“3 SECRET - SENSITIVE a \4 J 27 November 1962 Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/F with P01 and approved genersi in principle by ICI. Fully concurred in by DD/P. MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans) SUBJECT: Operation”
“14-00000 SECRET - SENSITIVE SR \ A F T . 27 November 1962 Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/F with ICE end approved general’: in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P. MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans) S”
“10 A6666_____ , 104-10307-10024 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 a ( A D TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE R A F T 27 November 1962 Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. ”
“the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: ”
“I SECRET -8- B. Contigency Planning New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a re”
“operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: %. -15-”
“SECRET -8- B. Contigency Planning New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a res”
“outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: % -15-”
“operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: % 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“7 0 D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Tyva Operational Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such oper”
“13-00000 ( 0 D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertakin”
“14-00000 7 A $ D, Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: 3 Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of unde”
“to mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelli- gence concerning Cuba and to develo p, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan permits intelligence, political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to ”
“re U.S. armed int ervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt polic ies of isolating Castro and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement/ with minimum losses in assets and U”
“6. rv I SECRET x-9- to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. 9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section- 107 of the Foreign Assistance A”
“imum, or even extensive, use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and facilities. No decision has been made that U.S. Military Forces will be committed at any time to support a revolt within Cuba or to intervene for any other cause. 3. Barring unforeseen difficulties, C IA can s ub”
“utralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere and will be taken in such a way as to permit dise ngagement/ with minimum losses in assets and United States prestige. The plan provides that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence be approved in advance by ”
“against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: !. 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“— *SECRET SENSITIVE Drafts spire 13 Nov, 1952 OPERATIONAL PLAN • CURA 1. A. The purpose of this plan is to cutlise action te wa undertaken by the Central Intellig Agency against the Castro/ soerey *** MA st of duringand: such Longer . 935 tpozace an may be Girestesst”
“develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan p ermi ts intelli gence, political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the target area, or other developments which would require U.S. armed”
“) I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, command and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, it undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli gence more difficult and shoul”
“• SECRET -9- to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment' to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. 9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and . action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, ”
“Docld:32423491 Page 12 EVED CLY 1 if such opportunities develop and can be exploited, this is likely to be a long and involved operation with marginal chances of complete success. 9. Even if the current operational plan attains maximum success, it is our firm conclusion that it w”
“14-00000 2 % I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intolli- gence more d”
“1 CAST 7 In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a ”
“13-00000 ( 0 I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli- gence more ”
“advance toward our ultimate objective. 4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assista”
“/ TOP SECRET { -5 and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the im”
“intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military ”
“7. Maximizing the political isolation of the *09 ^^^•' •'•Castro 'regime • from other 'free world states, and especially from states of the OAS; 08.. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of ' appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variet”
“flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation. . In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued ”
“unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their (01)CC) 2015 presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. Overflight ”
“PSEGRET TTTEEP 0il oUDUL ; ■ ■ To the extent feasible, U. S. military, forces employed ■ - 00 against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained . si 7 free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. ”
“-8- Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ Communist or Soviet forces. 6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should b”
“have a real opportunity, the must have something which they can join with some belief in its success 7 NW 66000 Docld:32424932 Page 8 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET PROJECTION (PHASE II). As a help towards the making of a U. S. decision on a future course of action, the Operational Repres”
“C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of command and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and_____ L political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only . for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maxi”
“13-00000 0 C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuri”
“13-00000 AKn,N TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - INCLASSIFIED b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment - - of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as; directed. c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with -? . contingency plans app”
“DRAFT TOP SECRET 3< »r-S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) C. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ”
“current policy and oth er li mita ti ons. Fully effective implementat ion of the present progra m m ay require some limited use of U.S. military facilities, particularly training areas and submarines for agent infil- tration and exfiltration. If a more intensive effort is to be u”
“a» SECRET -3- 8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral. preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistan”
“13-00000 > D TOP SEGRET -SITIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 49 IN REPLY REFER TOi .mASSIFED FAS DEC s 3 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUBJECT: ■ A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S) Reference: JCSM 809-63, Subject as ab”
“I SECRET •5. -and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. : It should be possible for this consultation and OAS • 1 action on the resolutions to be completed within :. s .. ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the r resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies o”
“leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in exile and the final, decisive military action. k id g ie g r o s ^ W ^ ^ ^ W « s . W ^ AvedksosithSeisyseres--n e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without d”
“13-00000 TOP-SECRET-SENSITIVE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF wasanaion 28, b.c. UNCLASSIFIED SM -161-64 31 January 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S) 1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, sub”
“O - - - - wot- - 04a opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing progr”
“intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces. We should be in a position to respond with open military support , (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of militar”
“W SECRET *11* COORDINATOR’S RECOMMENDATION I recommend approval of Alternative I. STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE I do not concur in the policy recommended by the a Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the ”
“-2- 2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as possible -- trying to ignore Castro and his island. 7, 3. Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of . targets important to the economy, e.g., refineries, plants using ”