“-49- things. O'BRIEN: Well, you have some successes and failures in—I guess mostly failures in the last of the Eisenhower administration' 9I‘m thinking' - in terms of Laos. Laos is the immediate problem in 1961. How do you respond to some . of these people who are in pol”
“-89- friends of mine, and when I'd talk to them and tell them my views, there was always sympathy. for them,so I might have mistaken that for understanding and so ong and even that was 0 rare enough so that I felt that [Interruption] Y LANS O'BRIEN: How long, is the manus”
“-89- friends of mine, and when I'd talk to them and tell them my views, there was always sympathy for them,so I might have mistaken that for understanding and so on and even that was rare enough so that I felt that [ Interruption] 7 N LANS O'BRIEN: How long, is the manusc”
“4 1 / SANITIZED MK 99 41 12/00 Oral History Interview with EDWARD G1=B. Lansdale July 11, 1970 Alexandria, Virginia By Dennis J. O’Brien For the John F. Kennedy Library O'BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin in anything like this is just simply with the question, ”
“-49- things. L O’BRIEN: Well, you have some successes and failures in--I guess mostly failures in the last of the Eisenhower administration I'm thinking in terms of Laos. Laos is the immediate • problem in 1961. How do you respond to some : of these people who are in poli”
“4 SANITIZED MK- 99 -41 12/00 Oral History Interview with EDWARD15212G=B. Lansdale 0 July 11, 1970 Alexandria, Virginia t . By Dennis J. O’Brien , For the John F. Kennedy Library O’BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin in anything -9 like this is just simply with ”
“-105- 9 feud and so on, and I hadn't said it, and I personally didn't care that much, you know,, I'd say, "Have you got all the hate out of your system now? Let's go on with the meeting, see.T1This of course would activate A A it more but I would say, "Well look, we real”
“-28- and let him do that. We have some wonderful Americans) and this 0 was what I was trying to do, :wEs to find out A which Americans have not only our interests at heart but were enough interested in foreign co - 03 to be - ■ ■ - 0 understand and have . - really would”
“-118- thing had on it, whether it would take his 5- 9 — taught head off or not. Hatgrter} I told him to shoot it up into the ventilating fan in the ceiling. We spent dinner ) actually, taking A parachutes and things out of the ventilating fans and the kid and I were cli”
“-120- O'BRIEN: Well when you get back, you talk to President A 9 Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone) as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here? LANSDALE: Well, this was when I came back, I met the A President. I went in with Taylor and Rosto”
“-48- • O’BRIEN: 0 Well that. V 9 You had taken-of course, A you’d had that interest in Vietnam and Laos. .. You talked to a lot of people, as I under- in a . stand, about Laos and Vietnam and the incoming "* A administration. Did.you have any intent or • prupose in m”
“-23- great selectivity and go for a handful, of . highly qualified people rather than a large group of Americans charging overseas someplace. . . This went for intelligence as well as diplomatic - and other economic work, and so on. I used to A ■ point out the embassies—f”
“-48- O'BRIEN: 0 - Well—thet ■.—- 9 You had taken,L-of course, A you’d had that interest in Vietnam and Laos. You talked to a lot of people, as I under- in . stand, about Laos and Vietnam and the incoming • A administration. Did.you have any intent or • pgupose in mi”
“-39- in dealing with some of the dissident areas and so on. All I had done was not plan- ning as much as coming in with sort of a shopping list of what people might look for. and individuals in these countries they might talk to to. .get information, on what was happe”
“-120- O’BRIEN: Well when you get back, you talk to President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone) A as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here? LANSDALE: Well, this was when I came back, I met the A President. I went in with Taylor and Rost”
“-23- great selectivity and go for a handful, of highly qualified people rather than a large group of Americans charging overseas someplace. . . This went for intelligence as well as diplomatic - and other economic work, and so on. I used to i • A • point out the embassies”
“-28- and let him do that. We have some wonderful' Americans; and this 08 1 was what I was trying to do, was to find out A. which Americans have not only our interests. / at heart but were enough interested in foreign cotricc to be /- to understand and have • pi. reall”
“-118- thing had on it, whether it would take his 5- 9 —* taught head off or not. -atcrtsr] I told him to shoot it up into the ventilating fan in the ceiling. We spent dinner ) actually, taking A parachutes and things out of the ventilating' fans and the kid and I were c”
“-114- to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing. O’BRIEN: Yecal Well between this time and the time A Tww] of the Taylor-Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . LANSDALE: th. no. Off and o”
“-105- 9 . feud and so on, and I hadn't said it, and I personally didn't care that much, you know?. I’d say, "Have you got all the hate out of your system now? Let's go on with the meeting, see. This of course would activate A A it more but I would say, "Well look, we rea”
“-9- O’BRIEN: Well, I suppose you had some conversations with Dulles and.with Bissell and some of these people about it. LANSDALE: Yes. O’BRIEN: What’s their feeling? You already discussed • _king you to sort of hold your criticism,. • 0 LANSDALE: Well, Bissell definitely fel”
“-74- put some red-blooded American boys in uniform out someplace) and they're going to start doing A other things as well. In collecting information) 11 kck) A . they couldn't help but tell guy. Well, if 3I.A you didn't do it this way and did it the other way, it woul”
“-17- talking so much. • O’BRIEN: Was he pretty tough? LANSDALE: Well, he wasn’t tough.. He was the most ineter- ested of anyone in the room there of what I would say on things and plague me with many questions. O’BRIEN: How were his questions? Was he fairly naive about t”
“-31- 01 It took us tgen, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed. O’BRIEN: tWell how do you come back into. . . well. maybe, perhaps we ought to pursue this.whole business of ”
“-9- O'BRIEN: Well, I suppose you had some conversations with Dulles and with Bissell and some of these people about it. LANSDALE: Yes. O'BRIEN: What's their feeling? You already discussed. , asking you to sort of hold your criticism, ..0. LANSDALE: Well, Bissell definitely f”
“1 -123- Yos.0 0WILE O'BRIEN: Yesh- Who were the peopleW on your staff at that point? *& LANSDALE : Well, let's see? D One of them was Sam Wilson, 1 whose now a brigadier general in the Army 0 Bowell A Jack Bowles- was a Navy Captain who went down to serve with the J”
“-119- me but used to bore other people. But he did know his country— and its history, which he would give at the .drop of a hat. This . evening in '61, seeing him, he was very hesitant in his talk and hadn’t——it .was something physical as well as mental hazard or somethi”
“-17- talking so much.. • O’BRIEN: Was he pretty tough? A 4 LANSDALE: Well, he wasn’t tough. He was the most ineter- • ested of anyone in the room there of what I .- would say on things and plague me with many - questions. O’BRIEN: How were his questions? Was he fairly na”
“-31- 08 It took us then, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed. O'BRIEN: Well how do you come back into. .. well. maybe, perhaps we ought to pursue this whole business of co”
“-79- meal or something) and had some way of dampening ITTE fattening the most emotional irritations out of a that would take place, just how-’ people beir seemed- polite at the time, so the content WOV uld hive of what they had to say would be something st that he. .w”
“-91- official documents of the French, trying to explain him and so on by friends, I found 9 very interesting and I had, no way of judging really on it—there was 0 O- 9tremendous sympathy and so forth being expressed, and then a very ■ A . strong attemot. to work out ”
“-90- to rewrite almost of all of it, and recast it, and retell it in a somewhat different form, with I'm about half-way through that,, but it'll be a fair-size book even so.. A - C. O’BRIEN: Well that's good-mainly on the Philippines and the early period in Vietnam? P L”
“-114- to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing. O’BRIEN: Yech. Well, between this time and the time A wtwa of the Taylor-Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . LANSDALE: Uh, no. Off and ”
“-91- 2 official documents of the French, trying to explain him and so on by friends, found 9A very interestinland- I had, no way of judging really on it- there was a tremendous sympathy 00 - and so forth being expressed; and then a very A strong attempt to work ° - _A”
“-3- stopped my visit to Vietnam, and back- . stopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as well as economic, military, and psychological^ and everything else. This, frankly, took a consife - standing on his part. . that because my ”
“-115- minister and some of the others, and invited = take & A me to look at their defense system in Israel. H I was quite enthusiastic about going and had everything arranged and was to leave on a Saturday, when about on a Wednesday or Thursday/ . A I was asked to go to ”
“-102- happened in each others sessions and what he was telling the guy. Then how useful this was mind you; I don’t know. a -A O'BRIEN: Well do you, find -again, in passing on to A c-A .the task force -and the formation of that Vietnam task force in the early part of ■ ”
“-88- 4 to them. So there was a mixup on a number of things on this coping with the.insurgency 'that was growing;not only the conventional .formation of the Vietnamese army but of a' conventional urban police formation of the police. And yet, throughout the systems there) ”
“-42- Guatemala, and it worked very well there for a time. The Latin Americans became quite enthusiastic, though again jealousies come in. They thought the Guatemalans were boasting too much about it. So,/when I was told that w problem I said, .Well, get them to emulate an”
“-45-. EANSDALE: Very much so, very much SO0. 2 O'BRIEN: Like rural economic development, 9 and agricul- Jural development. 2 LANSDALE: Particularly the oil companies, and I was 2 surprised. Standard [Oil Company of New—Jersey] showed me what it was doing because the rigs”
“-45- EANSDALE: Very much so, very much sop- 2 O'BRIEN: --Like rural economic development, 9 and agricul- fural development. 2 .■ LANSDALE : . Particularly the oil companies, and I was ' A Ci- surprised. Standard [Oil Company of—New—Jersey] showed me what it was doing becau”
“-108- out." And they got--Rusk and everything, you 2 know; J'You're off your sub ject, boy." But I said, "Well, Durby’s an old friend of mine. — and I like the guyo and I saw lot of him 0 when I was in Vietnam on this brief visit, and D I think it's a shame that the gu”
“-123- O'BRIEN: Yos. who were W Yeah. Who were the people on your staff at that point?- LANSDALE: Well, let's see?n One of them was Sam Wilson, ) 2 , who. now a brigadier general in the Army-o 4 A Bowell 2. 22 Jack Bowles- was a Navy Captain who went down to serve w”
“-38- arid put together some rough first papers for Taylor to start his thinking for the president. formed - Then when Taylor seprtea his group) I wasn't invited in on it and - didn't attend. A O'BRIEN:. Sure. W-h ngot any insight.. otanu it, right after the formation ”
“-35- having quite a bit of an advisory role with 1oura military commanders out there, and influence the and were with them, was fighting another Korea in Vietnam 1 more or less. wife There was some changes in tactics) t but.was more use of helicopters just for- verti”
“-102- happened in each others sessions and what he was telling the guy. Then how useful this was mind you I don’t know. A O'BRIEN: . Well do you. find, again, in passing on to a cA .the task forces-and the formation of that Vietnam task, force in the early part of ■ the”
“-22- in whose name these works are accomplished. would have no idea that he would ever desire to know some of the things that they’re working on very hard-—you discover whole buildings and all = 0 sorts of equipment busilly accumulating facts ■ • would say, I can’t A 30”
“-46- way down to the south.. [Interruption] 2 A He probably 7 • wouldn't do it; he'd chew the wire in-two 9 C— here. O’BRIEN: Oh my God__ It’s a wonder he-hasnt electri-—- 0- - 2 cuted himself . = [Laughter] - LANSDALE : —Yeah. It's not yours, it's some of mine• ”
“-12- nd met them, I didn’t get in on that© The one woula-av, WO person who has a view of their reactions 1o.th-m] would probably be Bill Bundy, (William Bs Bundy) who I know at the time was discussing this with them. O'BRIEN: Did you have ... Bundy and his £00 ... - at ”
“-90- to rewrite almost of all of it, and recast it, and retell it in a somewhat different form. with I’m about half-way through that,, but it’ll be 4 A a fair-size book even so. A C. O’BRIEN: Well that’s good-mainly on the Philippines and the early period in Vietnam? LA”