“STANDARD FORM NO.6 Office Memorandum Entan E. • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO t DATE: June 10, 1953 P/ FROM: v.V. Keug. Tolson. Ladd — __ Nichols Belmont. C V SUBJECT: 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-- INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON AB Cless --- Glavin---”
“Office Memo andum graupinS Font ID 64 204 • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Wo TO FROM SUBJECT: I * A. W. CIA 0 50 JAMES ANGLETON 0 KM OLUK 8 10/6/08 CA. #8871826 1 : DATE:April 30, INFORMATHON ALL 1Classified by SP484V/KEA HEREIN is O CLASSIFIED EXCEPT WH”
“IB MW -Phone (Area 202) Md TOP SECRET 1 TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON © 2 . ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTTY MILER 3 Mr. Johnson. I wonder if we could begin by having both 4 of your gentlemen give us some information on your backgrounds, 5 beginning with Mr. Angleton. 6 Mr. Angle”
“FT TAOTT el Sri& Re: Central Intelligence Agency Memo to Mr , Belmont LOT Information Received from James Angleton ■ Intelligence division. Angleton handles special cases of various nature and he is usually given considerable freedom and leeway in directing the operation”
“which sets forth instructions concerning the handling of information transmitted to the Bureau by Angleton, 7-26-98 CIA HA.3 wen DFGL/5,0 *OP C ASCEER PY LLP AobrY 0 2. SID /KSR 5668 HER H‘LLA_2 M8 A Nrene IN THIS DOC: MIENT EXCEPT LEE 7-8-98 It is recommended that a ”
“* Memo to Mr. Belmont Re: Central Intelligence Agency, Information Received from James Angleton the Bureau,_ particularly receives from the Israeli with regard to that information which he Intelligence Service. Angleton is now furnishing the Liaison Agent blank memora”
“future mail being directed to him be transmitted to % the Director = of CIA, "Attention: James Angleton, er Angleton stated that the above request was being made with the approval of Allen Director Dulles, the Director of CIA. He further indicated that he desired ,the abo”
“14-00000 • SEP.28. 1998 3:39PM , A NO.279 SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN P.22 I This would suggest that Angleton may have lacked the opportunity that others had had to observe the kinds of behavior Soviet defectors have displayed in sorting out who the important players are in ”
“SECRET/SCOPE)(s) Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: Senstudy 75 DETAILS : According to referenced memorandum, James Angleton, former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations, CIA, advised the FBI on 6/26/75 that he had recently testified under oath without counsel before t”
“several months Angleton has been very cooperative with the Bureau, He has volunteered voluminous infor mation of interest to the Bureau and he has followed Bureau leads in an effective manner. Much of the information which Angleton has furnished appears in the raw form, that”
“OP SECRET sedre ‘ ,2 . to n 98‘ Phone (Area 2021 $44-6000 e you were employed with the Agency, Mr. Angleton? I believe that might be a fair question. Senator Tower. In your capacity as Head of Counter- , 5 6 -intelligence, dlaRst ever come to your aEtention — did you”
“is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated. 3. As a result of a developing relationship with P”
“13-00000 10/8/1996 America Online: Dick Kovar Page 1 branch responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the CIA chief of clandestine services and later the agency’s director, placed Scelso in charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, ”
“OP SECRET: -4. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 it would be helpful to have a few background first.” 2 Senator Baker. If I may say so, so that Mr. Angleton 3 1 not be taken by surprise, there are one or two things that 4 I would like to discuss. The nature of that material woul”
“Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 in order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we've O. got to take this fellow to court now? to Mr. Angleton. That used be prevalent back in the ‘50s. To Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don't to to ”
“As a result of a developing relationship with IDEN-122 theIDEN-123representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by IDEN-124 , James Angleton, with the approval of Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the IDEN-95 i”
““wrweais ‘e TOP SECRET F33 ■19; 2 Phone (A rea 2021 $44-6000 PROCEEDINGS - e c o ie s © W Senator Hart of Colorado. Gentlemen, let's go ahead and 0I be sworn and get under way if you don't mind. Do you swear the testimony you're about to give will be ON the ”
“expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this! coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by Litry that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he ”
“Office Mem STANDARD FORM MS. 64 TO 2 MR . •ELMONT dum UNITED ECRET / DATE: GOVERNMENT March 9, 1954 N07 Tolson --------- Ladd--------- Nichols L Belmont —— • Clegg ------ Glavin_____ Harbo --------- FROM 2 V. P. 5 10/3/39 SPYELN/KFA Cast Rosen -------- T”
“So you developed some kind of a relation- 22/ ship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connected 23 with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of Israeli back in the 1940's? 25 Mr. Angleton. That is right. TOP SECRET NW 50955 Docla:32423393 Page 12 ”
“Phillips, page 17. OURMITTEE SENSITIVE Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the FBI would manipulate their files on employees of the CIA at the Agency's behest. He also said that he would not be surprised if other categories of files could be manipulated, including internal CIA f”
“■ BY e TOP SECRET • 22 ta t woetie Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 1 asset inhibit you in any way from using the asset or the Agency © 2 from utilizing it? 3 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the infor- 4 mation that we wanted to take up with him was also”
“And they were very much involved. X 4 1 0 F irst S tre e t, S .E ., W ashington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Schwarz. Just one more background question and /X then we will turn to the principle subject. CM ^Following through on the subject of Israel your To departure in 1974, is th”
“Phone (Area 202) 5.44 I left there — and I think this is a very important point - to first, I will have to explain we went to the restaurant, he Cl invited us to the restaurant, he was Insistent on it. And we went there. And here in the restaurant the entire discussion ”
“Counterintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence advised the FBI on 3/26/75 that he appeared beforen Agency (CIA), - the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and in response to questions— advised SSC he only had secondhand and fragmentary information • concerning (Israeli capab”
“him. 20 Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA? 21 Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no. 22 Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did? 23 : Mr. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did. 24 Senator Mathias. We will follow that up. 25 TOP SECRET NW ”
“S tre e t, S .E ., W a sh in g to n , D .C . 20003 Can you break it out that way? 19 20 Mr. Angleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but the primary thing of all is the question of penetration in the 21 U.S. Government, and then in allied governments. That would be ”
“which were T IN AND/OR, CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO . not reported through normal CIA channels. CIA Directors 0 permitted Angleton to run several intelligence projects, many of them with the Israeli Intelligence Service. He was CD given authority by CIA to handle these projects”
“Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then 20 he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it. 2) Mr. Schwarz. And what was his connection with Oswald? 22 Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department 23 13, and was head f Department 13 at ”
“NNA $ : Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 OF SECRET 35 Mr. Angleton, I have heard that, but I haven’tlooked at the dossier for the last ten years. He came to our attention 5 basically in connection with the leaks in the Bay of Pigs. 4 Senator Tower. Will you go back to the Szulc-”
“ately the Seymour Hirsh article o f D ecember 22nd came to our attention before it was actual ly pub lished, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two bas ic decisions. I w as g oi ng to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put”
“000/12% -17127 7485 Senator Baker. Did he have a prominent responsibility? 2) .2 Mr. Angleton. He was man that had very difficult 5 case abroad, which meant that it had to be buried, no leakages. ■ 4 And I used him twice, and one was a pretty lengthy use of him. 5 And h”
“Senator Baker. What did you regard him as? 22 Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who ! esepelly-Rorgapnitwbimg 23 was sent to mutilated the leads, of very high grade Soviets 24 whom we had acquired prior to that. 25 Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating”
“e Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that ca se w er e th at I h ad had so me pro fes sio nal differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it requir”
“program. Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman , a nd the facts of that case were that I had had some professional di ffe rences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterint el ligence business was run and th”
“1 / OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION 0 5010—106 AB Bemont U Tolson, GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum CECDET JLURG 1 DeLoach Casper _ Callahan Conrad - 4 Felt ----- TO Mr. W. C. Sullivan are7-24-98 DATE- 3/17/65 AA I C. ty. ”
“C3 co It is suggested that it would materially assist in the 4 handling of information received from Angle ton in the future, if' So 2 the Liaison Section could work out a procedure whereby Angleton might be referred to as a Bureau informant. This would permit the Supervi”
“relimatters, t has been the practice of Israel i//S) supervisors to clear with Angleton before disseminating information from him, outside- the Bureau.6) * 70 D In taking u p such a matter with Angleton 1 last week it 4 2 was determined that he objected to attributing info”
“entitled to one free shave.9% 20 And he says, I know your successor. And I don’t think he 21 actually mentioned the name. But in this article which has just 22 comebout he mentions him with his biographical sketch. 23 Senator Baker. Who was your successor? 24 Mr. Anglet”
“P Da 7 STOP SECRET Co 21 ■ Phone(Area202)544-6000 1 FBI has had no contact since 1965? 2 Mr. Angleton. That’s correct. 3 Mr. diGenova. Has the Agency had any contact with him 4 since 1965? 5 Mr. Angleton. Yes, we've had it, but we've had our 6 ups and downs. 4”
“on the CI to Staff that you wanted to tell the Director of the CIA Staff W D yourself? « NO Mr. Osborn, I very probably would have. I had very close W relationships with Jim Angleton professionally. M m HW 50955 DocId 32281990 Page 17 TAD CECDET”
“Js TOP SECRET 43 0009-rt (zoz rerv) suoud 1 By the same token, it induced people to bring their cases in 2 to us for analysis. They came to see us many times to see 3 the defectors, the stable of defectors that we had for 4 interrogation. 5 So that alone was a tre”
“Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 13 DO met him, I only saw him on the TV a few months ago, he looks like a broken man, he did that day anyway. But he was a very mysterious, very MR. OLSEN: To use the house term, he was a spook? MR. MARCHETTI: Yes. He was a very exo”
“- Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 SECRET 23 1 General Mr. Kennedy, he had a direct meeting with him. © 2 Mr. diGenova. And what, if anything, happened? 3 Mr. Angleton. Ohly encouragement. 4 Mr. diGenova. Could you amplify on that? 5 Mr. Angleton. Well, the Attorney General”
“TOP SECRET WksI 9’ c um rn tzoz OMV) suoue 1 Mr. Angleton. Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion © 2 between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others. 3 the Attorney General. 4 Mr. Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is this a typical 5 procedure for a”
“loose if th ey sta yed af ter th at point. Then unfort unately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move th e I sra”
“efore it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I w as g oi ng t o m ake two basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I”
“point. Then unfortun ate ly t he S eymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 2 1 22 1 23 24 25 Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library TOP SECRET to our attention before it was actually publis he d, a nd s o I br ought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to m”
“and no o position with the Agency, did you ver express your concern to to anyone out there that you thought this might have been o n N1 ) D setup by a foreign source, or from internally? to “"Io.”“ Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup? ora Mr. Kirbow. That this who”
“uncommon. The HTLINGUAL search further identified files because they had been the subject of Freedom of Information Act queries; however, these were not HTLINGUAL files per se, but files which contained the FOIA requester queries for HTLINGUAL information. (U) ARRB staff me”