“IC. .to” 8. (the other 2200 BTC presumably under military OF er —State official cover). Oridnally the us of State Departs r for CIA personnel W38 supposed 3 trictly limited as The Dulles-Correa- ackson report stated 1948, e CIA should not use State Departtuent cover is a ”
“14-00000 ,5 “ SEP. 28. 1998 3:25PM A NO. 279 P.4 / Oar ^ 0. SE C RET 98 (Israel, and a contract agent in New York. In addition to the ft Office of the Chief (including two special assistants and a Secretariat) the Staff was composed of seven "Divisions" and four "Gr”
“October 1960 Foreign Service Listse being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile. 11 are CAG. On the day of Presid”
“14-00000 t yST CR E-T—„7.tl -• -------------------------- Hd/gl: versus area division prerogative in the conduct of operations. Noting that there might have been some immediate reasons for the CI Staff to take on operational aspects in its efforts to increase CI activity”
“DCI."L/ The memorandum went on to sa y: b. c. It is obviou s that a compilation of Special Group ap provals in no way reflects the totality of signifi- cant CIA activities carried on over the past 15 years. With respect to overall DDP activity, it does not include any mention of ”
“listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are GAS personnel of the 31 officers listed on engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chils, 11 are CAS. Un”
“of 5,662. As a result CIA could not meet its counterintelligence responsibilities adequately even at this peak of on-board counterintelligence strength. It is our view that the Operations Directorate ought to devote no less than 10 per cent of its manpower to counterintel”
“being In 16. AS rseanel; of the 31 officers IG listed engaging in reporting activities, over hal AS. Of the YL 13 officers lifted in the Political Sectic Embassy hile, E D the day N 88 are CAS. esident Kennedy’ i47 percent N Embassi Ias are CA5. E 4 the politic”
“In such cases it will be apprecia ted if you will advise us of suc h r eferral in order that we m ay anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission (?) and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710) CIA The policy of eliminating reference to ”
“comprehensive reviews of the overt . - activities of the Intelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion, will not be productive of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the" ■ extent to which needed overt, information is available for collection”
“G. c.-vd € ( •* Mr. William E. Colby Page Four June 26, 1975 for the use of each such technique? How was the use of each such technique authorized, reviewed, and con trolled, internally and externally? What was the effectiveness of each such technique in achieving the”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“escribed as having been based on value judgments by the DCI."L/ The memorandum went on to say: b. c. It is obvious that a compilation of Special Group approvals in no way reflects the totality of signifi- cant CIA activities carried on over the past 15 years. With respect to over”
“in VM*wp-tunda 7 9 / 6 8 4 TOP SECRET - 2 - d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded; e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with ”
“6 SECRET 8. (the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should n”
“oval were characterized by an internal CIA memo- randum as "somewhat cloudly and thus can probably b est be described as having been based on va lue judgments by the DCI."L/ The memorandum went on to say: b. c. It is obvious that a compilation of Special Group approvals in no way”
“a#h 54 1**4* SECRET 54 1 Mr. diGenova. May I ask in this regard, it ends up • by saying, although according to CIA officials such activity has not taken place — what’s the other evidence that it has 4 which created the sentence? End 2n. b 285 Mr. Aaron. In looking at w”
“■ SECHA 8. (the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the ugo of Steto Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. Th* Dullen-Cerrea-Jrckeon report stated in 1948, "The CIA should ”
“CIA id higher salaris Ieven * EKE perhapa scause Allos one pro-.0 H tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA able t and hold YT OF . a large number od able independent-m a DB added brilliant i ctivist its staff, the n 9p038tions developed, and the greater role it pl”
“INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 19 f___ 21 jaw an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. "Cixthe n got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation. Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluate”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“SECRET SENSITIVE counterintelligence function, as a Staff function, to full parity with espionage and covert activities. One of the first undertakings of the Counterintelligence Staff was to determine who was doing counterintelligence work, what they were doing and under ”
“ly and thus can p robably be st be described as having been based on value judgments by the DCI ."L/ The memorandum went on to say: b. c. It is obvious that a c ompila tion of Special Group approvals in no way reflects the totality of signifi- cant CIA activities carried on over ”
“KI SECRET SuE SANEI2ED 1 06RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked I”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison abroad be improved through a judicious aug- mentation of exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing with the common advers”
“ply to the Committee? 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Photocopy fr om Gerald Ford Library 25 TOP SECRET GERALD S. FORD LIBRAR 2000x NW 66000 Docld:32105805 Pag e 6 1 ن COLBY, DIRECTOR, СІЛ, 2 3 4 5 6. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 AC COMPANIED BY SCOT T S . BRECKINRI”
“TOP SECRET - 2 - d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded; e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with ----namasmanansancan other”
“コトヒ ن COLBY, DIR ECT OR , СІЛ, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 1 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ACCOMPANIED BY SCO TT S. BRECKINRIDGE, JR., DEPUTY INPSECTOR GENERAL, ENNO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL Mr. Colby. I have an answer to a few of the ques”
“SANT16P vL If 16\ d. 5/11 6 SECRET CIA June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization 1 submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. On balance, CIA’s record has p”
“Committee.i Six months earlier my letter of August 141, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the . Industrial State." .It concluded with the startling premise I am now propared to prove to the Senate: "It is my firm p”
“14-00000 6 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities 1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the working group which you established in January to consult with y”
“reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete access to the administrative activities ... that are performed in support of both . . sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA." . ■. :. . Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General on July 18, 1962, . stati”
“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“Sttmtl 8. 0A % wdlothan220,0 freprempu / under military or other 'mitato 3Eficial cover)." Originally the uge of Siste Department cover for 0° Moe personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. be bullen-Correx-Jackeon report stated in 1948, "The CTA should ”
“1<'4 0/2 ‘, 25 ^ x 9/ 1 through its budget levels and manpower levels. let’s let the n agency decide how many people it takes to run a segment of its own organization. .4 Mr. Inderfurth. 7 very special segment, though. 5 Mr. Kirbow. Well special only because we have con”
“14-00000 other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation. White House Relations We are concerned about Agency relationships with the White House insofar as handling of intelligence matters i”
“SECRET 00 - 2- Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more, .limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intell”
“to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intellierce oמ- eration or an internal security case which does not have direct or in rect international ramifications. The course of events and the birhly conable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services h”
“.- ta APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CW HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 23 October 1962 00 10/255/62 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: After Action Report on the Findings of the Working Group This is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April 1962 which”
“operations. The Committee intends to approach the issues of the CIA’s domestic activities with a broad perspective, realizing, as I am sure you agree, that the' threats to United States security and the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence, as well as CIA inst”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“SECREI 9. the uighot of €9 Conerols’ revnst ia Algerl?. pe$*ezo-by noted with amnueemznt that the top floor van ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to ascora entrance that night to the CIA offices cely with difficulty.) . CLA 10 moparently d”
“14-00000 CIA Personnel Under State Cover We recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the DD/ P, after proper study, that CIA”
“interest as: the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the political section; the designation of CIA officers as 27] the CIA role in - 33 -”
“13-00000 - Mr. Allen Dulles, th Director of Central Intelligence agreed that GAO should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have- to be limited so as to remain outs”
“wuis-Evemerei ‘3720,% organizations to be checked for indications of such threats was pro vided to Anderson Security Associates, which in turn provided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization monitored. There was also coordination be”
“pea its SECRET J 6 12. enforced by director v. y State Department cha manship of working groups, ada by the infitrat partment. personnel into ielligence agency. Obviously this sct-—p would not succeed, however. aloes the State Department it self were prepared t vorc”
“espect to the security investigations in the United States. The question was as ked wh eth er we eve r used private investigators, and I said we normally used our own investigators. We have some relationships with private investigatory firms which provide cover for our investigat”
“14-00000 Her We believe the DCI’s office should also review all assign- WT ments in the middle management echelon with particular reference 7 to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training and suitability. Public Relations We recommend that the p”