“-relay**-,sisosytme:**tS#**********09996556e9d*a0w>,X-tjxz‘tw action to remove therchy SW3 9. re would appear necesbargphRt one-kovernmental organi-9 24 J23 3 ration be given the primary reppon ivijity for developing &%31t25 nationaleplan. .. o-PUe • 26 io. Thaljoint onie”
“INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW. % . ". 3. ' CONTINUE TO INFOF’S DISSIDENT ELSEKTS OF r.. . SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. IN CASE OF OVZE1H20.! OF IRUJ1LLO--WXE1M R OR NOT IlliTIATID EI PRO- U.S. GROUP—THE PRC-.S. CFCIIP SHOULD TROM.TLY .Ah VA JFFOT.T 10 CONSTITUTE 1 ITSELF AS REASONABL”
“the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational.task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular ”
“clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, a”
“imme- diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. 3. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance a”
“." which the execution would append over a period of 25 years, uplot into 5 year pe-• Briode. The plans and programs applicable to each period would be executed under .• the close supervision o? the Committee, and molizied in epoordande with much econo-1 :mio chungen 1s may bagp”
“Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in ade quate strength to ”
“handed to the designated representatives for their en lightenment. I think you will agree with me that the paper is poorly drafted and needs considerable pointing up in various - 59 - TOP SECRET”
“giving the President as little in formation about it as possible, and the purpose of it would have been to give the President an opportunity, if he so elected, to cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to continue but without,- in effect, extracting from.him an exp”
“MINISTER WOULD BE USED INSTEAD OF COORDINATING SECRETARY OF STATE AND MINISTER OF SECURITY AND MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS WOULD BE ADDED TO THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE,' WHICH WOULD NOT DIFFER DRASTICALLY FROM THE PRESENT ONE.) LANG HAS SELECTED CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINAT”
“rale and capabilities; the extent of internal support for and discontent with the regime, etc., etc. 4. I also spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities which the Ray organisation planned to engage in and the assets and capabilities which they have or can acquire to”
“and Social Council as a group which will present testimony. (It might be best if we obtained a sort of form appli- catton, which we could disseminate to the field, where necessary.) The choosing of the organisation must be done at an early date. Applications were to be in on ”
“rale and capabilities; the extent of internal support for and discontent with the regime, etc., etc. 4. I also spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities which the Ray organization planned to engage in and the assets and capabilities which they have or can acquire to”
“favorably by the 7ntred states, Tay Jholi in - +1 selves the provisional government and request help whether or not they actually 1 are able to assume power. If they are favorable to this procedure radtsdi e6. •I NW 50955 bo6fd?32425505 Page‘97 23.7 1”
“r cums of stability, and to retomimties of disidents to remove ikea, void romain, reover, a Cura :.: would, om for tim to cow, ס אוracterized wsנסבלס על מנ than progre, you we would have to commit ourselves to very ס ויגגעבןanoxic and other assistanco. NW 66000 Docld:32204457 Pag”
“Chairman of that Committee, and gives the PCI in his person, if vou will, the responsibility for presenting that budget to the 0% President 20 Noworos of cat tith that somewhat complicated and .2r. not entirely clear allocation cE authority to the DCT he 'simply TOP SECR”
“discussed and it was agreed that in view of the fact that preparations would take at least three months, these preparations should proceed and the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have been perfected.”
“is to ba on overt office and propaganda department and AXRAPP bus been, and will have so continues to be, described as • 601 organized for the purpose removing the CASTRO government, their recesser/y propszanse detivitiaa toward this and cannot bo covert. Could is be modified”
“€••5 % • 2 the foreign under : then of m — mpunterjirt fund - or of private investments jointly with the mobiliaition o. one no tion: rsodr00s. la for the bgaintengg to be given to private initiative towards the development of new agricultural, iitugtriol and cumeroialjenl”
“resoonsibiliti 21. . 28 which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented Part of our problem with this decision is, as hn: been 13 I stated and noted non ryf !•)■-» rrntimgt: of former lTr ie against the background of tiro pre: ent situation. ‘le rest of”
“14-00000 %CFORe vnt 1 •2- cortoin they cou.d not be. » statement mado by 177, no line of policy that B7L could pursue, no sugcation or propaganda line that 1? would follow could be dorse ia the naiso of the Motional Councils / so long as the men ders of each buncil are i”
“of communist takeover then decision will be made in Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FY NW 50955—Dacld:32423505 Page-95 TOP SECRET 235 T”
“14-00000 - SECRET 0 8 voluntary egencion, the Progai boul’ f’nlothe means through other contractors, or th ros its evr olfleen, of orranein dine 1 poonl on a top priori : ns r. : * *v ‘ % ont that the Pre rnm war etter geared to surl, ar effort tlee nav other V.S Sovertren”
“necessary that revision of tho financial budget be commenced immediately if PRC budget approval is to be obtained as soon as possible after a final Agreement has been reached. The budget document must be expanded in order to pro vide reasonably detailed information not only ”
“control of the government. a. Review of Political Action Projects Mr, Bandy stated that because of the special sessitivity of - programs involving covert support ta political parties and leaders in friendly countries, Egher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed T”
“of time should his efforts prove successful. The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the Council and with the U.S. are satisfactory. SESTET NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 20”
“TO: SECRET l’ste Milr or THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE -4- 8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents in- forming them of U.S. position and the necessity for an immediate request. If they are favorable to this procedure take all possible measures to prepare for the imme”
“ABOUT BEING AX MAN FOR THE 5 COMMANDO BECAUSE HE HASE to ASSURANCE THAT THE GDRC WILL P *- IM TO CARRY OUT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM.*”
“confident Jagan would not expropriate ' anything if he is getting aid from the US 'or the UN that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence) , Jagan is receiving no such aid and has no prospects of receiving such 0 ?. aid, then anything could happen.”
“key country there must be a central op- erational capacity and thority e’ith direct lines to the levels of action in Washington. --------- —eyt 0-46A4%* NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 15”
“obtained for arms And ammunition resupply missions to the Meos. It ‘ was agreed that this was matter for consultation between the Department £ State and CLA, and need not be referred to the Group for decision. 4 1 NW 50955 DocId:32204599 Page 3”
“want to get in the posture where someon e was attacking it, and taking us into court on the cons ti tutional base that exists. 1 And what I am seeking guidance on I wo uld like to M Chairman Downing. Well, I think if any question exists 20 in your mind as to th e c ons titutional”
“c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 3 CLASSIFtU TOP SECRET SPCNL-IANDHNG- NOEARN”
“-51- self-preservation type of an impulse,on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this. Then let’s make the military establish- ment serve the country in a much bigger way than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It’s usually the organization that”
“-51- self-preservation type of an impulse on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this.. Then let’s make the military establish ment serve the country in a much bigger way . than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It's usually the organization ”
“14-00000 the Department in the hope of getting a better deal directly with us. This in the more my Depression since if the British "swcotness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit — then the State Department hed Letter bo got into lire ”
“( ( 9 (06 1 0 A TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY -4- 10/30/63 such as removal of key personalities or relay of information. In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be eit”
“cooperation and guidance. He advised that he has been commissioned by the President to put togeth er an Interdepartmental Intelligence Unit for the purpose of pooling information received from the various intel ligence agencies and based on t he evaluation of such information, it”
“sound Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that a more nationalistic note. To come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68”
“(to be concerned with “"larfor issues of our over-all policy, our trade policy, our „relations with West African governments, the effect Of British Colonial policy on our inter ests and the relations (in coo peration , with an independent American Consul nt alar) of British an”
“JubAAR L. O 0: 42 was done and a comprehensive program of suggested action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval it should probably then be discussed with him. . It was stipulated that in any case no action should t”
“regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular SOURCE: STAFF: FILE: EC #a 2 DATE:”
“no chance for success of en 5 4 armed movement. “It was agreed that even though the Committee 4 3. 3 2 2 1 1 Lrnge 1 triveis s.e wi-sot. teonvelns ord SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM - tele-t-ci-at STATE -QtA JAAMY NAVY INA AID OCA FBI #3 CINCSO #- USIA I*We (Niote. Fold du”
“indicated that he also had a report Hr. Joyce’s dis- cussion dth the Foreign 0.fice, and that the former had found little British desire come involved the ters of exiled /roups. He surrested that the British considered this 36 an oxtreubly complicated and undesirable situation wh”
“background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required. 8 - - f.. * a s^d &”
“SUKARNO WILL ADOPT TO ATTEMPT RESOLVE SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS STILL UNCLEAR. HE WELL AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT BY ALLEVIATING ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND INJECTING SOME VIGOR INTO ZONOMY HE WILL BE ABLE CIRCUMSCRIBE WHATEVER LATENT OPPOSITION THERE MAY STILL BE TO HIS REGIME. 3. WESTE”
“either side, without authorization from Washington. b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY”
“background and have morepolicy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required mac Vitkolnf-s*NFhwa-norhamkwixshAims..rasdlksvehansulhArse e m r 8 *-233”
“reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this matter. Your ideas will be useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall sale a synthesis of the reports so sscombled - adding thereto the thoughts of the French”
“papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light EYES ONLY Km”