“'individual operations. 21 For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would 22 review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and " might 23 say we think that the Station has overextended itself this 24 month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the 2”
“CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S. Army; Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, repre senting COS/Army. 68/ - 90 — TOP SECRET”
“radio operators or saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, you must request 0955 DocId: 32423505 TOP SECRET 234 7 Page 94”
“been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly we11 placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number" of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, ”
“of appropriate U.S. combat olomento and/or logiotical support, the wido variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; ■ o ■ *0 SECRET 2 HY 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 31”
“or operate on the perimeters of insurgent. base area systems. 2 Insurgent combat units in avoiding prolonged ;combat may use escape routes that will subject them ideally to ambush by Hunter/Killer Teams. In this, the classic principals of "the hammer and anvil operation" wil”
“interest of collecting .. marginal intelligence. -Must -be prepared- to sacfrice - diversionary - tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective.. If tangential . things are Tolled up we then have a different op, and a new op . line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves a”
“17 %, SECRET -2- shipment had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence and again urged that more such snitments should be stepped ve in the future. Rogers then briefly discussed the SINNP.a operation and asked NAUNG-1 if he didn’t think this area for ”
“four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number' of these contacts for periods ranging up to t”
“NECESSITY MILITARY DISCIPLINE OPS MATTERS, Ph AMYUM LEADERSHIP, WHICH MORE CONCERNED FURTHERING IDEALS THAN G-6,AC HE TETUTE ONE FenChan G85 PAIR A/1, n EFFORT CAPTURE CONTROL OF ORGANIZATION For SELF 4.’% . 1.. • eerestr, .4 %.. I *l bote CHUPT" fedtdweesu-ereris SECRET *”
“Special Operational Team and the three lunter/Killer Teams by selected members of the JSOPG. -18- Pt-a--S9ernkilafnrseanwateere9:42i1tiverlirs 2.12”
“Operating () Propaganda Off,Media ( )L f de c. Support ( ) Security Officer (2 d. Training Communications officer ( )F - 6.4 Sabotage Officer (1) [Logistics Officer ( ) P- a. Plon.,Target.,Train()) Medical Officer ( ;00 b. Expiosiveespecial D Vicen Other ( 1° % PA "12 c.U”
“Orqani zation and nagemente - (See Figure 2) ecause of the importance wh ich STORICS, Inc. Lt 5 to •ropostod progrue, tie ill keep close top manage- 1 rent cognizance of this project. The responsible officer (Pr. er w11) is e Director and Vice President of SIONICS and will”
“the Special operations and ounter, idler Teams will gradually expand operations to fulfill their asic roles that of independently operating teams moving silently to interdict, ambush and destroy the enemy -23- 2.12 s”
“targets of opportunity. f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation. OCADET /1A00 I te onor a ««• •”
“the only| communication with the principal agent is by secret writing. There 1 uW is nevergenough room in an S/W message for both the positive intelligence reporting and the supporting operational details, and it is the latter | that suffer. S/W communication also inevitably”
“U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies 1 that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; OR SECRET 2 NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 46”
“ed and that it was strictly an infil1- tration procedure and not a commando type bit and run action. This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distribute”
“V. ‘CONCEPT OF Ori.RATIONS A. General Concept The purpose of this program will be to strike 8 the Communist insurgents where they are most vulnerable and to mesh the operations of selected Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams into present Royal Thai Government ongoing Co”
“-6- d. Surveillances: 9- Agent Acquisition 1. Spotting 3. Aspeasmout 3. Recruitcout 4. Training 5. Manacerent 6. Terminations f . Clandestine Communications G. Counter Intelligence b. Interrogation 1. Reporting J. Intel ligence Research and Analysis 06 8. It is re”
“choser tart Hal :or red ian! tt in 4 t. ■.• thflan : 1. vit : giz from wake 105 to 2o,cholojical eration 6 C-N41 funter/Filler operations in conjunction with xh znd bl’p units, or with MrG Mobile Training Units must include Provision for comprehensive psychological o”
“The expansion of operations where feasible. Bob Amory should be asked to designate one of his best men to centralize the intelligence collection and evaluation. The Defense Department should designate the section chief for underground and guerilla activities. MSCK0 EYES ON”
“OPERAT ION OF THESE FAC IL IT IES. . D. PROVIDING-DESIGN ENGINEERING Preus FOR AN EMERGENCY COMMUNE- CAT TONS SYSTEM, AS WELL AS THE PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION, A.N5 CHECK-OUT OF THE SYSTEMS E. FOR WISHING PRE-FABRICATED MODUL A? STR UCTURES TO BE USED AS INTERIM”
“I cfciL of 1.11 inter/killerd : 0.11 - iff ive and vift teai r-ion and with- % *....... t. 3. ceil rerations: ter/diller T’cams will operate .in tive order areas and villaer complexes in order to operate directly nitlin the population against and within ■ which _ .anist”
“14-00000 RTC PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS HUNTER KILLER COMPANY ___ 11.- SP OPNS HUNTER KILLER ICO Hn •io • SPEC OPNS , 1 Cape. Co. Cmdr. j 1 Lt: xo HUNTER KILLER I 1 1st Sgt. 1 Jr. NCO/EM-RTO J STRENGTH 50, 19 N:00 100 Jr. NCO/EM ' 124 Total " FIGURE 6 -”
“eng Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested. 5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make man”
“services activities. 2. Operational Tasks: a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.”
“guerrilla warfare, or have engaged in underground operations. (c) Individuals employed in or having access to key facilities NW 88321 Docld:32989529 Page 1975 - 44”
“)4-00000 % NCTTT MAPGENE scAr ACT DAWEE iDIN. TEDCATY 1 & EMLSFERUIG VAXM\NO. • "RASA” ! Jon SPTGLA: OPERATIONS mods ftoil LIAISON AS Rip WITH: PLANNING GROUP RT ARMY SIONICS SCAF - MliTui" ~OTHERS RT AIR FORCE fir. :1. Werbell (To be 1 (Th be As Req:! st RT ”
“cleared with. . appropriate civilian end military officials, with whom high level liaison is maintained in the field. . 4. A major criterion of OPC activities is that they not be directly attributable to the U.S. government. Hence they fall into tyo classes: a. Those conduc”
“that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE: * For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section infra; on the ’’Executive Action Capability.” NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 71”
“leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, .etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information .here to work with,, people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Al”
“Id Ue enjc n =P rohi hi te d from itste any .<4 at tracti t. whatsoever. ;_ •urili entitional palitse , (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, * dtl, 3nd "t i " personnel voted follow closely so i/ic activities en conduct with their :5nr counterparts. continuous evaluation of: to activit”
“OPERA TIONAL TASKS, OR TO LIVE AND WORK IN ACCORDANCE COVER REQUIRE- RENTS. 1 2. IF AMSTALK-1 SELECTED FOR OPERATION, REQUEST HIS 0A SECRET”
“ung Americans that are anxious to actively participate in the fight against International Communism. "First, let me state that we are an Independent and self supporting organization. Our primary mission is to provide qualified instructors for all legitimate organizations actively”
“security reviews of operational activities. g. Coordinate double agent operations. : E 2 IMPDET CL BY 055431 ’J cpordt wi. ..l”
“keeping informed about develop ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele ments of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring opera tional coordination similar to that achieved by the meeting of support elements ev”
“channels which utilize a foreign diplomatic courier. C. Approval was granted for the conduct of operation SSIKE, an exfiltration operation be implemented 21 September. C. Cn 9 September seven ANNA2E agents were terminated leaving a total of thirty in the group. a. The int”
“tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated. SOURCE: STAFF: Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960 Bob Kelley FILE: DATE: June 29, 1975”
“OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP Potential. 9, SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET* HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER SECRET”
“SECRET HARVEY EX 1 R371 DECLASSNO OBJECTION TO RELEASE Cs ON AND/OR ■ 6/25/75 AS SANITIZED ris DOCUMENT 9 Kgs JC 21 SUN % Project ZRRIFLE 1 1. Rdentification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use foreign agent assets for Division D. operations. A”
“of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal / agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for process log at a laboratory equipped for that purpose. After the film is ”
“the out standingly successful U. S, 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of he Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla o”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424016 Page 8 5 SECRET”
“13-00000 ti; % SENSITIVE 27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are approximately: (1) Headquarters, Joint 6 Off 42 EM 1 Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JUWTFA (2) UW Operating Base 36 Off 482 EM 1 (3) Support units 15 Off 331 EM 1 (4) ”
“responsibilities: (1) Chief, SID, CI Staff: Action resuensibility for penetration and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and Security Services at home and abroad (as agreed to by Chief, NH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected wi”
“SECRET HARVEY EX 1 R371 6/25/75 1 0 9 Kgs Project ZRRIFLE T Identification: The propose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use foncioa aquet assets for Division D poor operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas. nichuduig the United States, but milt por”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424017 Page 8 5 SECRET”
“officer, instructors, advisers, or consultants; and capable of developing oddigenous forces, directing operations, and personally participating in operations. The training envisioned normally would include, but not be limited to: 8. Language apittude testing and subsequent l”
“and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high- level reconnaissance of denied areas. Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means 3. Proposed "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK 98 Mr. Jorgensen ”