“S-E-C-R-E-T EYES ONLY obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined. 4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay- behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communic”
“with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish, the flow of intelligence from refugees, it ”
“13-00000 1 with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from ”
“with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it i”
“• SECRET SENSITIVE Draftisew 23 Nov. 1962 OPERATIONAL PLAN - CURA * ANAT he" .A. The purpose of this plan is to cutlies the action to We undertaken by theCentral Intelligence Agency against the Ometro/ Commmist government of Cuba during FX-63 and for such longer " period ”
“0 3 CONFIDENTIAL purpose of substantially reducing the tune required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be author- ized only by specifically designated commanders. — . "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean" CO”
“ORN SPECIAL BARLING PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS PAGE 10 - 18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA) To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed. Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA ”
“sal for approval. INTELLIGENCE 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA) To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is ade- quate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. ”
“- t E. Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cub”
“- 3 - 6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures t”
“13-00000 ( I E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any 8 significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stres”
“- tions putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage. Really current "inside"news tips can do most to undermine the regime's morale and interest the Cuban public. Classifi- cation may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a pri”
“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the development of the paramilitary operation”
“13-00000 % -7- b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD. 0. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba. VI. COORDINATION The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of th”
“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the development of the paramilitary operation”
“A. Communications Intelligence: We will continue 4 our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communten- tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be poss”
“S-W d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift. e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost certainly know where they were. Mr. Douglas said that a m”
“13-00000 ( € H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. Per’s As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from are”
“H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount ss much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continent”
“W. Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban lead”
“13-00000 F"ot 1ess and nasclutions : .AMOT-EOBL2ERelationship. The Agency must recoguire the 8. poss (t!I1ty of straimad Eeel1s the invasion. It La liaved because of the failure 08 re Prose «Ive Ageney 12 Lani will be able. beeause € 1 als excellent eracnal relationsh”
“submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February, RFK PAper e 5 SENSITIVE TO”
“tation operational prog 12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are 88 satisfactory as ENGS be De 24T pected in view of the target. Given Mexico City’s strategic loca- Ope tion astride the only direct air link to Cuba, mor”
“S-E-C-R-E-T - - ' EYES ONLY - i icover and deception operations by that date. 7. Task 7, p.5. Byl February CIA will submit an opera- 1 tional schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance move- t ment inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities select”
“13-00000 668 SECRET TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban 1 ^ *9 *9 1 1 9 2 Government (FCG), the develo”
“Mfr oronw Hag resistance group or uprising. 2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plant against Cuba. iv. DOLRAUXIOK: P (vo :2. P To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required develop the following program: 0 “toaye-ge 00 -errkevP Th s.0 t : Pe reawt”
“is recommended. 3. Cuban Brigade Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 26”
“H. Exploitation of £xilo Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collecting, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount ss much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continent”
“n. Communications Intelligence: To will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA - station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communion- tions. As the current situation "norma 1izes" it sheu to be p”
“TD SECRET SENSITIVE .3. Maintain refugee debriefing programs. D. Wexmmike Wliralin Nalso services SF dove zrodrers- 3. Peyeholoxical Warfare (CA)UN The program must primarily concentrate on and ***** reach the Cuban population. The following psychologize) wer fere activities”
“action organization within Cuba which will be respon sive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned. to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be cr”
“13-00000 ) and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations; We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas ”
“and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison servides]who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint , dis”
“s% 6hngsms ^9 i 42 C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS 1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father’s) farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportati”
“training by the U.S. on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force, which will be planned to strike with at least overt U.S. logistical support. * 38/ * Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December • 1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff. 197 - TOP SECRET”
“LEASING FACERS SUMATE 1 104-10228-10085 CONTINUATION OF LI DISPATCH UP AND MAARI HLSH-3354 210W 1001 4. As you are probably avare, infiltration of bodies and materiel into Cuba has become increasingly difficult and there is every indication that tightening of internal control was”
“4-00000 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running RS controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba ”
“13-00000 8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communica tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it shoul”
“is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational asset for Operation Mongoose. At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban peop”
“addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their pl”
“rsion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32401396 Page 4 SECRET situation in the recipient country and included appropriate suggestions as to strategy which might be used in securing implementation of the desired actions. f. Requested posts in”
“13-00000 II 1 DEUAC] -6- (5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad. 2 B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE 1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile. 2.”
“13-00000 ) 1 4 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six)Cuban vessels we are 24 now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running (12) Cuban diplomats station”
“ns are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made. While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anti- cipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be”
“rsion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424012 Page 5 SECRET situation in the recipient country and included appropriate suggestions as to strategy which might be used in securing implementation of the desired actions. f. Requested posts in”
“politicalya .economic, psychological and military actions. Such -actions might include leaflet dropping propa ** are* * sabotage, strikes, and opposition to die regine tx che s* logical operations urging defections: large 9 eatsaidtg of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET involved in establishing this Agency activity on the island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected with the United States Coast Guard in order that there be no interference with maritime activities; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was”
“13-00000 i1CR SECRET 5- Eimis .. Obviously, the successful execution of well- . ; - . planned clandestine or covert operations is time consuming. Recruit- %%: ment, isolation and training cannot be accomplished in a matter of days. There is no standby reservoir of multi-”
“DO* CFPRF CLONE SENSITIVE, woe as X. or. 2. % Assist State in 5**6se-9.0% ts, leaders. political groups. 3. Prevido covert 0.9 •” seeh other Cuban political PTorriate * ale •AC at 0 of the Osban nine 2 itting the A C. soncmict 1. Participate In inter-agency e”
“the agents would certainly talk if captured. Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he re commending them, and further”