“document which Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered points including the following: 47 "1. The USG should not lend itself to direct political assassination. "2. US moral posture can ill afford further 4* tarnishing in the eyes of the world. VC Ach”
“man, as well as' whatever additional, per sonnel we need. I think this is the.best way to handle it. However, it will be necessary to use I the CIA apparatus and agents for this.' That is why it will be valuable to assign a CIA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happ”
“5.9 EV $092ne TOP SECRET sr * Lesr .(.I - le .M 23 LAvensen $66-$00 1 from rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, and 2 the second one was to say in the final version, "However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political 4 assassinations”
“your staff, 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 19 about what was really in train, I would have had a very different approach. Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman. 22 The Chairman. Senator Mondale. 231 Senator Mondale. Yesterday Secretary Rusk testified be- © 2”
“the second draft was a one-page document which Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered this points including the following: "1. The USG should not lend itself to direct. 5 on 5pm 1 political assassination. "2. US moral posture can ill afford further ta”
“13-00000 TRAIT Notsi by 00 / Tre / 1,- trim ooly Yco IY 18 January 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964 at the White House 1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President ”
“19 encouraged to undertake such an explanation. 20 Mr. Schwarz. And .did you encourage him? 21 Mr. Bundy. The exact form of our message to him, or our 22 if you want to call it, the instruction to him, the President's! 23 decision, I can no longer recollect, but my impres”
“the position that we are overly exercised, that I was inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing befo”
“59 gee-ie-Sele.-aerate4 e n TOP SECRET Phone (Area 202) 544-60005:% w € will. “heeieals MTo NHA 114 17 1 because then it would be a year. 2 Mr. Schwarz. The problem is the Ervin Committee was found 3 not to have jurisdiction to issue the subpoena. 4 The Chairman. Well,”
“TOP SECRET 6000 objection i have aeskieecotatonanethxcFintona to mave co-l, Phone (Area 202) thePress which will’simp1y re-emphasize to them what I thinR Iosieerciingnenitencee, -20 :!4 209 the trole of President Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy Skew ---------bee”
“amt TOP XECRET 27 Phone (A rea 202) 544-6000 1 smiled and said, well I was testing you. I agree with you 2 completely. o And then he went on for a few minutes to make the point how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United States 4 5 for moral reasons shoul”
“was quickly shot down. Nevertheless, the CIA was in fact embarked upon such 2’attempts during the period under review. 221 Now, we are led to conclude either that we are not being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administratic pr which is very hard for me to ”
“ng the period of September 28 to October 3, 1963. "I assume and would like to be so advised : if the contrary is the fcat-i that your January 31, 1964, report is not final inasmuch as I recall an investigation is currently being pursued with respect to an allegation of some signi”
“e representatives of the White House and the State Department of the aforementioned matter, especial ly in view of information furnished by the Committee in dicating t hat S ec retary of S tate Henry Kissinger would be testifying in executive session before the House Select Commi”
“President said that when the crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on nuclear-free zone s was eliminated.- 5. I then stated that the President should know that there was on record a letter from”
“* level wants something done, it is very difficult for him t judge whether the President par St has bean in contact ith the Agency or that he has donr. this through his National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, r who-ver. There could be ■J.O way that. I could j”
“Bundy that Memorandums of Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically. Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to me. The President agreed. NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline. Bundy will apparently disc”
“14-00000 July 8,1952 Note: Nelson please deliver this to Allen. To: Allen Dulles You recently asked me for our views on Yugoslavia. The enclosed memorandum 1s a consensus formed from all of our key staff members. It also meets with the approval of John Hughes. I think ”
“other words, DCI’s letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intel ligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his chee”
“such memoranda describing contacts with the White.House between Septem- ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communi- cation on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful super vision on the part of the White House. NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 1”
“tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error. n* NW 50955 DocId: 32423525 Page 192”
“.4 V. VLVALI ( )rr’ 8 RECEIVED OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25. D. C. I JAN 29 1962 4057 27 Jamomel9g2nE8b CIA HAS aOR TO AND/OR- MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed FILE N. B. Noting that you will be away from the cou”
“th 0 -MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 3, File #3 Itemn Date of Meeting Participants Subjects Covered 13 May DCI & Bundy re: NRO report and NSAM on Communications 14 May DCI, Rankin Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms) (No MR expected) MyRxkaobexprepaxedxky MxxxNekm”
“Council, and he confirmed that the President had signed another Presidential finding on 3 December. 4. (Secret - GLC) FAA ALERT/LIAISON Called Guy McConnell, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, and alerted him to the information we had on the Bob Woodward article, gave him the”
“Defense on 31 January 1975. Given the march of events and the uncertainties involved, in addition to the responsibilities of his high office, it is understandable, perhaps, that the Secretary has not wished to become entangled in disputations on this subject matter as lo”
“come up with a plan which made professional sense to s which we felt sound enough 30 that we would present it or masters. We would have done SO and the resultant instruction t. the fiel’ would have depended or. their reaction as far as I was concern- within the Agency. ”
“” AT$ TOP SECRETEN 35 ton $44-4000 for It. Raves Q Mr. Goodwin. Well, X mean ■ Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that. Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they 5 Were words that were going to give exactly the impression you 6 are talking abou”
“Council, and he confirmed that the President had signed another Presidential finding on 3 December. 4. (Secret - GLC) FAA ALERT/LIAISON Called Guy McConnell, L Senate Appropriations Committee staff, and alerted him to the information we had on the Bob Woodward article, gave him t”
“" —included in this ’ summary comes firm sensitive sources, then.- .... • .compromise of which would be detrimental to the U. S. : . .: ■■ > " ■ .-. Ji* 4-n Xie bragedu’s GJraratyiters .era frrot ogitgonn *remain 10 Xerox copies being sent to Mrs. Mildred.Stegall,a *ox O.the ”
“J— Dillon Exhibit 5 September 21, 1960 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 21, 1960 Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State”
“violent elimination of foreign leaders? 21 Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult, thing to speculate 22 on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably 23 both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way, 24 most likely, simply weighed the process ”
“13 the Navy a long time ago, and I commend you for your dedica- tion and your experience and what ha s come to be your reputa- tion for, as we have talked with other members of the agency, they have referred to you as sort of the touchstone, or the person who was the expert among”
“13-00000 »1 028DE C-ty EYas L - 3 - level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he ”
“a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 happened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that. 20 Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in 21 Turkey, and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urge 22 this on him, to warn him before he did assume responsi”
“known in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA,, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 544”
“S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 19 world, we gave the leadership. We created all of the inter- 20 governmental committees. We brought services from tiny 21 fragmented units up into major components of their government, 22 the five major countries, which meant we reoriented t”
“)00 0 98 serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yug”
“attack him and his policies. He said, however, that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because it was an election year in which he would be politically involved. 8. The President then said th”
“AKekee 14-90029 TOP SECRET 50 1 Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was 2 advised you that there was an assassination plot in which 8 1 3 were implicated and he told you that we don ant any part it and you are to send message n his authority saying that. 5:”
“upward from the Agency or the Defense Intelligence 23 Services, which would come to the Special Group. 24 And the other was when the President had an interest-- 25 and I did have an interest from time to time in these TOP SECRET NW 50955 Docld:”
“penetration in the U.S. Government, documents whichj 18 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 30003 he had seen in Moscow, cryptonyms of operating agents, documents. 19 which could only have been prepared by our organization, and 20 many other cases going back into the”
“November 22. 1968 4e IH - Bob -- If you approve this (it is based on a brief memo from General Lansdale) 1 will send it on its way. In addition you should have a meeting - as soon as possible - - with Lansdale and the senior representatives of State. Defense and CIA. If ”
“groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and ”
“::C TT 9*02€ W Au.lll L-Adl-uuit. UuL JILT 9 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services SUBJECT . : Press Allegations re Use of Agency .Polygraph. 1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone ea”
“TOP SECRET * - * 1", (‘e. 36 1 of disclosure, the problem was wa did not want to be associated 2 with assassination. That's why I struck 1 ut. Senator Schwaiker. You changed the language, but the first part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, we feel the 5 } tra”
“withhold such information from those responsible for formulating policy on the unverified, assumption that they might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who an NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 178”
“TOP SECRET Mr !C VW 30 Prone (Area 202 $44-6000 association with political assassination since the U.S., matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination.** 0 Senator Baker. I’ve got to say, and I don mean it to be critical of this witness, but on first reading”
“a 44. 0 N ' 1« TOP SECRET: 6 0 0 0 ′0 60 tre e Phone 1Ar», 202) 344 1 The Chairman. What is the question?'" 2 Mr . Smothers. ■ The question is who in the White House provided Mr. Bundy with documents relevant to this investigation. C o fh rl 5 4 And I belie”
“ment set forth in the Departmental letter to the Senate Select Committee of July 15, 1975. This lett er required prior Bureau screening of notes taken by Staff Members during their review of the afore- mentioned material. Blackhurst subsequently advised SA Daly that the Committee”
“13-00000 07 -7- the advice and guidance he had received from his principal advisers whom he considered professionals and experts in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number of cases although he was the”