“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“KI SECRET SuE SANEI2ED 1 06RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked I”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency shouldEoVa nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the yesra since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte ef the world. A number of governments 111! in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 0% overthrow •”
“memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. " AR THE ORIGINAL Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many IBR parts the world. A number of governments still la power know”
“by the U. S. Government if they were presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government. CIA Personnel Under State Cover The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various allowa”
“need for revamping of the "intelli gence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not able to control its operatives once they are in the field and of the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo.) HW 509”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yot. to the yeare since, CIA has, to effect, ‘made’ policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even bean targets of CIA attempts at overthrow”
“~.3W CEARET OLORLI " '(Z) Mail Coverage. 'Another much needed intelli-ns gence tool is mail coverage.. • Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our represen- tatives should confer and exami”
“14-00000 July 3 NotDraftSent MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: NCFE-CIA RELATIONS 1. When this Division was delegated the responsibility of conducting CIA relations with NCFE it was immediately apparent that a variety of problems existed whi”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have zething to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte 0 the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 2% overthrow ”
“SANT16P vL If 16\ d. 5/11 6 SECRET CIA June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization 1 submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. On balance, CIA’s record has p”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“6 SECRET 7. I has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because cf the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann’s re”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“CREr Z. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggs sta ways in which some cf those prob- lemns can perhaps be alleviated 1. CIA Autonomy • CIA conducts three main forms cf secret work; clandestine intelli- gence collect”
“in your para. a.) 4. The remedy which is being developed as a consequence of this investigation is the re-definition of the responsibilities of CEA and authorities of NCFE and the development of new procedures for the conduct of relations between NCFE and CIA. These definitio”
“SECRET analysis, for FBI personnel. • In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Cur”
“confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain • within its legislative charter. ' I am arranging for the published * transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific. direction made ”
“. Washington, O.C. 20003 19 i have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders 20 1: in the field have wanted. Some of this has to do with priorities that are imposed 21 22 on the CIA representatives from Washington. Some of it has ‘ S hw iis sa g Otr ”
“CONFIDENTIAL 4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between ”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that, would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further more, we were under i”
“SECRET 6. 2. Covert politic) operate ns tochnieally reqaire Etnte Department cloerenne. In practice, however, CIA bns often boon able t ceiza the initiative in ways which reduce State’s role almost to that of a rubber stamp. This hus been partly the 0000:9wauca c the supe”
“would create some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA were unable to locate a particular source, there would still be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot locate him, does not mean t”
“SECRET U 205 meant too that the State Department, eites apprised ef an operation only in Ita later s%0gen, 10 under grant proncure to endorse the operation 34 already mountad because cl the alleged evil consequences of onorcistug & vetc. I well remember Tom Monn’s ses06rk t”
“NA-HSM* F14 :83 ‘rember 27 because it has -bracketed portion that we might considerably do away with. That's page 40. v। The bracketed portion navs that the NSC would approve /7. all counter-intelligence activities of the CIA in the United *3 States and- it spells ou”
“SECREI 9. the uighot of €9 Conerols’ revnst ia Algerl?. pe$*ezo-by noted with amnueemznt that the top floor van ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to ascora entrance that night to the CIA offices cely with difficulty.) . CLA 10 moparently d”
“SECRET 6. la 2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber mtalep. This has been partly the consequence of th”
“risk of creating suspicions that they were or are associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA were unable to locate a particular source, there would still be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot locate him, does not mean that he is not alive”
“Sttmtl 8. 0A % wdlothan220,0 freprempu / under military or other 'mitato 3Eficial cover)." Originally the uge of Siste Department cover for 0° Moe personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. be bullen-Correx-Jackeon report stated in 1948, "The CTA should ”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 19 f___ 21 jaw an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. "Cixthe n got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation. Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluate”
“In such cases it will be apprecia ted if you will advise us of suc h r eferral in order that we m ay anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission (?) and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710) CIA The policy of eliminating reference to ”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison abroad be improved through a judicious aug- mentation of exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing with the common advers”
“14-00000 - 2 - (3) NCFE has not only failed to provide information about its activities, but had generally expanded its relations with government agencies in an effort to play one agency against another and, indeed, in many cases play the personnel of one ■ agency agains”
“ould so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances where continuin g CIA p ursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau s discharge of its in te”
“FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DI”
“SECRE[ J. For ikn part, CIA Lias developed A whale series 01 functions poral- .lelinng already existing functions of the State Department, and cf the Defense Department as well. Today it bas its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign servi”
“DLL 2l 7. .w • la It has meant too the the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its ater stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operatic as already mounted because the alleged evil consequences as exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's ”
“13-00000 13. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and 1 detected no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency’s covert action program. - -7 ill CORD MEYER, JR. Chief Covert Action Staff Distribution: Orig. - Director, CIA 1 - Exec. Director 1 - DDP I ”
“0P. 44. at 043 1 intelligence information. that this would not, you know, that 2 at the same time the Agency could be directed to perform such 3 other collection tasks as directed by the NSC. 4 In other words, the point is that certainly they do 5 some overt collection. For”
“SECTET 5. 14, peralloom and Policy wertd-on < iilium,■ to we vuewe teewww semew vowon tone, who Minim Clandestine activities abould 20 acneaned net only in the context of their relationship to an open society but *le® in tito catsext of their ralzticnebip to United States”
“SECRET 6 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows: ‘ 1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment”
“SECRET IC 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this ■.I memorandum would e as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general .clearance authiruty over all clandestine activity. This. • right be effectuated on the British model by the ap”
“IC. .to” 8. (the other 2200 BTC presumably under military OF er —State official cover). Oridnally the us of State Departs r for CIA personnel W38 supposed 3 trictly limited as The Dulles-Correa- ackson report stated 1948, e CIA should not use State Departtuent cover is a ”
“operations. The Committee intends to approach the issues of the CIA’s domestic activities with a broad perspective, realizing, as I am sure you agree, that the' threats to United States security and the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence, as well as CIA inst”
“government. There have beon troubles of a comparable revtin B 00t onalsverst 00 in a 2566 0 CIA has I gold‘ that, in 3ush CE88S, neither the Embassy nsr the Depart 0 is noszeelly : mint in Washington informed this type 1 operation. n F A i- - ndexciseassho”
“instance) widely blamed for ,developments which it 1s wholly innocent. " The argument of this memorandum is that CIA’s trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency ha ............. n permitted to operate 1-5 : and that this autonomy is dno to three main ca”
“-2 - 1) Clarify CIA’s mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to' reflect: --that included in the proper functions 6f the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter- ”
“SECRET 6. 2. Covert Department clearance. operations political In practice,technically hasState require however, CXA often been able to seize the initiative to ways which reduce State’s role almost to that of a rubber stamp. This has been partly the consequence of the s”