“services activities. 2. Operational Tasks: a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.”
“services activities. 2. Operational Tasks: a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.”
“14-00000 NCTTT PROGRAM CONTRACT MONTHS 1 0 1 29 3 45 76 8 9 10 11 12 1 23 4 6 8 10 12/14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 S IG. CNTR. IL. & ORG. PERS. RAINING PROGRAM ORGANIZE PLTNS. ESTABLISH SOP'S & LN w/ RTAF, BPP % TNP UNITS INSERTION OF H/K TMS. IN TAOR’S OPNL PHA”
“C. Provide advice and support for Station's CP penetration program.I % 46. TraihinG osincO, AT MAST TRAINING »M otievt You ^O „,( GW,„The near Stytnadveang None 05 202 :2791433 SECRET”
“targets of opportunity. f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation. OCADET /1A00 I te onor a ««• •”
“security reviews of operational activities. g. Coordinate double agent operations. : E 2 IMPDET CL BY 055431 ’J cpordt wi. ..l”
“the Special operations and ounter, idler Teams will gradually expand operations to fulfill their asic roles that of independently operating teams moving silently to interdict, ambush and destroy the enemy -23- 2.12 s”
“OPERAT ION OF THESE FAC IL IT IES. . D. PROVIDING-DESIGN ENGINEERING Preus FOR AN EMERGENCY COMMUNE- CAT TONS SYSTEM, AS WELL AS THE PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION, A.N5 CHECK-OUT OF THE SYSTEMS E. FOR WISHING PRE-FABRICATED MODUL A? STR UCTURES TO BE USED AS INTERIM”
“responsibilities: (1) Chief, SID, CI Staff: Action resuensibility for penetration and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and Security Services at home and abroad (as agreed to by Chief, NH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected wi”
“Vwslwdy J MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations /1 SUBJECT : Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activitics jn.(Xs) Jf-6)() JPkGSCZ) 1. Counter Intelligence Staff,[Police Group (CT/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy ”
“I cfciL of 1.11 inter/killerd : 0.11 - iff ive and vift teai r-ion and with- % *....... t. 3. ceil rerations: ter/diller T’cams will operate .in tive order areas and villaer complexes in order to operate directly nitlin the population against and within ■ which _ .anist”
“U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies 1 that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; OR SECRET 2 NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 46”
“OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C0/0 SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN Contacting AN AGENT, HOW DID' WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL ACONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL). WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH”
“NS CIA continues to be one of the most important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time consuming. Proper handlin”
“933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, •5 FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED To MEET SECRET at”
“OPERA TIONAL TASKS, OR TO LIVE AND WORK IN ACCORDANCE COVER REQUIRE- RENTS. 1 2. IF AMSTALK-1 SELECTED FOR OPERATION, REQUEST HIS 0A SECRET”
“of appropriate U.S. combat olomento and/or logiotical support, the wido variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; ■ o ■ *0 SECRET 2 HY 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 31”
“basically designed to achieve a PE, or rosi stance, objective but the implementation of the project requires the initial application of techniques and standards which are designed to collect information a positive or FI sense and which require a major CE effort for the protec”
“OUTLINED, AND THE STATION’S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY % THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE. COS Explained THE DCID‘S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARaNCE, Secret”
“non-official cover, under State, Army, and Air Force cover. Poroonnal er divided functionally withinF1, F?e and CI sections. Initiate and launch ncy F1, PP and CI mperations using best available independent assets 0a wall as assets available through foreign (aagannea) liaison.”
“opportunity. Case Officer - Natthew S. DHOLEY a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LICCL phase of the LIFfAT Project. b Conduct the training of all personnel aseipned to the LICOOL phase. C. Maintain LICOL capabilities for mounting operations against targe”
“repair, installation for new line coverages, or line coverage cut off. Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a min imum, Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents. Alternate and emergency communi”
“primarily by the "outside" case officer, David M. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintenance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and conjugally reviewed with the agents.”
“officer, instructors, advisers, or consultants; and capable of developing oddigenous forces, directing operations, and personally participating in operations. The training envisioned normally would include, but not be limited to: 8. Language apittude testing and subsequent l”
“CEOD [T •.... i./ ili. ! 0002455 I General A. duties B. Typical II People II day - list III the survellance ops. - I1”
“attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican. 5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and ”
“CONTRIBUTECHET ■ Vis 73PT. TO CONTRBUTiON' CRIME- DISORDER, OVERT COMMUNIST ACTION, ETC, och THIS;WOULD:COMPRISE OVER-ALL DEVELOPMENT USOM POLICE,SURETE AND oN. RELATED INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES TO INCLUDE: LAE” LOSCEA. A, CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL POLICE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE SEC”
“Orientation, Introduction to Intelligence Techniques and the Operational Fumi liarization Course. If the CT has served in an attached capacity with one of the Staffs or Divisions .upon completion of the OFC, the assessment of that Staff or Division on the CT’s performance an”
“14-00000 4. optT PALBLl • I “ These agents work voll together and it is ay personal fealing that" with proper considerations or call it "agent handling", thoy willihm -accomplish their assigned mission. ofoo..fot C-i-yr-md aM-Mrel do roconmerd, once the type of Maps an”
“one career agent and one secretary in planning and conducting Station CA activities and intelligence collection activities on Mexican government Support and conduct operations against other priority Station targets to. TRAINING CESIRCD: INDICATE RHAI TRAINING sou BELIEVE YO”
“four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number' of these contacts for periods ranging up to t”
“been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly we11 placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number" of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, ”
“HAS RESULTED. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, TREBLING THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING OVER THE PREVIOUS SIX MONTH PERIOD. AN ADJUNCT TO THESE DUTIES 15 THE HANDLING OF ONE U.S. CONTRACT AGENT whg HANDLES A PENETRATION OF THE CRTOCga COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS CONTRACT AGENT SECRET”
“'individual operations. 21 For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would 22 review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and " might 23 say we think that the Station has overextended itself this 24 month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the 2”
“operational intel licence support role, he at this point had never been cut in a plans. Of course, Chief of Station Jid not knew whether he would be willing +nc along with th:: set up of not. Mr. Baro:. The Chief of Station here is considering an TOP SECRET”
“questionnaire: ininccordance 0 it h CSt.P Liaison Police operations - penetration communist organizations Unilateral operations - penetration local security services id. redtoimo orsiuto. 7 .. 1MOCAVE-GHaV-TeaiaiNg vhu;G€Ll6vk vou sBoQta T----9f.rrwa.- H. otntnd, Vwe Fes”
“FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS HMDRIG mNINSD MIO CONTA) ALL., FOR Fol SP-2 ALM 3/12 ____________________________ I 101 31 pels” pAS NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 311”
“established with appropriate Thai military and para military border control ■ units. Te this Eim SIGNICS advisor y and tecnnical pe rsonnel - would be working closely with appropriate JSOPG opposite numbers in order to insure proper employment of the teams It is important to”
“specialized personnel, the GAUAS would go and locate the 21 personnel, talk to them, spot them, get their personal history 22 from them, send it in, and the: people would be traced out and 23 checked and cleared and eventually introduced to the station 24 case officer who”
“surface surveillance, keep watch for small craft, fishing and merchant shipping operating * Caribbean south of Cuba, and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.”
“0000 r \— CLASSIFICATION an Ansesee 10.48 83 To DISPATCH SECRET PRO. POSED PROCESSING ActiON MARKED FOR INDExing ACUOAM - PUS D Chief, WH Division motimpcxlng aequiaro BYO ONLY QUALIFIED MLADQUARTERS MM CAN JUDGE INDEXING FROM ABstnact. Chief of Station, JN”
“modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analyzing JMAIC operational proposals and steps in light what is learned about opposition intelligence capabilities and activities, and towards containing ”
“OA a. Penetration • Penetration of legal and illegal networks, identification of intelligence personnel and targets; collection of information regarding methods of operations; collection of positive intelligence. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 25 10-15-74 NW 88321 D”
“PHASING A. PREPARATORY PHASE 1. Principal Objective# To acquire current CI information on opposition services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence operations and through recording CI information. SECRET”
“correspondence coming back from 20 overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence ! 21 activities abroad. 22 To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency 73 i on operational activity across the board. So, we are generally 24 J aware of the ope”
“understanding can be clearly made that this is in : fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big ‘input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters 2 to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in .the given concrete conditions”
“political action activities; intell, collection; military training of officers and enlisted men via current DOD program; counter-insurgency training; waVL”
“ISHMENT OF -INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES, HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C0/0 SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID • 0 WE ENSURE THAT C/0S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WIT”
“BEHIND COVERT ACTION ACTIVITIES- THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED Ewee AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET.H , DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: WILLIAM W. RELEASING OFFICER . CLASSIFICATION WELLS- C7EUR COORDINATING OFFICERS ’ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE”
“keeping informed about develop ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele ments of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring opera tional coordination similar to that achieved by the meeting of support elements ev”
“deliberation.: 4. This is clearly an effective, well-managed operation serving an important need. We recommend renewal without hesitation. Attachment Project Part E. Ninkin Foreign Intelligence f --”