“14-00000 Annex Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text Annex - The Cherepanov Papers 0001005 3”
“14-00000 • v. annex A - Statements o: Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex 2 - Sun. ■ e O. Cases No: Examined in Text Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers % 3 G0010C5 ( FORET 1 oLuRI-1 \ .J”
“the material was actually missing. “The letter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963. 00011C9 --- 3 SECRET chia .R 1”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“1 4-00000 SECRET IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO * -eo*p: 0. 0001112 -SECRET :Exctacez r. art:motte - Conopraling and o rowsenu y. 4 *2 1 , - )■ ilixo U b ill gin W 26 26 a t”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“14-00000 vLURLE ANNEX The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A, " Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B, " Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area. 4 The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be 6001237 examined and can be cited as follows. G5ol? 1 Excludes t szimmatic ”
“13-00000 O ranchay Re: NOSENKO Having Reniewell Buy 451 note several. Reports, identified as E author not compl e tel y - We D Conclusions & Comments in ite Case of is in Box 45,(ile JuninI.(ThisNosenho"(as) Sal8ic JReport) -264 pgs. Foiser (Il Lasheen released in V”
“given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts 19 0001097 SECRET y .r.. :59 % •/** ISA”
“The : matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first,be made on the respon- cu sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above. 0001166 :6 SECRE % 9aa”
“14-00000 SECRET / II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CAS^ SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 - 6300P 1 Excluded from automatic C001010 SECRET downgrading and declassification”
“14-00000 ORODET *1 SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IX NOSENKO CASE SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to .zd NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO ”
“13-00000 « SECRET ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO 0 Ece*cf - 4 SECT coangrovgic _ declasji.regfiei”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“c. tec !.;s to KGB Residency ana AValiabirity “TO CPA’, Ornngseen. 1 . 1* d. Timing of 1962 Contact 752 £ ■ 7 e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753 f. The Recall Te legram 753 g. Remarks 753 w ib ia ii G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 756 1. Introduction 756 aet 2. C”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. . The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in SECRET 00010C8 2 ? L”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate. 1 363 TS No. 197124 2 Top Secret Copy 10”
“statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. 0001152 5”
“1 4-00000 (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Ch of which he reviewed and that he kept one. regmatt- Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“14-00000 5 00 . ■ th it SECRET II. SUMMARY OF DEVEIOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1.957 . * * * * * * * W W HC92Do/3," • , SOUP 1 Encindes from automatic 0001010 SECRET I downgrading ui declassification Can asclisioie”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“14-00000 SECRET H. IS THERE ANY EVSAENCE 7 THE CONTACTS CF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1950 TH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE "RGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR .OR RGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFE”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn’t say". or "didn’t comment" o”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“14-00000 LAGS (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usu”
“(Retracted.NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret C°py _”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“14-00000 SECRET "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies. non”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“14-00000 f SECRET e F. NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT/ ARE NOT CREDIBLE $ 0001217 SECRET”
“Army, Naval, and Air attaches.* Comment: Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility for supervising operations against service Wuewiie attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO for the first time claimed he was personally. responsible for (as contrasted to supervising”
“14-00000 we SECRET A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL, TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 620:2 1 . Excluded frem aslomatic 0001025 SECRE declassification downgrading and!”
“1 4-00000 wide SECRET .. V • ecrurdl: E. CAN THE INFORMATION FCI SHED BY NCSENKO BE CONSIDERED :N TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIEL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR,HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 3 q J 3 ”
“14-00000 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a sign”
“prior to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected to be a KGB agent.O SEVERN has not visited the United States since 1961, and he has not been interviewed by the FBI. NOSENKO’s information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in”
“1 4-00000 P W R ! ^ y w , '^ First Section, First Depar ent. s inform On Was pepornegsy.ver-nerecegg furnished to NOSENKO pri arily because of his friend 2 with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENXO learned of certain v. de casts or was”
“14-00000 new **>Titwr y eonerenew* tftoto.rtareshart €% 0*06 St* ********** ***7*0*17 "tiol-paengyoGneerz Page b. NOSENKO’s Conduct in Meetings 626 c. NOSENKO’s Behavior Under Interrogation 627 (i) Introduction 627 (ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627 (iii) Evasion, I”
“14-00000 CEODET NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which ”
“claimed he was being punished for misuse of operational documents.] In response to his interrogator ' s question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he thought the truth would not have been believed. In a voluntary statement”