“DE CUBAN AND SOVIET EMBASSIES DO WHILE IN MEXICO? IDENTIFY ALL LOCAL CUBAN CONSULATE EMPLOYEES с. D. HSCA CONFUSED BY INABILITY TO LINK PHOTOGRAPHS OF PERSONS VISITING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES TO TELETAPS, HSCA HAS BEEN INFORMED THROUGH INTERVIEWS THAT THERE WERE FIVE TELETAPS ”
“sly designated by Mr. Gary Cornwell as being of interest to the HSCA. Mr. Edwin Lopez, of the HSCA - if, was also present, but did not have access to the Mexico City Station material. 2. Mr. Blakey was furnished the following sanitized portions of the Station history which he rea”
“#:NW 65990 Date: 10-29-2021 SECRET 20 August 1978 SUBJECT: Response to IISCA Request of 25 July 1978 1. A thorough review of Agency files containing production from the LILYRIC photographic surveil- lance operation in Mexico City reveals the exis- tance of no LILYRIC logs or prod”
“THE DESCRIPTION OF THE CIRCUM STANCES UNDER WHICH THE RECRUITMENT WAS MADE, THE SIMPLE STATE- MENT THAT A SOVIET OFFICIAL WAS RECRUITED IS SUFFICIENT TO SET OFF A FULL SCALE INVESTIGATION BY THE KGB INTO EVERY SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO SERVED IN MEXICO CITY DURING THAT TIME FRAME”
“13-00000 SECRET L September 12, 1995 WORKING PAPER Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995 Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting It was agreed that “STATIONS” would be the focus of the presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour. Marwell recommended”
“although not always to be trusted. One inci- ident was recently uncovered in which sulfur was capsuled and sold |as an antibiotic. Medical facilities have recently been improved by the opening of a new hospital which meets United States standards. Physicians and surgeons are ”
“13-00000 I’’ X714% .1 SELAtl 1-53 (C iS Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related OH) to the Soviet or Cuban? — saves HSCA Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists a living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J. BUILDING, PASUTHGTON, D”
“opez, of the HSCA If, was also present, but did not have access to the Mexico City Station material. 2. Mr. Blakey was furnished the following sanitized portions of the Station history which he read in my presence: a. Volume I, Chapter II (C) Station Expansion and Joint Operation”
“14-00000 .i C. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries. d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplo- matio traffic. 4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico. a. Spot, assess and recruit”
“Station’s only secure surveillance asset. It is a very anall untrained unit at present, but through this project it will be developed Into a useable, valuable asset. 4. We are not passing FI/OP's comment to the field, because WH Division believes that unilateral assets should”
“1 4-00000 ralsaan | CONFIDENTIAL | DEFERRED TELEPOUCH t/ 78 1584998 PAGE 003 1584998 TOR: 1820312 NOv 78 MEAT 47396 IN SEPTEMBER, ANOTHER OPERATION BEGAN AGAINST THE RETREAT OF THE SAME PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY MENTIONED ABOVE SINCE A MEM PROPERTY HAD BEEN ACQUIRED, AGAIN”
“13-00000 veUZs 3 1-57 was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary (EEZ OH) 7 - for the Mexican officer in charge to ask the American officer: = Archives HSCA for the telephone numbers? Mr. Scelo. The Mexicans were probably_tappingother / Sitz "SS (202”
“2 6 NA. ■ « < * m iim m N ^ ^ a 25 NCW 1 1AG CONFIDENTIAL Nevonboz 23, 4007 To: Hr. Henry Dearborn1 Doputy Chiof of Mission Mr. Wallaco W. Stuart : Counselor for Political Affairs 1. UG FromNathan L. Forrig a 7 Logal Attache Subject: INSTITUTO DE INTERCARDIO C”
“GARZA Hernandez, Lieutenant, Mexican Army, age 26. 3. The training objective of the program was to familiarize the trainees with the basic tradecraft principles and techniques involved in the conduct of clandestine activities, with primary emphasis on the work and activities”
“13-00000 ( ( 0. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries. 2% d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplo matic traffic. Ay 4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico. S. Spot, assess ”
“no alternative to the present system Mexico City in employing.1 However, .We believe that a determined effort must in Headquarters for processing and retrieval of such information. 24 MNNXt/1e reco aded that: M.79 ■ The Chief, WH Division, in collaboration with the i Chief,”
“years at the station, the primary objective of recruiting a Soviet a- national has not been achieved. Although the station’s knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities centered about the /exbesay in " + 32 Mexico City has been greatly widened, it hear led to little positive ”
“further sit uation report on his forthcoming trip co the Far East. He was ready to call off his trip if KUBARK felt that the world situation was gloomy. (See MEXI 1919, 11 September 1962). E. Security; There were no security problems for the month of September. F. Techni”
“the Soviet merstion in Mexico City and now covering a 3 many 0a thirt. lines in n given month. The project - 1a staffed by an "outs:de" cage officer (Career Agent David M. WILSTAD (p) of Project ICG), four contract a ento who Jo ad- . ministrative work, and twenty-one field a”
“nterest have become evident, both of which involve sensitive operational considerations: Mexico City •. Mexico City is considered one of the most important bases for Soviet clandestine operations against the United States. As a result Soviet and Cuban diplomatic installations hav”
“nd Luis Jimemez de ASUA) HMM-20835, 5 March 1963 (Confersation Sacha VOLMAN) - Juan Jose AREVALO and ΗΜΜΑ-21059,8 April 1963 (Judith FERRETO Segura) HMM-7160, 9 April 1963 (Whereabouts of Juan Jose AREVALO) ΗΜΜΑ-21087, 16 April 1963 (Judith FERRETO Segura) ΗΜΜΑ-21338, 10 May 1963”
“issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion arises as to the classification status of information, it could lead to complicated legal proceedings and pro”
“nterest have become evident, both of which involve sensitive operational considerations: Mexico City •. Mexico City is considered one of the most important bases for Soviet clandestine operations against the United States. As a result Soviet and Cuban diplomatic installations hav”
“HMMA-18538, 2 February 1962 (Cuban Commercial Activities) HMM-5883, 26 September 1961 (Cuban Commercial Activities) HMM-5915, 22 September 1961 (Transcontinental, S.A.) HMM-6012, 14 November 1961 (Mexican Firm Shipping U.S. Goods to Cuba) HMM-6220, 27 February 1962 (Lorenzo ”
“probably will continue to be, virtually nil. In fact, at present in this area HBFINCH % contacts are non-existent. (2) LIHUFF/1I was first picked up as a contact by Station Mexico City in 1950 after having been a contract agent for Station Panama City for some three years (w”
“(name of person un known) f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being hold open. g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tappod la the Central) 1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box) terdeaAe —”
“13-00000 221173 A w&wtsa 1-141 (e tc by) YOSH Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City’s station's operations 1 dee one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency? 3 : 6 Mr. Scelso. It was then. That is; the variety and - prober 9 E the National, Archives ”
“14-00000 SECRET 23 October 1958 MEMORANDUM FOR: CWH SUBJECT 1 Development of Physical Surveillance Assets in Mexico / REFERENCE 1 WH/FI Memorandum of 14 October 1958 1. The subject of the recruitment of a physical surveillance team in the United States for use in Mexic”
“14-00000 The Washington Post 6 December 1956 • . 1 Red Asylun Mexico • • By Roscoe Drummond Foreign Communists Find It a Safe Operating Base 1 C. MEXICO CITY—For-ign. todav. The record is perfect- sheltered safely here. They I ‘Communists continue to Sud ly clear on tha”
“that wo might find out what makes yours so especially effective by having one of my people go to your station for a few days to talk with you and your officers and get the detailed story. I could then take another look at the other operations and see what's missing or what’s”
“0100 10 7/1/63 AT +MMA - 21845, June monthly Tarasoff report Horsfall + Backlog 2. U.S. CitiZENS IN CONTACT. 3. Tarasoff CONTACT 4. Are hart + Leads of interest S. RETENtioN of SUMMARIES HmmYV -118313 8/6/6 3 91 Station Fol an Am. co lowd -ups HMMA-22005 8/23/63 ”
“VEILLANCE NOTES Unclassified 1A; 1B Redact 08/14/1995 Box 18 v9.1 NW 66000 Docld:32271927 Page 1 1 t 0213 1 SECRET Interview of Thomas Keenan by Dan Hardway and Harold heapon 3/24/780 Mr. Keenan was given. a copy of the release letter. and stated that he under- stood it Mr. Keena”
“-UAR Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person un known) f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly precessed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open. g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central) 1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)”
“rs has on occasion appeared to be developing a basis for criticizing CIA's performance in its part : of the investigation in Mexico City, under its charter to evaluate the performance of the intelligence agencies. At one time, and possibly ز کرد still, they appeared to be attempt”
“13-00000 8 ECR ET vE-e. Exclude routine travel information and CI/CE information from TDCS and reports, and. d. Use the cable channel only for reports that are perishable or are of special intelligence interest. Organisation for Administration 56. As in his direction of ”
“14-00000 RET No.: HMM-1464 pages: 8 Number of enclosures: none Report m Arthur S. Approved by: Pe Distribution: copy to: S - Headquarters to: 2 - Files we cryptonym: Ce. OD dat comments: . Soviet f Forwarded herewith is the first in-a proposed series of monthly re”
“14-00000 6 June 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THS RECORD SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING Or DAVID M. WILSTED (ps) 1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Heyn and Mr. Jolin Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (p”
“14-00000 1 tezPatw 9V8D CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH SECRET HINA-19729 Category station files receive the clips pertaining to Soviet commercial. activities, propaganda activities, Soviet contacts, etc. Very often, a single clipping may have to be copied to be sent to the fi”
“Through its technical coverage of the Soviet Embassy, 24 the station has been able to spot and, through subsequent action, to thwart a number of such Americans, several or whom might have done untold damage to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. 20 In this respect, ”
“Lazaro Cardeaas del Rio 2. Sam Brooks 3. Gral. Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio 4. Lic. Alonso Agullar Monteverde 3. CTAL 6. ing. Jorge L. Tamayo - 7. Russian Embassy : 8. Leopoldo Areaal Bastar 9. David Alfaro Siqueiros 10. . Problems Agricolas y Industrtales 11. Vicente Lombar”
“th ist intimate knowledge. We further recommended that maximum discrimination be used 1h determin ing material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the e filing be reduced. We further recomi be reduced. ded that . overtir made voluntarily when”
“COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Phillips, page 6 relationship would have been at least partially responsible for reporting such a visit to Headquarters. Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case, it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any action other ”
“dLenfthiu 0 -3- position, it should be possible to obtain, information on the Ministry of Education and other aspects of the Mexican ”education system which, according to the last word received ‘from Headquarters, is somewhat of a priority requirement. d. RMD. This project ”
“and operational action on their - own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did n”
“13-00000 ECRET mmber one priority of Soviet operations here elsewhere in the world. 21. The station 1a seeking to supplement its collection through technical means with a program to acquire at least one access agent for each member of the Soviet Embassy staff. These n ac”
“13-00000 SECRET now working in Mexico City, had recruited three sub-agents before leaving Cuba but his channel of communications with them has been severed. Another station agent is in a good position Cuba to obtain intelligence from foreign telephone communications. The ”
“REFTTM OF RSN MEAT TO - ACAY WS. T HFOAL . 1. .Erofict of the Project. - - - -g*-2. - 77 AC: —The Soviet Embassy as Soviet tomrorcial Activities Reports milmitted during the past year have conveyed-ali substantial amount of detail concerning Soviet economic and co orcial”
“justification for its views, cit ing the fact that the above-mentioned FBI walk-in was not shielded when led into the back garden which LICALLA overlooks. We have no evidence that Soviet interest is any threat to the operation; rather it may be assumed that they accept the s”
“RECENT MONTHS. IN APRIL 1978, THE STATION UNDERTOOK Al AUDIO OPERATION DIRECTED AT THE OFFICIAL OUT-OF-TOWN RETREAT OF A PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY IN MEXICO. SUBJECT PARTICIPATED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF A CARETAKER ■ WHO PROVIDED ACCESS TO THE TARGET INSTALLATION AND WAS SUBSEGUENTL”
“Executive Vice- tion to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic mission! President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIENVOY also coven City, Al Wichtrich,f channels political information to the station special ca”