Results for INFORMATION REPORT: POLICY GUIDANCE DIRECTIVES FOR CUBAN INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES IN HAITI

“produced some political intelligence responsive to our requirements. 12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting has covered general political developments. 13. A librarian and teacher who is a ”

“13-00000 (2) Consider, at time whan the criticality of the situation diggaten, I instituting the cinrentine or Cuba giving an reaBon idence of expors of egonte and material of subversion brough Cuba,” b. Intensify Puychological Actions, '(2) Create prontens for the Cantr”

“carry out the following activities: (1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services as required (OPS/WH). (2) Prepare organizati nal studies and blacklists Cuban Intelli- gence and Security Servicesporsonrel, and black lists of person s. aiding or ab”

“13-00000 % -7- b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD. 0. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba. VI. COORDINATION The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of th”

“14-00000 % ‘ 10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarilyat continued intelligence collection and nt the re”

“13-00000 SERRE -7- three categories of sensitivity for usa by the Agency, by designated members the United States intelligence community. and by authorised components the Cuban Government-in-Exile. (OPS/W) (3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/WH) (4) Pr”

“put you in contact with about two individuals for the purpose of starting you on your assignment. It is anticipated that other leads and contacts will result from - these introductions, both in Havana and the Interior. ■ 7. When talking to any local contacts you make while in”

“13-00000 ( 1 10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the”

“and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison servides]who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint , dis”

“identification documents. - ' b. Documentation of A ents in Cuba: AMRCNG-1 suggested using an identificati n card issued by the Havana University for their students. He had a sample copy in his possession, which he claims was readily accepted by Castro security forces as bein”

“is recommended. 3. Cuban Brigade Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 26”

“DO* CFPRF CLONE SENSITIVE, woe as X. or. 2. % Assist State in 5**6se-9.0% ts, leaders. political groups. 3. Prevido covert 0.9 •” seeh other Cuban political PTorriate * ale •AC at 0 of the Osban nine 2 itting the A C. soncmict 1. Participate In inter-agency e”

“in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations. There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeast”

“* 10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and nt the recruitment for ”

“13-00000 ) and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations; We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas ”

“sal for approval. INTELLIGENCE 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA) To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is ade- quate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. ”

“4-00000 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running RS controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba ”

“drawn up for Ernie Sparks use.) (4) Deputy Chief, CI/ICG: Responsibility for compiling records end studies Cuban Communist ‘arty. To this end, question- naires have been prepared for Agency officers assigned the task of interrogating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Cormunis”

“13-00000 Following are examples of the types of activities which could be undertaken. This is not an exhaustive list, but is presented to illustrate the types of activity which might be considered. , : ; &. Intelligence and Counterintelligence (1) Interrogation of refugees.”

“.1 % f 8. We are providing you with a letter from & cover company (attached hereto) which you will use only in the case of extreme emergency in the event that you cone to the attention of the Cuban- authorities. This letter states that you are there on a vacation. and that”

“recommended. 3, Cuban Brigade Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 94.”

“13-000001fears Crwsm ^i::; att -2- 98 /could be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico; support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range -objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable . of gathering intelligence and ”

“more senior agents; to serve as a consuicana and advisor on ouban affairs for stations or bases which did uoc possess ca office: Imswledgeable regarding Cuban operations; to aid suea- Stations in conducting operations, to confer with and, where desired by the Local Station, to ad”

“13-00000 F"ot 1ess and nasclutions : .AMOT-EOBL2ERelationship. The Agency must recoguire the 8. poss (t!I1ty of straimad Eeel1s the invasion. It La liaved because of the failure 08 re Prose «Ive Ageney 12 Lani will be able. beeause € 1 als excellent eracnal relationsh”

“13-00000 ) 1 4 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six)Cuban vessels we are 24 now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running (12) Cuban diplomats station”

“A. Communications Intelligence: We will continue 4 our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communten- tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be poss”

“13-00000 ( I E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any 8 significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stres”

“n. Communications Intelligence: To will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA - station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communion- tions. As the current situation "norma 1izes" it sheu to be p”

“- t E. Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cub”

“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”

“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”

“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”

“13-00000 8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communica­ tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it shoul”

“CLASSIFIED :MESSAGE *.4 * ROUTING TOP SECRET 1 4 2 5 ATE: 3 6 53 207 IC 402 st DIRECTOR DEFERRED' ■ CONF, ROUTINE INFO i - PAGE TWO OUT 60694 TO TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443 IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE”

“LEASING FACERS SUMATE 1 104-10228-10085 CONTINUATION OF LI DISPATCH UP AND MAARI HLSH-3354 210W 1001 4. As you are probably avare, infiltration of bodies and materiel into Cuba has become increasingly difficult and there is every indication that tightening of internal control was”

“shipping businesses. So too, with diplomacy. Every foreign diplomat now accredited to the Regime in Havana has been examined by the Agency as a prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplo­ mats were approached. Of this number about one half took our bait and have accepted”

“0 3 CONFIDENTIAL purpose of substantially reducing the tune required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be author- ized only by specifically designated commanders. — . "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean" CO”

“and the other American States aware of the threat. The following should be utilized to accomplish this: . * (1) Intelli ere briefings of: : 1- 9 (a) U. S. Sovernment officials, % (b) Newspaper representatives and editors.o (c) U.S. businessmen operating abroad and going a”

“SECRET CNSINL -2- on Coban'-Bloc relationships. *MLS .- : Covertly support the above-cited V. 8. national objectives with respect to Cuba. III. XANED mmussoe/ewntereeli--"--fef * 1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of. Juha - . with particular emphasis on the foll”

“increased coverage of entin Castro groups, activities at the airport and no entreee into the diplomatic concuni ty. C. Four agents were recruited and two agents were termi- noted during the period. d. In ecoporation with the German desk, we have initiated so operation to de”

“4-00000 and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Linison/ Operations: We will continue to press the linison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for ”

“13-00000 Co te‘ - 5 - (2) Deputy Chief, ICD, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration of Cuban Communist Party via third countries. using Cubans as agents (as agreed by Chief, Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/L/CI and”

“particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad; At the present time we are running Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled”

“13-00000 II 1 DEUAC] -6- (5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad. 2 B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE 1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile. 2.”

“tation operational prog 12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are 88 satisfactory as ENGS be De 24T pected in view of the target. Given Mexico City’s strategic loca- Ope tion astride the only direct air link to Cuba, mor”

“13-00000 (a) Translation into Spanish and printing ■50,000 set series en mmphlets entitled, "Democracy versus Commmism". (b) Development of audio visual film strip baned he "Dencerncy versus Communism" amphlets for % illiterate Latin American enlisted men. dha-bu tred rig”

“s, and the Children's Institute, as well as the Special Con-1 sultative Committee on Security. 2. 12 Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban wor”

“13-00000 oront uNorIVL - 79 - controlled on-island CA asset. We provided financial and other support for on-island operations. / Comment: if brought to the attention of the GOC, such activities might have prompted the GOC to consider retaliatory action against the U.S. G”