“13-00000 dgeyt 7 4, -Operation DEFECTOR; uUt a. Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to defect with equipment. b. Concept; This activity when properly planned and implemented has the effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian”
“CONFIDENTIAL SAOGC/LtColHaig/1c/59856/18Dec63 December 18, 1963 OSA 353 CUBA MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DDR&E Office of the Secretary of Defense SUBJECT: Anti-Sabotage Operations in Latin America The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban 12-18-63 Affairs (”
“simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the Cuban land mass. 6. Thia operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and expense.: ISPS Special Handling of this paper is r”
“ed, and we feel now would be an opportune time to try the plan, if it can be made to appear logical. NW 66000 Docld:32312809 Page 3 SECRET SECRET DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C. PM Mr. Tolson Mr. Felt Mr. Sullivan Mr. YO Mr. Bisho”
“E AGENCIES AND FIELD CATICES ADVISED BY ROUTING TING SLIP($) OF DATE JUL 22 1977 Classification 1977 Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division, John Edgar Hoover, Director 3/11/98 4/1/98 CLASSIFIED BY 5668.520/11 5668-50/ Subject: PROPOSED INDUCED OPERATION (U) DECLASSIFY CN”
“• SECRET SENSITIVE Draftisew 23 Nov. 1962 OPERATIONAL PLAN - CURA * ANAT he" .A. The purpose of this plan is to cutlies the action to We undertaken by theCentral Intelligence Agency against the Ometro/ Commmist government of Cuba during FX-63 and for such longer " period ”
“in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations. There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeast”
“Lie Communist regime through broadcasts (st witch would appearTO COTTO from local dissident groups activelyplanning to harass the regime. 1300 2). Task 10, CLA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castros failure to the uban population via balloon with a view of p increas”
“TD SECRET SENSITIVE .3. Maintain refugee debriefing programs. D. Wexmmike Wliralin Nalso services SF dove zrodrers- 3. Peyeholoxical Warfare (CA)UN The program must primarily concentrate on and ***** reach the Cuban population. The following psychologize) wer fere activities”
“0 3 CONFIDENTIAL purpose of substantially reducing the tune required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be author- ized only by specifically designated commanders. — . "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean" CO”
“13-00000 Attrit Cuban resources (a) Purchase the defection aircraft. Sofcheh Conduct non-astribmutable actions 30* petroleum solcurons, upon which must bin’s economy depends. iese actions should extend all the 1 from dircat destruction to sabotage Cocarsters said storag”
“. Gale Mr. Ponder Mr. Rosen Mr. Tavel Mr. Walters Mr. Soyars Tele. Room Miss Holmes Miss Gandy PROC. 2. (S) The essence of our letter was to suggest for your considera- tion and analysis an operation targ operation targeting the Cuban Intelligence Service S (CubIS). The basic sce”
“Reproduce SECRET NO CCT 12 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WE Division SUBJECT : Political Organiser for Cuba 1. Following cur conversation of a fow days ago I asked Horace N. Davis to look into the matter of sanding a political organiser to Cuba to do a first-hand study on the scene. Kr.”
“ft 14 SECRET 3 Jamary 1962 - MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WH Division SUBJECT t Operations Proposed by Station Mexico City to . Influence Mexico to Prefix Relations with Cuba. - 1. In addition to the proposal advanced by Ambasea dor Mann to pace certain telephone tap t”
“CLASSIFIED :MESSAGE *.4 * ROUTING TOP SECRET 1 4 2 5 ATE: 3 6 53 207 IC 402 st DIRECTOR DEFERRED' ■ CONF, ROUTINE INFO i - PAGE TWO OUT 60694 TO TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443 IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE”
“y consider the Air Force proposal and lend our support to the operation wherever feasible. NOTE: (火) Classified_"Secret, Group 1" since this involves very sensitive operation Cagainst an enemy diplomatic establishment, CSJ unauthorized disclosure of which could seriously affect n”
“rsion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424012 Page 5 SECRET situation in the recipient country and included appropriate suggestions as to strategy which might be used in securing implementation of the desired actions. f. Requested posts in”
“- 4 - r failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, bu”
“rsion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32401396 Page 4 SECRET situation in the recipient country and included appropriate suggestions as to strategy which might be used in securing implementation of the desired actions. f. Requested posts in”
“raids at. night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.’"" 6. Use of MIG type aircraft US pi”
“13-00000 ) 1 4 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six)Cuban vessels we are 24 now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running (12) Cuban diplomats station”
“tation operational prog 12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are 88 satisfactory as ENGS be De 24T pected in view of the target. Given Mexico City’s strategic loca- Ope tion astride the only direct air link to Cuba, mor”
“13-00000 SECRET M^? RAKam 9093 52*7 POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT -CUBA- 1. Operation SMASHER: 49 a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and commercial communications facilities in Cuba., b. Concept: This to be accomplished by t”
“the h De 11 • SECRET - 4 - We regeDuctDrover 0 opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations^ for further actions based upo”
“of this dialogue -- to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split — was fully de tailed in my last memorandum to you. This is an effort to fine an operational :technique. Richard N. Goodwin SECRET-- NWsiless”
“1 - Incident 21 GuantanamoOCCURICU 26 May when a light Cuban aircrait lancer there. Three Cubans had forced the pilot. .t pistol point, to land them at our Naval Ease, kith State’s con- currence. Defense acted: the Cuban pilot flew home, the 3 Cuban escapees stayed on the”
“particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad; At the present time we are running Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled”
“change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies. 2. A series of- well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine . appearance of being done hostile Cuban forces. a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (no”
“TOP SECRET SENSITIVE H. TV intrusion- Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts. has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and parade demonstrations.‘ ”
“13-00000 ( I E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any 8 significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stres”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET Second, with respect to assisting the Latin American nations to resist the impact Coommnint subversion, there is a summary of our current programs and a listing of specific additional things which we can do; in other words. treatment the subversive ques”
“raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach. 6. Use of NIG type aircraft by US pil”
“interested in the number of agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning the program until the subject of economic denial was intro duced. He asked to be told what additional measures could be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the Expl 11"' ”
“product unobtainable) to the Cubans has been successful. — 24 In general, the West European) services have been cooperative in assisting us to mount operations against Cuba and against installations in their own territory.lo Latin American services, have been most helpful in”
“higher authority should be obtained on what is desired generally in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba. . 2. ■ Cuba - Proposed Clandestine Intelligence Operations. - The Department of the Army requested approval for two operations: (a) the establishment of a clandesti”
“- 3 - 6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures t”
“major CIA project. Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Decep tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this. Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popu”
“the agents would certainly talk if captured. Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he re commending them, and further”
“4-00000 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running RS controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba ”
“and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison servides]who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint , dis”
“- t E. Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cub”
“- 3 - f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected. g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to 4 be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would no”
“00000 V.002 VL J183 I (2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October. 3. Commando Plan Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (k, Engliab) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARE LA Castro, an of”
“refugee pilots are personally acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the Castro intelligen”
“President on 22 October 1962. The degree of this effort is remarkable and runs all the way from full cooperation to an outstanding exertion of personal commitment, resourcefulness, and imagination to find ways to help our effort. we To cite only a few of the current|FI operat”
“o' 5S pa %., v-07, DMVIt J. eosenems****=0*0 -6 1 a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence; c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a ”
“S-E-C-R-E-T ■ - EYES ONLY - 17. Section D, p.3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus. have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by l February. 18. Section”
“13-00000 668 SECRET TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban 1 ^ *9 *9 1 1 9 2 Government (FCG), the develo”
“DO* CFPRF CLONE SENSITIVE, woe as X. or. 2. % Assist State in 5**6se-9.0% ts, leaders. political groups. 3. Prevido covert 0.9 •” seeh other Cuban political PTorriate * ale •AC at 0 of the Osban nine 2 itting the A C. soncmict 1. Participate In inter-agency e”
“information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. s. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime. a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats. b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in”