“will provide some antisubmarine reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5 capability in the ocean approaches TOP SECRET TRINE Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68”
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“will provide some antisubmarine reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5 capability in the ocean approaches TOP SECRET TRINE Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68”
“13-00000 / / PAS E6E SECRET The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150 launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate. Dr. Langer aske”
“Navy. "(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period. 2 HW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 123”
“The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which.made its report on November 2. At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of ”
“price. To questions as to whether either type was in existence, NY. Scripps replied that he was bound confidences. general, however, he did not foresee any technical barriers. ..4 When asked how he could finance his proposal, Hr. Scripps said vis that he would begin with priv”
“c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints. I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions, about the rea”
“TOP SECRET I ..................... . — ......... 1 -• 5.4 178-10004-10053 10 December 1962 J MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. THE WHITE I..i)i. sir page sei 2 SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 7 December 1962 1. After concludi”
“tried to give this ORW program to the FAA. That Agency, however, would not accept the program, and, therefore it was terminated by CIA.— SECRET SENSITIVE 7 NW 50955 Doold:32105622 Page 8”
“rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high. The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.”
“the on the high seas. Floating base Northern Fleet. Some of the ships would be vulnerable in TOP SECRET TRINE Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68”
“negotiations which have been holding up active consideration of low-level photo graphy. He said that there are differences of opinion among people closest to this situation as to what the effect of resumption of such photography actually might be on the negotiations. Mr. G”
“program is.to follow. There is no future price commitment for this pro- duction program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research a nd development contracts,, the. price of the production program,- which for all practical purposes would be committed to the devel”
“hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between shots. 5. Mr. McCone reported that the OXCART vehicle would have one more flight at Mach 2.5, and then would be pushed up to its full speed and altitude. General Doolittle noted that the next, 6increase presented very se”
“Group's concern on the likelihood that developed and what Beers 20 21 should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August.! 22 Mr. Schwarz. The memorandum has quite a range of matters 23 to be considered. And they range from, if I can use the 24 characterizati”
“Director NRO and manager of OXCART project. 5. Question of use of Air Force officers versus civilians must be decided by higher authority, likewise the question of operational responsibility between that of CIA or DD/R or personnel seconded from the Air Force versus direct A”
“requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must be weighed against their possible advantages. I want to point out that in selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option”
“The Air Force Council, chaired by the. Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice .Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be ”
“covered with radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be relaxed. (2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars associated w”
“"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war. "(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with”
“hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send. a U.S. warship on this route. The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's positio”
“would show operating costs in excess of $83,000, plus an additional $60,000 for transmitting equipment on a C-54, and a cost of $250,000 if the C-54 were lost. 7c/ 210 - TOP SECRET”
“developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my inte”
“Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change. A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recommended that further w”
“been fighting during the past fifteen years. we go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for / the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters — the tax program, AID, defense,”
“as the 22nd of August 1961, after the.Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated requirements of both Services was -not technically feasible. Whil”
“continuation of Project JMATE, the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred did not set the criteria for the continuation or dis- solution of the project. This air drop was a complete (footnote continued on following page) - 112 TOP SECRET”
“Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people, unit sized groups. And no decisions had been • reached at that time. It was only that 201 - TOP SECRET”
“1 3-0000^^^^^/^^ math. r cnDET SUNE TVCQ ON1 V C.120 0:11.8 9 May 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone Dr. Scoville was present for Items 1 and 2. -J Ca”
“Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single ”
“concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact,. Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was prema”
“IRogers I covered most of the highlights dealing with previous attexpts to supply the ANTUM group with arms and ammo, and air-maritine operations currently being planned. In this connection, IMRNG-1 was highly pleased to learn that a 4,000 pound SECRET / 91BK”
“13-00000 SERRE oLON- EY 29 August 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 29 August 1963 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1’and 2. Mr. Cheever was present f”
“13-00000 conclusion that the capability can mainteined an acceptable degree of readiness ithout having ol Ishi tanks on hand. In the event utilization is desired, the Department of Defense would able provide helius as well as the launching resele and erm fnoceseary. helium”
“(DPD 3505—60). Memo for DPD/AS from D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub: Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60). - 375 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 2. EYES ONLY 3. DoD 98 ly Reconnaissance Forecast. ■ . Mr. Johnson presented a paper dated 30 December 1963 expressing the State Department’s concern regarding a'number of the missions , described in the January 1964 schedule of the Joint Reconnaissance ' ■.te”
“complex. Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command Post Was established. 128/ 138 - TOP SECRET”
“to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited? . The entire group would later be returned to a stag ing area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation. - 158 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 esmmessimneur D -2- 3. 98 I Revised January 'Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule. The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended. No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula, ■Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Eve”
“problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached. Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump. The DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small % as we had hoped for, it was being worked on. ”
“to reschedule tentatively for the middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July, in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negoti ating process might have gone int”
“BRUSSELS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS A NEW PURCHASE AND THESE PLANES WAVE NOT BEEN DELIVERED.) (FIELD COMMENT : NO OTHER DETAILS KNOWN.) 2. FIELD DISSEMI STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT FIND OF MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL Mtn ARMY/AGSI NAVY AR J65 SECBEP NSA NIC UNA ”
“restrictions to Iden K. Most of the pilots were required to remain out in the field to meet operational needs. Also only one 8-26 was available in Iden K which”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET 98 24 a whole lot of intelligence information and had come to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported that the Board of Estimates w”
“CONTINUATION OF : J & C hB T DISPATCH IRYBA? EUT-1-004, 11 January 1962 8. The eisdor uf ALMARK maintaining in the European area at least one :1el installation having 02818206 It personnel representing wodly mpetencies necessary4 U4 intelligence unierlakinga been recu.firme”
“brigade in training — I remember repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline that if we are really going to have to place this heavy reliance on a landing force, this is an all together prepos- terously inadequate number I remember being told that people did not see how it ”
“without such support. Even with respect to such operations, however, it should be remembered that tike percentage of successful night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great 1 . to justify the risk, B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against chose”
“shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960. - 93 - TOP SECRET .”
“robably produce two mig aircraft which would be brought to states by one Czech and one Cuban pilot." NW 66000. Docld:32271623 Page 5 SECRET CB90FFFF”
“c. The USSR may repeat last year’s performance of multiple fir ings from a prototype operational complex at Tyuratam. Three such launchings were attempted at five- minute intervals in May 1963; two succeeded. d. We also do not rule out the possibility of firings from ope”
“the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been determined,in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recom mended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the”