“FCD. NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiqniNS NKO 10 EL”
“questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO. On 0001224 7 SECRET”
“14-00000 that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary. GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. 1 In eac”
“14-00000 that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary. GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re t ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. 1 In ea”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“1 4-00000 rherntrispuinsy **02i (2% WK -curst CPCENIRES 1 October 1968 CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTTS IN THE CASE OF € YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO wolT FEeitswS % %”
“14-00000 • .— J. it * ( First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished addition”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“1 4-00000 P W R ! ^ y w , '^ First Section, First Depar ent. s inform On Was pepornegsy.ver-nerecegg furnished to NOSENKO pri arily because of his friend 2 with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENXO learned of certain v. de casts or was”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“14-00000 SECRE1 the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omiss”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“tho 7. NOSENKO’s exact statements and meaning on various specific sub- jects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled 7. 48 and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particul”
“outside the USSR. arem. There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the onors BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis- ernew crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY sawem case and the actual record are a refl”
“14-00000 vLURLE ANNEX The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A, " Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B, " Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In”
“14-00000 Annex Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text Annex - The Cherepanov Papers 0001005 3”
“Western Intelligence, even if the . 1 - information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, "inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his 0 . having provided such i”
“the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. . The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in SECRET 00010C8 2 ? L”
“14-00000 • v. annex A - Statements o: Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex 2 - Sun. ■ e O. Cases No: Examined in Text Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers % 3 G0010C5 ( FORET 1 oLuRI-1 \ .J”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”
“that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this 4 6001046 28 SECRET”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with ZUJUS, nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of ZUJUS since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section. 0001187 27”
“KOSOLAPOV trip. 06 As with the JENNER-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at 06 this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the GARLAND KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledgeo 1 7 o - / 0001195 i-35 COT 1oriioisha % 4/BR”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“14-00000 119 665. Ffrirvg ---na---tmaithred ,4 (111) Remarks •The completeness and accuracy of NOSENKO’s information on the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is by 95) and the / CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by GOLITSYN and analytical evide”
“ct that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosanko ia sensible enough to realize that undue publicity”
“prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD. NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description iNSENKO ***-71810-40009070 10 SECRET ”
“14-00000 F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGS DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY11 IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB? I ca? 1 :Exc^J fra ctm| i 0001078 SECRET 1 si 1”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MIS”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“of a casual encounter in the halls, * * -.. rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any u Srit A .^ ^ "* ton reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this ”
“unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN 7 0001085 SECRET usiridnkeBezl: 'I”
“13-00000 Source 111 Source 112 said, but under the given circums tances of how 700-9/8080/998408 and acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected. No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted Source 112, Source #3 and Source 11”
“trip. As with the IJENNER)-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the GARLAND- KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of 0001195 35”
“NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various . claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold 1 the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual BfgdaeSeyen .6 0001048. SECRET”
“KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB. There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is 0001251 2 SECRET”
“the reader • to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers ‘appropriate. The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami- : nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, " has been considered in SECRET 0001008 2”
“basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that s”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting fron y, that it had to E have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence 55 OFODET VLu___ < .c”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“evacuated to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was closed, if he was there. * * The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims to be (and with a completely false life history, or one lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but no”
“13-00000 February-March 1964 -eolllas egaxe ''Jce7a e0*7, sics IS eyhomm CE-iass serves extaissinet According to a sensitive source: "27,83049 Ssap/gujir shigat. A KGB commission a 5 in the process f studying tl the scale loss tl [caused by NOSENKO’ defection] to the”
“KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. • !I1 : 6001079 4 SECRET OLUALT 4”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“(MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that 3 0001134 SFOPET OLUIE,”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”