“1 4-00000 P W R ! ^ y w , '^ First Section, First Depar ent. s inform On Was pepornegsy.ver-nerecegg furnished to NOSENKO pri arily because of his friend 2 with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENXO learned of certain v. de casts or was”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“14-00000 • .— J. it * ( First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished addition”
“questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO. On 0001224 7 SECRET”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various . claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold 1 the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual BfgdaeSeyen .6 0001048. SECRET”
“ime is spent on direct polygraph examination than on interrogation. TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 1 : : i i ! NW 65990 Docld:32375412 Page 3 104-10210-10015 TOP C EYCO CO 2. 4 Highlights to Date 5. 03 WALD Case: The opening session was a polygraph examination conducted by Nicholas Stoiake”
“(MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that 3 0001134 SFOPET OLUIE,”
“14-00000 SECRE1 the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omiss”
“trip. As with the IJENNER)-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the GARLAND- KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of 0001195 35”
“current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual 6 0001C48 ”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this 4 6001046 28 SECRET”
“13-00000 Source 111 Source 112 said, but under the given circums tances of how 700-9/8080/998408 and acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected. No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted Source 112, Source #3 and Source 11”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“KOSOLAPOV trip. 06 As with the JENNER-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at 06 this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the GARLAND KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledgeo 1 7 o - / 0001195 i-35 COT 1oriioisha % 4/BR”
“Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations.*t*om.,9o" a. Information from NOSENKO In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist IR Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, 5 . which had theretofore concerned itself with”
“capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases. The summary also noted that there was a question concerning 2 whether Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case. 06 0001154 % 7 SFCRFT 41BR”
“1 4-00000 rherntrispuinsy **02i (2% WK -curst CPCENIRES 1 October 1968 CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTTS IN THE CASE OF € YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO wolT FEeitswS % %”
“14-00000 vLURLE ANNEX The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A, " Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B, " Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In”
“FCD. NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiqniNS NKO 10 EL”
“of a casual encounter in the halls, * * -.. rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any u Srit A .^ ^ "* ton reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this ”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“tho 7. NOSENKO’s exact statements and meaning on various specific sub- jects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled 7. 48 and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particul”
“case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with ZUJUS, nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of ZUJUS since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section. 0001187 27”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“outside the USSR. arem. There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the onors BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis- ernew crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY sawem case and the actual record are a refl”
“ct that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosanko ia sensible enough to realize that undue publicity”
“basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that s”
“14-00000 a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SGD. It has not been possible to substantially”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially, confirm”
“the case officer directly involved with the case. In regard to the Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS met in the USSR. It wa”
“would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form. In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, 17 0001177”
“plausible and 5 therefore the operation against STORSBERG took place more than six Jr J He months prior to the time claimed, by NOSENKO and (STORSBERG. 109 HW 50953 DocId:32318825 Page 54”
“14-00000 Annex Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text Annex - The Cherepanov Papers 0001005 3”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“1 4-00000 • -.* supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at thi”
“14-00000 08 explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the 49J cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964. ( « 0001248 5 • we. i •. 6‘e —Lus’ 4* •* EPDCT IB”
“14-00000 • v. annex A - Statements o: Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex 2 - Sun. ■ e O. Cases No: Examined in Text Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers % 3 G0010C5 ( FORET 1 oLuRI-1 \ .J”
“trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in 54 0001214”
“his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2”
“whand 764 Sr. *92.00 • r PA F, ar, % %4 ts -W ptt 5 2-a8B3 It: 0% 5 * a P, «. ;J. 77907 . .. . --- •wit-4 * yr oo-ciled .I th * This is in reference to NOSENKO’s statement that PREISFREUND 4 ■■Masas $i3At-A3ways involved STORSBERG in specula”
“statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. 0001152 5”
“13-00000 21akth8 awngoRA t wistatton ka,9g 020001 7743550 2886 WEP 28769 2710108699007480908 to 9SABIE 5388 tly • Certain of the discrepancies noted in the previous summary Source #1 Source #2 between information from ‘ and kaw and from NOSENEO have been ”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”