“confirmed by Angleton and other CIA officials during a meeting with an FBI representative on 4/3/69. At this meeting CIA representatives stated that this liaison with IIS was known by the White House and the U. S. State Department. (S) JFk ()(6) At the present time the FBI h”
“attention before it was actually published, and so I bro ug ht Mr . An gl eton up and said that I w as going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterintellige”
“in counter-intelligence? 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D. C. 20003 19 Mr. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt. There may 20 : be some overt things put out that support document that was 1given to a double who would pass it to KGB. But if the man 22 is regarded t”
“pril APRIL 3 For several weeks I have been giving this matter s erious thught since I began que stio ning my capability to bring about a better coordin- ated effort directed against foreign intelligence targets, particularly those of the Communist-Bloc. I have always aimed for pe”
“relimatters, t has been the practice of Israel i//S) supervisors to clear with Angleton before disseminating information from him, outside- the Bureau.6) * 70 D In taking u p such a matter with Angleton 1 last week it 4 2 was determined that he objected to attributing info”
“fferen ces in the organization with Mr. Angleton a s to t he way th e c oun ter int el li ge nc e bu siness was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the Directorate and of the Agency.”
“I had had some professional differenc es i n the organization with Mr. Angleton as t o the way th e counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the Dir ector”
“man, and the facts of that case were t hat I had had some professional differences in the organizati on with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordinatio”
“ton as to the way the counterintelligence busin es s wa s r un a nd t he way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of co ordination of the other elements of the Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various occasions in the p”
“efore it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I w as g oi ng t o m ake two basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I”
“rewarding, but also punish- ing. Bec ause of this deep involvement I now real iz e t ha t I hav e b edly neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left I would like to give my family the attention it rightfully :deserves. It would be most dis”
“during a veriod of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal S ecur ity - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, but also punish- ing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have bedly neglected my responsibilit”
“he way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the I sr ae li a cc ou nt was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various occasions in the past. I did r”
“l ret ire men t benefits : that people would loose if they stayed after that point. Then unf ort una tely the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 25 Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library TOP SECRET to our attention before it was actua lly pub”
“$3 wile i *9 TOP SECRET 11 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 General and so forth, rather than to go through the normal © 2 bureaucratic chain of command out of the CIA and ita various 5 components. 4 Mr. Angleton. With the added fact that we did not disclose 1% W3 1 ”
“, but al so punish- ing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have bedly neglec ted my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left I would like to give my family the attention it rightfully :deserves. It would be most dishonest of me i”
“- Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 SECRET 23 1 General Mr. Kennedy, he had a direct meeting with him. © 2 Mr. diGenova. And what, if anything, happened? 3 Mr. Angleton. Ohly encouragement. 4 Mr. diGenova. Could you amplify on that? 5 Mr. Angleton. Well, the Attorney General”
“elopments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intel ligence. It was most challenging, very rewa rding, but also punish- ing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have bedly neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left ”
“point. Then unfortun ate ly t he S eymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 2 1 22 1 23 24 25 Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library TOP SECRET to our attention before it was actually publis he d, a nd s o I br ought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to m”
“erves. It would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the re- cent events which have led to the severan ce of direct liaison with the Cen tral In telligence Agen cy . Sin ce I have been the principal Bureau ele- ment in the day to day relations between the organizations,”
“ed for perfection, but I do not find that the desired results are being achieved. For almost 1.8 yea rs I have handled an assignment during a veriod of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging”
“but I do not find that the desired results are being achieved. For almost 1.8 years I have ha nd led an assignment during a veriod of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, ”
“of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intel ligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, but also punish- ing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have bedly neglected my responsibilities as a father a”
“So you developed some kind of a relation- 22/ ship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connected 23 with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of Israeli back in the 1940's? 25 Mr. Angleton. That is right. TOP SECRET NW 50955 Docla:32423393 Page 12 ”
“ately the Seymour Hirsh article o f D ecember 22nd came to our attention before it was actual ly pub lished, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two bas ic decisions. I w as g oi ng to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put”
“loose if th ey sta yed af ter th at point. Then unfort unately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move th e I sra”
“a S 20 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 26 TOP SECRET 85 Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into 1 this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and 2 so on. 3 And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio 4 going to be put into Havana, and l”
“degree of c oo rd ination of the other elements of the Directorate and of the Agency. W e ha d d eb ated this on various 22 23 24 25 occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and took a number of functions away from it. १. The liaison with the Photocopy from Gera”
“g to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership in to the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I said I would offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligenc e doc tri ne, he could stay working with us. He did not have t”
“e Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that ca se w er e th at I h ad had so me pro fes sio nal differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it requir”
“years ago and kne w a lot of the senior Israeili who were inv olv ed in it. I bel ieved there was in adequate coordination in the Arab areas. Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compart mentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with our other d ivisio”
“would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the re- cent events which have led to the sever an ce of dir ect liaison with the Central Intel ligence Agency. Since I have bee n the pri ncipal Bureau ele- me nt in t he day t o day re lations between the organizations, i t h”
“20003 19 counter-intelligence forces. 20 And this added thing of Hersh has about dealt the final 21 blow. 22 OrBakel U hatesto-interrupt you, and I also hate sto Fast Street, 23 24 to ask you this question, but can you make an evaluation of the effectiveness of the”
“fully :deserves. It would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the re- cent events wh ic h have led to the severance of direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. Since I have been the principal Bureau ele- ment in the day to day relations between the organiza”
“future mail being directed to him be transmitted to % the Director = of CIA, "Attention: James Angleton, er Angleton stated that the above request was being made with the approval of Allen Director Dulles, the Director of CIA. He further indicated that he desired ,the abo”
“'uoiJuiyWM h a s ^••HS i n j o te 19 that they concluded that there was no substance to this 20 information. 21 They had to reopen the investigation -- 22 Mr. Angleton. And they also said: send it to the Army. 23 Mr. Miler. Yes, send it to the Army. 24 Now, they had t”
“32th.4 , 19 w** -1 y, z Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 25 TOP SECRET' 84 planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and 1 it was foredoomed. 2 Mr. Schwarz. Through the exile community in Miami? Mr. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything, 4 and so o”
“•3 a $5 put their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some under 202) '' ' II"' ■m a,Mn num - n— ------------------------- ---------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- ------------------- ------------------ standing. It is based on a fidu”
“the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordinatio n of the other elements of the Dire ct or ate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various 22 23 2 4 25 occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 19 73 a nd took a”
“several months Angleton has been very cooperative with the Bureau, He has volunteered voluminous infor mation of interest to the Bureau and he has followed Bureau leads in an effective manner. Much of the information which Angleton has furnished appears in the raw form, that”
“oint. Then unfort un ately the S eymour Hirsh ar ticle of December 22nd came 1.5 16 17 1 8 19 2 0 21 22 1 23 24 25 Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library TOP SECRET to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make t”
“Phone (A rea 202) $ 4 4 - TOP SECRET 31 1 He was a more valuable agent. If he had not been un- covered he would have been today Chief of British Intelligence. In the case of George Blake, who was in the British 4 cret service, he gave to the Soviets one year in advance th”
“the Seym our Hirsh article of Dece mbe r 22nd came 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 25 Photocopy fro m Gerald Ford Library TOP S ECRET to our at tention before it wa s actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make t wo basic dec isions. I ”
“ea. Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us. Mr. Colby. Still working with us to hel p o n t he transi- tion of the whole counter intelligence program. Chairman C hur ch. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton ca se, Mr. Chairma n, and the facts of that case wer”
“Counterintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence advised the FBI on 3/26/75 that he appeared beforen Agency (CIA), - the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and in response to questions— advised SSC he only had secondhand and fragmentary information • concerning (Israeli capab”
“if they stayed after that point. Then unfortuna tely the Sey mo ur H irs h article of December 22nd came 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 25 Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library TOP SECRET to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said ”
“ng to make two basic decisions. I w as going to move the Israeli account from his control and I w as going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Cou nterintelli gence Staff. I said I would offe r him a post of tying together some counterinte lligence doc trine, he ”
“d had some professional dif fer en ces i n th e or ga ni za tion with Mr. Angl eton as to the way th e counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the Direct”
“P SEC 10 Mr. Schwarz. And was there any other significant reason why you kept the Israeli account, if that is the right-ex- t Phone 3 pression?/ 4 CAMr. Angleton. There wasn’t one after I left there. 5 nor was*// there one here in Washington. / 5 6 But the other side”
“WIWevor----niatte 38 TOP SECRET los 97 - Phone (Area 202) 544-4000 intelligence service in the US in regard to the efforts toll acquire nuclear technology or material? 2 3 Mr. Angleton. No. Let me just state my own feeling about some this. 4 After ,talked to me a”