“• SECRET SENSITIVE Draftisew 23 Nov. 1962 OPERATIONAL PLAN - CURA * ANAT he" .A. The purpose of this plan is to cutlies the action to We undertaken by theCentral Intelligence Agency against the Ometro/ Commmist government of Cuba during FX-63 and for such longer " period ”
“S-E-C-R-E-T EYES ONLY obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined. 4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay- behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communic”
“13-00000 1 with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from ”
“with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish, the flow of intelligence from refugees, it ”
“ORN SPECIAL BARLING PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS PAGE 10 - 18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA) To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed. Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA ”
“with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it i”
“0 3 CONFIDENTIAL purpose of substantially reducing the tune required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be author- ized only by specifically designated commanders. — . "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean" CO”
“- t E. Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cub”
“sal for approval. INTELLIGENCE 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA) To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is ade- quate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. ”
“- tions putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage. Really current "inside"news tips can do most to undermine the regime's morale and interest the Cuban public. Classifi- cation may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a pri”
“13-00000 ( I E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any 8 significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stres”
“submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February, RFK PAper e 5 SENSITIVE TO”
“tation operational prog 12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are 88 satisfactory as ENGS be De 24T pected in view of the target. Given Mexico City’s strategic loca- Ope tion astride the only direct air link to Cuba, mor”
“W. Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban lead”
“13-00000 % -7- b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD. 0. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba. VI. COORDINATION The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of th”
“13-00000 F"ot 1ess and nasclutions : .AMOT-EOBL2ERelationship. The Agency must recoguire the 8. poss (t!I1ty of straimad Eeel1s the invasion. It La liaved because of the failure 08 re Prose «Ive Ageney 12 Lani will be able. beeause € 1 als excellent eracnal relationsh”
“TD SECRET SENSITIVE .3. Maintain refugee debriefing programs. D. Wexmmike Wliralin Nalso services SF dove zrodrers- 3. Peyeholoxical Warfare (CA)UN The program must primarily concentrate on and ***** reach the Cuban population. The following psychologize) wer fere activities”
“13-00000 668 SECRET TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban 1 ^ *9 *9 1 1 9 2 Government (FCG), the develo”
“S-E-C-R-E-T - - ' EYES ONLY - i icover and deception operations by that date. 7. Task 7, p.5. Byl February CIA will submit an opera- 1 tional schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance move- t ment inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities select”
“- 3 - 6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures t”
“13-00000 ( € H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. Per’s As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from are”
“A. Communications Intelligence: We will continue 4 our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communten- tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be poss”
“addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their pl”
“Mfr oronw Hag resistance group or uprising. 2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plant against Cuba. iv. DOLRAUXIOK: P (vo :2. P To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required develop the following program: 0 “toaye-ge 00 -errkevP Th s.0 t : Pe reawt”
“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the development of the paramilitary operation”
“H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount ss much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continent”
“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the development of the paramilitary operation”
“is recommended. 3. Cuban Brigade Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 26”
“action organization within Cuba which will be respon sive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned. to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be cr”
“13-00000 i1CR SECRET 5- Eimis .. Obviously, the successful execution of well- . ; - . planned clandestine or covert operations is time consuming. Recruit- %%: ment, isolation and training cannot be accomplished in a matter of days. There is no standby reservoir of multi-”
“n. Communications Intelligence: To will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA - station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communion- tions. As the current situation "norma 1izes" it sheu to be p”
“s% 6hngsms ^9 i 42 C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS 1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father’s) farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportati”
“addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited .assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre- arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their p”
“H. Exploitation of £xilo Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collecting, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount ss much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continent”
“S-W d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift. e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost certainly know where they were. Mr. Douglas said that a m”
“13-00000 II 1 DEUAC] -6- (5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad. 2 B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE 1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile. 2.”
“4-00000 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running RS controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba ”
“T 4 C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS 1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to - ’s farm one kilometer from the coast father and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo ”
“13-00000 ) and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations; We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas ”
“13-00000 ) 1 4 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six)Cuban vessels we are 24 now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running (12) Cuban diplomats station”
“LEASING FACERS SUMATE 1 104-10228-10085 CONTINUATION OF LI DISPATCH UP AND MAARI HLSH-3354 210W 1001 4. As you are probably avare, infiltration of bodies and materiel into Cuba has become increasingly difficult and there is every indication that tightening of internal control was”
“and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison servides]who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint , dis”
“13-00000 ) woP-secRH - SENSITIVE For SECRET activation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCLANT would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept* recommended,”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN NOFORN 4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that . projects would be operable within the next few months. 5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military ”
“politicalya .economic, psychological and military actions. Such -actions might include leaflet dropping propa ** are* * sabotage, strikes, and opposition to die regine tx che s* logical operations urging defections: large 9 eatsaidtg of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such”
“ns are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made. While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anti- cipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be”
“training by the U.S. on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force, which will be planned to strike with at least overt U.S. logistical support. * 38/ * Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December • 1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff. 197 - TOP SECRET”
“* 10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and nt the recruitment for ”
“to a drone. b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin A”
“refugee pilots are personally acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the Castro intelligen”