“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER/Cryptonym 11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- bona fides — is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym -11. -(S) In sum, question 4 — bona fides — is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptony”
“13-00000 Office of OIM. mation Manages SECRET CIA TALKING POINTS re Protection of “IJDECANTER” Cryptonym Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) 26 August 1998 • The ADDO Jim Pavitt has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance t”
“13-00000 Office of ‘O • ’mation Manager SECRET CIA TALKING POINTS re Protection off”IJDECANTER" Cryptonym Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) 26 August 1998 • The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt — has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importa”
“13-00000 SECRET Of course, information on the publ “record via the media. - *—- There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of (IJDECANTER.) '• Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding co”
“13-00000 SECRET OIM-98-0084 06 August 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland Chief, Information Review Group Central Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym 1. (S) The ”
“13-00000 a SECRET VFK T3 OIM-98-0084 06 August 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland Chief, Information Review Group Central Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym 1”
“substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in ”
“13-00000 SECRET if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., ”a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; spe”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER/Cryptonym 13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release. 65 88 5 SECRET”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym OIM/IRG/LSS: blo/31287 (6 August 1998) Distribution: Orig - Adse 1 - EXDIR 1 - ER 1 - D/OCA 1 - D/OPA 1 - Principal Deputy General Counsel 1 - D/OIM 1 - DA/IRO . 1 - DCI/IRO 1 - DO/IRO 1 - DI/IRO 1 - D”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by , stating that this CIA assessment is supported by ”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging sat”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym isatellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging sa”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by re”
“13-00000 RE TURN TO CIA Back:- : Use Only SECRET Do Not Reproduce if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., “a‘ valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the”
“13-00000 4 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym 13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release. Lee S. Strickl”
“-—— • Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a member of the British Service. As such, he was [is] a liaison source. This raises concerns about protection of our liaison relationships. Moreover, Mr. Devere’s identity constitutes “foreign government information” whic”
“iIJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, "THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised. I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage woul”
“13-00000 SECRET of course, information on the public record via the media. There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of)IJDECANTER/ Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence ”
“13-00000 * SECRET TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service... - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors. • The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; th”
“13-00000 st SECRET TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. %.• This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; t”
“our capability 3 to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian ''service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not iknow this for certain.-------------- --- And third, there is an equitable issue.i The CIA has ___ never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a de”
“Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a member of the British Service. As such, he was [is] a liaison source._ This raises concerns about protection of our; liaison) relationships. Moreover, Mr.severe's)identity constitutes “foreign government information” which, as ”
“constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; ”
“13-00000 SECRET If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold. In the matter at hand,”
“with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know—this—for—certain. • And third, there is an equitable issue _ i-The CIA ha S..__ never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a de”
“and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised._ — I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure — the disclosu”
“13-0000'0 SECRET SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources been officially released and that are closely held within the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of his family even though they live in the United States, CIA cannot, at this time, agree to the offic”
“hand, we are very constrained by !what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own 1 ! knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially I released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The 1 Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defec”
“13-00000 SECRET 3. Phillipe Thyyraud De Vosjoli: Former head of the French Service in Washington (1951-63), De Vosjoli retired and became a CIA/FBI asset. As a USG asset, he had contact with German and Canadian Intelligence Services in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. He b”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT : (U) Identity of Human Sources been officially released and that are closely held within the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of his family even though they live in the United States. CIA cannot, at this time, agree to the offi”
“this particular document. • But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired i”
“13-00000 SECRET dvio-serele • If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree. • This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold. % 5 *”
“judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions. 5 SECRET”
“In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after——Y Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of A reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions. 5 SECRET”
“13-00000 SECRET The practice of counterintelligence (CI) and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four % basic questions: • what information was compromised? what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information? what understanding ”
“13-00000 SECRET • The practice of counterintelligence (CI) — and hence the issue of damage to national security — proceeds from four basic questions: • what information was compromised? • what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information? what understandi”