“00 92*9*6*9EM7#,*XEpl1'1 a TOP SECRET 19 g Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 no 1 truthfulness, or that the CIA was running wild, and acting on © 2 its own initiative, engaging in murder plots, murder attempts, and not informing, let alone securing the authority from, 4 t”
“such memoranda describing contacts with the White.House between Septem- ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communi- cation on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful super vision on the part of the White House. NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 1”
“was quickly shot down. Nevertheless, the CIA was in fact embarked upon such 2’attempts during the period under review. 221 Now, we are led to conclude either that we are not being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administratic pr which is very hard for me to ”
“known in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA,, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 544”
“security; is that right? Mr. Helms. It is my understanding that they were satisfied. Representative Ford. Mr. McCone,, do you have full authority from higher authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information in the files of the Central Intelligence Agen”
“apparently McCohe had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a igment of his imagination. However, to prove Hie unstable tendencies -of this source, the source had later claimed that he was actuall”
“Y. 25 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 their more sensitive intelligence operations, were meticulous I 2 in that respect. 5 Now, I clearly am wrong. But that is what I would have 4 told you. 5 Senator Mondale. Well, are you wrong? 6 In other words, what you testified to --”
“Let at eats ad -4- % The hearing record includes some pages of sworn testimony from_ witnesses*during __hearing days as well as numerous staff interviews. The documents which the Committee obtained included raw files from the . agencies and departments, from the White”
“W ashington, D .C . 20003 who was working on discernible or apparent deception as reflected 19 in CIA reporting from the field of Soviet disinformation 20" concerning the situation in the Middle East. 21 And we did a tremendous study on this and which was 22 4 1 0 F irs”
“apparently McCohe had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it. was a, igment of his imagination. However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source. :the source had later claimed that he was actua”
“**********RSSXMI2W TOP SECRET 14 1 My own impression as to this matter -- and I have already 2 testified to the fact that I am relying on a recollection of a meeting of which there is no record -- is that had I been 4 briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal, und”
“::C TT 9*02€ W Au.lll L-Adl-uuit. UuL JILT 9 May 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services SUBJECT . : Press Allegations re Use of Agency .Polygraph. 1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone ea”
“such memoranda describing contacts with the White House between Septem ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communi cation on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful super vision on the part of the White House. HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page ”
“TOP SECRET As to the Board’sestudy, Mr. Bundy told.Dr. Killian that. ,40 the Board should include in its"review discussions with the :7,9 Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint. .. Chiefs of Staff — Mr. Bundy ind: cating that the Secretary of ., , Defense”
“implement that capability. Harvey incorrectly jumped to the conclu- sion for the KGB that Hawkridge was a cooperative soursa of much of my accurate counterintelligence on KGB. Hawkridge had precipitated your investigation by appealing to a Treasury official. The official pre”
“system which produced the ambiguities is corrected. % This was done pursuant to the instructions of CIA Director Richard Helms (Helms Ex. __ ; 6/13/75 Tr. __ ). In fairness to Director Helms it should be added, however, that he was responsible for requesting the preparation ”
“Kissinger's recollection: I left (the October 15th meeting) with the distinct impression that there was nothing that could be done in this covert area that offered promise or hope for success. I had the distinct impression that was Dr. Kissinger's conclusion, and that in ”
“stupidity of putting this type of omment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was c ncerned. we would write n document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale ”
“will be more hesitant to raise hypo- . thetical questions if they’ learn of the existence of a study having <, been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy’s hope that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sani- tised version of the report, but if ”
“CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting. messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard: ... I can recall no instance in my exper”
“e t, $ € w a in n g to n , © C.. 1 0 0 0 1 initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the 19 planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact. we 20 feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and 21 expose the United States to great d”
“clear that assassination should be excluded from consideration. ASSUMES THAT THAT WAS Intonton There is admittedly a tension within the four findings. The first and third points tend to suggest a lack of authority while the second and fourth points explain why agency offici”
“-J- CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard: ... I can recall no instance in my exp”
“involved in the tel-tap. We should be able to use their arguments to continue to protect the liaison relationship. 7. Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Board that CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this cable has already been released in full.”
“t any action would embarrass the negotiations, which was why I was asking. Bruce said he understood. I then checked with Don Wilson, USIA, who confirmed that all CIA psychological assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use and were being used as desired by the Presid”
“Murrow, that this is not a sub- ject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.' (Lansdale Ex. 16).' Ha”
“Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal. And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I don’t : imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you would not rather clearly rem”
“963. "I assume and would like to be so advised : if the contrary is the fcat-i that your January 31, 1964, report is not final inasmuch as I recall an investigation is currently being pursued with respect to an allegation of some significance which emanated from the White House a”
“59 gee-ie-Sele.-aerate4 e n TOP SECRET Phone (Area 202) 544-60005:% w € will. “heeieals MTo NHA 114 17 1 because then it would be a year. 2 Mr. Schwarz. The problem is the Ervin Committee was found 3 not to have jurisdiction to issue the subpoena. 4 The Chairman. Well,”
“con- flicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of other senior colleagues. Thus, this report m ust, if it is to be comp rehensible, attempt to depict the decision-making process in all its complexity by referring when necessary to the individual participants. SECRET NW 6599”
“th 0 -MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 3, File #3 Itemn Date of Meeting Participants Subjects Covered 13 May DCI & Bundy re: NRO report and NSAM on Communications 14 May DCI, Rankin Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms) (No MR expected) MyRxkaobexprepaxedxky MxxxNekm”
“e representatives of the White House and the State Department of the aforementioned matter, especial ly in view of information furnished by the Committee in dicating t hat S ec retary of S tate Henry Kissinger would be testifying in executive session before the House Select Commi”
“whether he and Edwards had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an assassination operation: "I thought I made clear that it was my impression--and I believe the impression incidentally that I thought was confirmed in the [I.G. Report]--that in discussing th”
“it and started 4 1 0 F irs t S tre e t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 20 talking about it, what are we going to do about 21 this — I don't know what the conversation was about. And 22 Bannerman called in and said, what was this all about? 23 Mr. Wides. Thi”
“" —included in this ’ summary comes firm sensitive sources, then.- .... • .compromise of which would be detrimental to the U. S. : . .: ■■ > " ■ .-. Ji* 4-n Xie bragedu’s GJraratyiters .era frrot ogitgonn *remain 10 Xerox copies being sent to Mrs. Mildred.Stegall,a *ox O.the ”
“19 the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward. 20 Mr. Schwarz. Now, document 3B indicates and you 2'1 have had an opportunity to review this one before, I think 22 Mr. Bundy. Which one are we now talking about? 23 Mr. Schwarz. 3B, Mr. Parrott's memo. 24 Mr. ”
“that we had been given this job to do and that we 21 at headquarters saw that as the safest way for them to 22 accomplish the job that they had been given with the least 23 possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that 24 sort of thing. 25 Senator Schwei”
“DTP SECRET 43 1 has brought some thousands of letters from the constituency of 2 certain southern Senators who shall remain unnamed or near-' 5 Southern Senators, because it kind of was a catalytic agent 4 in getting a lot of complaints on the Committee and everything 5”
“5.9 EV $092ne TOP SECRET sr * Lesr .(.I - le .M 23 LAvensen $66-$00 1 from rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, and 2 the second one was to say in the final version, "However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political 4 assassinations”
“involved in one way or the other with — an assassination operation that was being run out of Task Force to O A C M W, and I will represent to you that there was indeed an to © assassination effort or a series of efforts run out of Task to Force W beginning and out of”
“State, Defense and the Director of CIA which purported to 20 be a discussion between Gromyko and a very senior source 21 to the effect that they had given up on the Arabs, that they would no longer support the Arags, they would no longer give 22 23 them arms, that they .w”
“4/13/78, p. 34. 157/ Ibid., p. 38. 158/ Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 1. 159/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 3 3-38, 14-15. 160/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 6/26/78, pp. 3-5; Annual Fitness Report on Ann Goodpasture, 1/14/64. € i (aT Classif”
“■ \ p) CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard: ...I can recall no instance in”
“examination. 6. The four individuals were Iden 182 of the Department of Defense and Iden 183 » Iden 184 , and Iden 185 • of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forward”
“act was to be, it was clearly to be assassination or the death of the foreign political leader? Hedgman: Yes. Q: Instigated by the- CIA, initiated by the CIA? pS-r** Hedgman: Certainly if those -_ if Dr. Gottlieb’s lethal agents were employed, that would have been the r”
“withhold such information from those responsible for formulating policy on the unverified, assumption that they might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who an NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 178”
“Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb’s instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that he was to carry out Gottlieb’ s instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by name, and he doubted that he”
“the CIA, who also did not feel disposed to veto something 'approved bv the PRESIDENT.'" (5-6) CARD 4 of 4 00 -”
“” AT$ TOP SECRETEN 35 ton $44-4000 for It. Raves Q Mr. Goodwin. Well, X mean ■ Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that. Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they 5 Were words that were going to give exactly the impression you 6 are talking abou”
“magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me.. (Bennett testimony, p. 21) - According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to: issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi- ^Vj4 mony, p. 84) The Department of Defense”