviet Bloc Di vision (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. L NW 65990 Docld”
“SECRET SENSOT counterintelligence personnel should be allocated to the counterintelligence unit in Headquarters. This 10 per cent, comprising 566 officer and clerical employees, would still fall considerably short of our counterintelligence strength in the fall of 1945 whe”
“he period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1 966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as ”
“in this report, there was during most of the period with which we are concerned a substantial co ng ruity of views between the SB/CI Group and CI Staff that militated in favor of coherent operational policy, even though the two organizations might disagree on matters of detail. O”
“as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used in ter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:3240487 1 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redun”
“n of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to ”
“IU/ SEUKLI 13 1 Mr. Tovar. Berween the Soviet-East European Division and 2 CI Staff we should be aware of it. The two were most primarily 3 concerned with the USSR. [ think one or the other of us would 4 inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern. The 5 Americans, ”
“kn own a s Soviet Russia Divis ion (1952-1966) and Soviet Blo c Di vision (1966-197 4) . The t wo na mes are often used inter- changeably. L NW 65990 Docld:32375547 Page 7 SECRET وس بکه 104-10211-10004 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and”
“4). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant, since the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Ne”
“the Polish intelligence service which also had enormous significance for our efforts against the Soviets. Just prior to his departure from Switzerland, he handled one of the most complex and challenging Soviet CE operations ever encountered by our service. 2 . In 1962 he was”