“-7- 2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda Central Intelligence Arenes Responding ta the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guansbara seized large quantities of props- ganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubans flights. For example, som”
“SECZ6Z returned to their point of origin. d. Instructed Embassy ■ Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline C8sA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMIA operate charter flights to eerry refugees from Havana to Central America. CIA, as a result”
“■ SECRET ; -6- conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had 'developed - between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative. 70 4; Control of Transfer of Funds?- Department of State Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasur”
“SECRET troths-l-mb---ar-eenicte -7- * 2. Control of Kovo^nt of Cdjtin Propaganda Central Intelligence Agency Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police 1 of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propa- ganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the”
“mpleted in Costa Rica. A similar facility in Nicaragua is scheduled for completion by 1 July 1963. : c. Established an Intelligence Center at CARIBCOM Head- quarters, in connection with the program of surface surveillance of the Caribbean, for rapid processing and dissemination t”
“4-00000 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ONG: A. C. DELANEY ROUTING UNIT OCI CONFIDENTIAL 4 EXT ■ 7454 1601 2 5 TA 12 SEPTEMBER 1962 g0) 3 12SEr *;- 59z to MEXICO CITY FROM DIRECTOR __ SIG CEN DEFERRED CONF: AD/CI ROUTINE INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, C/NE 3, C/FE 6”
“Cuba for presentation at the Group’s meeting of 9 October. 62. On 6 October, COMOR provided to the NRO a memo randum entitled "Intelligence Justification and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba" for use in this presentation. Para Al. of this paper stated that "there is now ”
“C T •1. -9• 4. Control of Transfer of Department of. State Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963, 5. Strengthening of Connte ncy Capabi”
“U.S. Naval Station, Rodman, Canal Zone for use by the MTT and will be delivered there about 20 June. 3. The Central Intelligence Agency has: a. Completed its efforts to improve U.S. government communications in Latin America by the installation of the remaining two commercial lea”
“SECRET -7- 2. Control of Novement of Cube Pronscando Central Intelligence Agency Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of props- genda brought into Brasil by passengers on the special fates flights. For example”
“SECRET: -5- 3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas’ and Arms Department of Defense a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963. b. Continued to ma”
“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST AITE Uo M. Progress of the September Overflight Program OFFICE 58. While the MRBM and IRBM deployment continued and the first good ground reports began to filter out of Cuba, .the four-flight reconnaissance program approved on 10 Septem- ”
“SECRET 2. The Department of Defense: A. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba at the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that date. Between 25 April and 23 May 1963 additional sea surveillance was realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to t”
“returned to their point of origin. d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated tha”
“SECEET -G. 4. Control of Transfer nf Funds Departcent of State Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963. 5. Strengthening of Couter-Inguxxency C”
“SECRET -9- press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported. 8. Other Special Actions Department of State a. Obtained action by the CQAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document t”
“LATIN AMERICA OVER SOVIET INTENT IONS IN CUBA, IT STRESSED DEFENSIVE NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING FURNISHED 4 CUBANS IN AND IMPLICITLY DENIED ANY SOVIET INTENTION TO ESTABLISH LN MILITARY RISKS BASES IN CUBA. STATEMENT, MOREOVER, CONVEYED INDIRECT ASSURANCE THA”
“legislation, restricting the travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action). I. Persuade Latin American governments to prevent re-entry to their country of persons suspected to have been trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action). J. Persuade ”
“ompleted in Costa Rica A similar facility in Nicaragua is scheduled for completion by 1 July 1963. C Established an Intelligence Center at CARIBCOM Head- quarters, in connection with the program of surface surveillance of the Caribbean, for rapid processing and dissemination to c”
“SECRET 9 press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention ’did. not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported. 8. Other Special Actions a Department of State / a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the docume”
“SECRET -6- conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative. 4. Control of Transfer of Funds Department of State Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department ”
“SEGREL into Ecuador. Ship movement information had been provided to the US Naval Attache Bogota by the District Intelligence Officer of the Fifteenth Naval District. There was no apparent involvement of Cuban arms or Cuban trained personnel in this instance. 7. Other Specia”
“-9- 6. Control of Franefer of Funds DenAxsuenk_a£_StaEn Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963. 5. Strengthening of Counter-Incureency Capabili”
“ing on the recommendation in the paper on "Th e Movem ent of Subversives and Subversive Trai nees" a nd other sources, instructed the non-isthmian posts to encourage host governments to take additional counter-subversion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local situation”
“SECRET STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOV - 1 DEC 1963 x Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.. ■C..jinilJ. III1II JI umnljinririimininimmmtrwinrcmtcmmwMnfai*ft.faWuai.■ ifatm”
“me operational. This cable gives reliable voice and te let ype communications to CINCARIB in cluding both classified teletype and voice. Negotiations are continuing in Honduras, Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio facilities Installation of a multi-channel”
“connection with the Department of Defense, should' concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It was determined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt would be made by means of air patr”
“s were planned of which 15 were cancelled. Of the NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 13 - 12 SECRET SECRET operations carried out, four învolved sabotage and ten others encountered contact with Cuban forces. Thus, during 1963, the Castro Government was aware of at least 14 operations i”
“Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted. B. Intelligence Activities and Operations The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962, consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, p”
“13-00000 Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing Western Hemisphere countries. This is the situation I fear, a”
“ompleted in Costa Rica A similar facility in Nicaragua is scheduled for completion by 1 July 1963. C Established an Intelligence Center at CARIBCOM Head- quarters, in connection with the program of surface surveillance of the Caribbean, for rapid processing and dissemination to c”
“or use by the MTT and will be delivered there about 20 June. 3. The Central Intelligence Agency has: a. Completed its efforts to improve U.S. government communications in Latin America by the installation of the remaining two commercial leased circuits into Guatemala City and Man”
“(EXCERPT FROM UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHITE PAPER ON CUBA ISSUED AUG 1960) 1. Armed Incursions. No sooner had the Revolutionary Government of Cuba taken power than it launched a program for exporting its resolution to other countries in the Hemisphere, particularl”
“SrCKET-SEPSLTiYE - 13 - v?/j ‘ The raids also had an impact cm the Cuban military and 37 security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed ou Nispecial alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive a positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently e launch”
“14-00000 4 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ORIG: A.C.. DELANEE′ ROUTING UNIT OCI SECRET chottp EXT i 7454 1605 DATE : as SEPTEMBER 1962 (so 3 I Mey 4 s T° ‘ MEXICO CITT 15S0P22/2 ZZz FROM: DIRECTOR ---- S46-CEN CONF: AD/CI2 DEFERRED INFO : ADDP, C/CA, >0/1, S/C 2 ROUTINE ”
“by the unified commander involved, to meet the singular problem encountered. Preparations ha ve been made to respond to a possible requirement in the case of the Venezuelan ship FERRYMAR III. f. Ordered to the Canal Zone a Coast Guard Mobile Training Team for a period of six mont”
“SECRET -5- 3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms Department of Defense a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963. b. Continued to maint”
“SECRET AlMS Stuna General: Arma mniggling is one of the "facts of life" in Latin America and has been engaged in by dinetcent elements f^y many years. Reports of Castro involvement in these activities have been frequent since ika shortly after his seizure of power early in 1”
“and advised the Group that we must plan contingent methods for evading such coastal defenses. Also McCone stated that he had asked for a review of all reports for the last 90 days because of his continuing concern over the large number of unexplained reports we are getting on”
“SECESZ until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conskry. b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express cur deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brasil and request their .cooperation”
“/ SECRET -2- on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities. Department of State a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport faciliti”
“SECRET - -2-< on Cuban merchant ships.: Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities. : ■ - : ;r Department of State a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of air”
“SEGBEK -14- Department: State Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal polities of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy’s discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations w”
“completed in Costa Rica. A similar facility in Nicaragua is scheduled for completion by 1 July 1963. c. Established an Intelligence Center at CARIBCOM Headquarters, in connection with the program of surface surveillance of the Caribbean, for rapid processing and dissemination to ”
“00 SECRET 10 - IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962 A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and E^uipAent In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet Union became clear”
“MONGOOSE - PARAS S, TL-T0 J* TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST A0 178-10004-10056 Ph J 14 November 1962 SCI THE WHITE HOUSE OFFicr MEMORANDUM FOK: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba, 1 July - 16 October 1962 A. The”
“1 J e7e which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with ”
“■ €) J. SECRET -14- Department of State Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on / charges of involvement of Cuban rission in internal politics .i / of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy’s discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible”
“September as SNIE 85-3, had already been set in motion by the DD/I, in a memo to the AD/NE of 24 August). d. CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily paper on Cuba, including current intelligence, estimative as sessments and coverage of the press, to be distributed to”
“able from Florida to Panama became operational . This ca ble gives reliable voice and telety pe comm unications to CINCARIB including both classified teletype and voice. Negotiations are continuing in Honduras, Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio facilitie”