“4 1 / SANITIZED MK 99 41 12/00 Oral History Interview with EDWARD G1=B. Lansdale July 11, 1970 Alexandria, Virginia By Dennis J. O’Brien For the John F. Kennedy Library O'BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin in anything like this is just simply with the question, ”
“-49- things. L O’BRIEN: Well, you have some successes and failures in--I guess mostly failures in the last of the Eisenhower administration I'm thinking in terms of Laos. Laos is the immediate • problem in 1961. How do you respond to some : of these people who are in poli”
“-49- things. O'BRIEN: Well, you have some successes and failures in—I guess mostly failures in the last of the Eisenhower administration' 9I‘m thinking' - in terms of Laos. Laos is the immediate problem in 1961. How do you respond to some . of these people who are in pol”
“-40- LANSDALE: Well, Bolivia. In Bolivia, I was interested in particularly the Bolivian Air Force’s .■.work of setting up a public school system over in the eastern slopes of the Andes-- down in the jungles and in the very sparse settlements. They were really the one gover”
“-23- great selectivity and go for a handful, of . highly qualified people rather than a large group of Americans charging overseas someplace. . . This went for intelligence as well as diplomatic - and other economic work, and so on. I used to A ■ point out the embassies—f”
“-23- great selectivity and go for a handful, of highly qualified people rather than a large group of Americans charging overseas someplace. . . This went for intelligence as well as diplomatic - and other economic work, and so on. I used to i • A • point out the embassies”
“4 SANITIZED MK- 99 -41 12/00 Oral History Interview with EDWARD15212G=B. Lansdale 0 July 11, 1970 Alexandria, Virginia t . By Dennis J. O’Brien , For the John F. Kennedy Library O’BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin in anything -9 like this is just simply with ”
“-110- isn't my idea of a good spot to be in. You just get belabored over that. O’SIN tAySPKL*: Well, did Nolting ever try to get you back to A Vietnam, in an advisory position? LANSDALE: I think so. There were a number of attempts by the- Vietnamese themselves, and unfortun”
“-114- to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing. O’BRIEN: Yecal Well between this time and the time A Tww] of the Taylor-Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . LANSDALE: th. no. Off and o”
“-89- friends of mine, and when I'd talk to them and tell them my views, there was always sympathy. for them,so I might have mistaken that for understanding and so ong and even that was 0 rare enough so that I felt that [Interruption] Y LANS O'BRIEN: How long, is the manus”
“-89- friends of mine, and when I'd talk to them and tell them my views, there was always sympathy for them,so I might have mistaken that for understanding and so on and even that was rare enough so that I felt that [ Interruption] 7 N LANS O'BRIEN: How long, is the manusc”
“-39- in dealing with some of the dissident areas and so on. All I had done was not plan- ning as much as coming in with sort of a shopping list of what people might look for. and individuals in these countries they might talk to to. .get information, on what was happe”
“-48- • O’BRIEN: 0 Well that. V 9 You had taken-of course, A you’d had that interest in Vietnam and Laos. .. You talked to a lot of people, as I under- in a . stand, about Laos and Vietnam and the incoming "* A administration. Did.you have any intent or • prupose in m”
“-40- 1 LANSDALE : Well, Bolivia.. In Bolivia, I was interested in particularly the Bolivian Air Force’s Juati5n - work of setting up a public school system over in the eastern slopes of the Andes-- down in the jungles and , in the very sparse settlements. They were real”
“-48- O'BRIEN: 0 - Well—thet ■.—- 9 You had taken,L-of course, A you’d had that interest in Vietnam and Laos. You talked to a lot of people, as I under- in . stand, about Laos and Vietnam and the incoming • A administration. Did.you have any intent or • pgupose in mi”
“-114- to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing. O’BRIEN: Yech. Well, between this time and the time A wtwa of the Taylor-Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . LANSDALE: Uh, no. Off and ”
“1 -41- very structure considerably for the lowest class in Bolivia, and with the arms forces doing it. This, again,was the very first.visit. A gn In Venezuala, I had come up with some ways of safeguarding our own interests in.. Ke 91 Vene zuala-which are not only oil pr”
“-120- O’BRIEN: Well when you get back, you talk to President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone) A as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here? LANSDALE: Well, this was when I came back, I met the A President. I went in with Taylor and Rost”
“-120- O'BRIEN: Well when you get back, you talk to President A 9 Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone) as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here? LANSDALE: Well, this was when I came back, I met the A President. I went in with Taylor and Rosto”
“-110- isn’t my idea of a good spot to be in. You ■ just get belabored over that. / O’BSIEN LANSDALE: Well, did Nolting ever try to get you back to Vietnam, in an advisory position? LANSDALE: I think .so. There were a number of attempts by the- Vietnamese themselves, and un”
“1 -41- very structure considerably for the.lowest class in Bolivia, and with the armed forces doing it. This, again,was the very first .visit.. • In Venezuala, I had come up with some ways of safeguarding our own interests in.. Te Venezulla-which are not only oil produc”
“-9- O’BRIEN: Well, I suppose you had some conversations with Dulles and.with Bissell and some of these people about it. LANSDALE: Yes. O’BRIEN: What’s their feeling? You already discussed • _king you to sort of hold your criticism,. • 0 LANSDALE: Well, Bissell definitely fel”
“-17- talking so much. • O’BRIEN: Was he pretty tough? LANSDALE: Well, he wasn’t tough.. He was the most ineter- ested of anyone in the room there of what I would say on things and plague me with many questions. O’BRIEN: How were his questions? Was he fairly naive about t”
“-17- talking so much.. • O’BRIEN: Was he pretty tough? A 4 LANSDALE: Well, he wasn’t tough. He was the most ineter- • ested of anyone in the room there of what I .- would say on things and plague me with many - questions. O’BRIEN: How were his questions? Was he fairly na”
“-106- LANSDALE: I don’t know. the o0 I heard about it this first Saturday after the inaugural—I think that's it. It was very early in the administration. McNamara asked me to come down to the White House and meet him there, and thought it was to brief him on, something. A”
“-9- O'BRIEN: Well, I suppose you had some conversations with Dulles and with Bissell and some of these people about it. LANSDALE: Yes. O'BRIEN: What's their feeling? You already discussed. , asking you to sort of hold your criticism, ..0. LANSDALE: Well, Bissell definitely f”
“-22- in whose name these works are accomplished, would have no idea that he would ever desire to know some of the things that they’re working on very hard- you di scover whole buildings and all sorts of equipment busilly accumulating 0 facts ■ ■ '' arese would say, I can’”
“-106- the a I heard about it this first LANSDALE : I don’t know. Saturday after the inaugural—I think that's it. It was very early in the administration. McNamara asked me to come down to the White House and meet him there, and I thought it was to brief him on something. ”
“-58- LANSDALE: Well, I had wanted the Laotians to defend their, country, and I was all for the work • Meos A . 9- with the Maoists and s on of doing it. A z Once.it left that and started involving us I Vietnamese or us, on bombing or anything )else, I felt that the cost o”
“-31- 01 It took us tgen, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed. O’BRIEN: tWell how do you come back into. . . well. maybe, perhaps we ought to pursue this.whole business of ”
“-31- 08 It took us then, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed. O'BRIEN: Well how do you come back into. .. well. maybe, perhaps we ought to pursue this whole business of co”
“-14- into it again at that point at any time? LANSDALE: No.. O’BRIEN: You do become involved in Cuban affairs at a later time. LANSDALE: Later, yes. h5 O’BRIEN: When do 00 you have any- .with the (Maxwell) Taylor committee 0 Which makes the inquiry about it? LANSDALE: I m”
“-14- into it again at that point at any time? :LANSDALE: No. O’BRIEN: You do become involved in Cuban affairs at a later time. LANSDALE: Later, yes. ho O’BRIEN: When do you 00 you have any- which makes the inquiry about it? with the (Maxwell) Taylor +1 T.. committee”
“-22- in whose name these works are accomplished. would have no idea that he would ever desire to know some of the things that they’re working on very hard-—you discover whole buildings and all = 0 sorts of equipment busilly accumulating facts ■ • would say, I can’t A 30”
“-38- arid put together some rough first papers for Taylor to start his thinking for the president. formed a Then when Taylor stprtedhis group * .A. I wasn't invited in on it and I didn't attend. A O'BRIEN: Sure. :got any insight. .. etinu it, right after the formati”
“i -11- up with details of whether it could succeed or not. That was my last advisory role with him. I was taken off advising on the project after that, actually by my own request because I was apparently causing too much trouble and orks of progress. O’BRIEN: ‘lac's the”
“-12- nd met them, I didn’t get in on that© The one woula-av, WO person who has a view of their reactions 1o.th-m] would probably be Bill Bundy, (William Bs Bundy) who I know at the time was discussing this with them. O'BRIEN: Did you have ... Bundy and his £00 ... - at ”
“-102- happened in each others sessions and what he was telling the guy. Then how useful this was mind you; I don’t know. a -A O'BRIEN: Well do you, find -again, in passing on to A c-A .the task force -and the formation of that Vietnam task force in the early part of ■ ”
“-74- put some red-blooded American boys in uniform out someplace) and they're going to start doing A other things as well. In collecting information) 11 kck) A . they couldn't help but tell guy. Well, if 3I.A you didn't do it this way and did it the other way, it woul”
“-38- arid put together some rough first papers for Taylor to start his thinking for the president. formed - Then when Taylor seprtea his group) I wasn't invited in on it and - didn't attend. A O'BRIEN:. Sure. W-h ngot any insight.. otanu it, right after the formation ”
“-3- stopped my visit to Vietnam, and back- . stopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as well as economic, military, and psychological^ and everything else. This, frankly, took a consife - standing on his part. . that because my ”
“-28- and let him do that. We have some wonderful Americans) and this 0 was what I was trying to do, :wEs to find out A which Americans have not only our interests at heart but were enough interested in foreign co - 03 to be - ■ ■ - 0 understand and have . - really would”
“-3-- stopped my visit to Vietnam, and back stopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as 0 well as economic, military, and psychological / and everything else. This, frankly, took a . consid - standing on his part. . that because”
“i -11- up with details of whether it could succeed or not. That was my last advisory role with him. I was taken off advising on the project after that, actually by my own request because I was apparently causing too much trouble and orks of progress. . O’BRIEN: ‘.. s th”
“-105- 9 feud and so on, and I hadn't said it, and I personally didn't care that much, you know,, I'd say, "Have you got all the hate out of your system now? Let's go on with the meeting, see.T1This of course would activate A A it more but I would say, "Well look, we real”
“-42- Guatemala, and it worked very well there for a time. The Latin Americans became quite enthusiastic, though again jealousies come in. They thought the Guatemalans were boasting too much about it. So,/when I was told that w problem I said, .Well, get them to emulate an”
“-122- don't think it would have been completely in the, Vietnamese context. O'BRIEN:. Yeah, do you get any of this thinking when you . get back? Any contingency planning or thinking about the building of troop levels to a:more substantial levels maybe linked wi th the se”
“-123- O'BRIEN: Yos. who were W Yeah. Who were the people on your staff at that point?- LANSDALE: Well, let's see?n One of them was Sam Wilson, ) 2 , who. now a brigadier general in the Army-o 4 A Bowell 2. 22 Jack Bowles- was a Navy Captain who went down to serve w”
“-32- that up originally, I don't know. I was rather surprised—he seemed to have seen copies of lectures and other things that I’ve given on the subject, But-, who had A passed those to him and who had talked to him about it, I just don't know. BRIEN: Let's say, let'”
“-58- LANSDALE: Well, I had wanted the Laotians to defend ow.- their country, and I 'was all for the work - Meos A 9 0 wi th the Maoists and s on of- doing it. A / Once it left that and started involving us Vietnamese or us, on bombing or anything . else, I felt that the”