“14-00000 643 € January 1975 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media. 2. NOSENKO was in the United States u”
“14-00000 1 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person”
“the delega- tion and developed several "confidential contacts" firing the trip, which turned out to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO, somewhat long and dull, ile explained that .hee would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long the trip was to be, and t”
“1 4-00000 cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO’s above claims are impugned by fact or probability. or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is ”
“14-00000 “> SECRET NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he ap”
“my family, That's all. But I feel that not only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are faults throughout the entire system of socialism. What I mean is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Po land, things are bad with KADAR (in Hungary),”
“any, light on that area of our Interest. ■- - - : : * : 7. The possibility that NOSENKO’s defection was de- .: .1 signed to wrock the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction chat, the Soviets would not have chosen such ”
“of our interest...... : 7. The possibility that NOSENKO’s defection was da- .signed to wrock the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that, the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent: (staff officer o”
“SECRET NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Ame”
“14-00000 4. officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell two items of information. He said that the need for money 1 was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the en- 1 suing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the ”
“sip-nio gseresoveitesine Top Secret 1 (Annex A) 12 February 196'. (continued) At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advisi.g the police of NOSENKO’s disappea rance and S”
“of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. A”
“iques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi s first pha se has enabled us to confirm our analyses of key aspects of this case. More important is the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive. areas and this is worrying him be”
“,4-00000 1 IV • FVER t1 4 LiLv. .$3 1• • -2 - 5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desirs to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First- Deputy Chief of that department charged with the s”
“subversive activity directed against the . U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with . - . U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation within the U. S. Government originated with his distasts’and hatrad. for the Soviet regine in general, with his desi”
“<: detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the 0. . 8. S. Government. € During the course of his contact with U.S, authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with 5, the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred % for the Soviet regine in g”
“14-00000 .DJ ****9,9X90X27*19927Rv*w9 4 278. 4 says 'Never mind. The Cubans will give him an entry visa.1 31 SS And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in two days. The Cubans gave their visa ”
“light on that area of our interest. 7. The possibility that NOSENKO’s defection was de signed to wreck the conference was nost carefully considered. The decision to accept bin was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff ”
“' eTASNE"PZBMT MIStIY-TRY-lI-AMISf-iA-lsare RarE Emlo.Y. 23- March 1964 The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO .= *-- ynerrvn*-s wife 1-1-1 -1- had explained - - required that she 4- so”
“—the circumstances. They may-make mo.come ‘In that case we can meet. Case . You know that I would not bring any pressure. Officer: That's something we understand because we are .. both in this business. You and I are in the :same business, so you can't— NOSENKO: Let me inte”
“14-00000 753. few*.- e. Willingness to Meet CIA i Although in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and then disappear, there were indications from the outset that he expected and planned to come back for further m”
“’During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel ligence matters because h”
“14-00000 AVIULVUIILI 750. 3. Motivation Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source might not want or be able to admit even to hinself. Thus, what NOSENKO said a”
“him a considerable number of hand- written notes to which he referred when describing to CIA officers KGB operations of which he claimed he learned at KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation security duties were not onerous. He visited the Geneva Legal Residency dai”
“identity of a former American Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area, and the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually controlled by. the KGB. In reply, the American explained that he was n”
“14-00000 * A January 1975 269 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media. 2. NOSENKO was in the United States ”
“14-00000 ■ Soy iei' si de. hic rep l icd there had been none since the confrontation last year following NOSENKO’s arrival in this country. We then mentioned the attempts on several occasions by NOSENKO’s wife and mother to contact him through the Embassy in Moscow but adde”
“14,00000 ! eo -r-g-grm---xascasepy,-r--71ma-S-eks : - Nosenko’s Account Disputes Charge by Soviet Sceertqad-A : LL Si, -w-a-mar.---------------------- By TAD SZULC,3 -- Sportalle The New Zorn Ausse. Defection Preceded Report ServiceOities ’s of Officials the State of t”
“on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed kis a to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not o defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done. c. Motivation NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to contact America”
“destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO’s recent- ly publicized”
“in the Soviet Union." Exfiltration plans were then implemented, me and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same /night. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The de- cision was reached on 11 February to bring. NOSENKO to the United States, and in the e”
“them. NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United”
“13-00000 Top Secret (Annex A) Kapiton st 2869 53® 22198 1 am *** Bales 50688000946100 2091800 ammesizatzmesk anturtrantso 08 /049/128/38 3/2972878897 ’... . we .0 write END *******02*d*ron******-9709*72/2d-zaz/ So asgeytva 23 March 1964 The two women”
“condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO’s "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps e taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody. 364 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ---- -”
“14-00000 if ( 10th January 1975 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media. 2. NOSENKO was in the United States”
“any, light on that area of our interest.2 7. The possibility that NOSENKO’s defection was da-’net signed to wreck the conference was nost carofully considered. The decision to accept bin was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agen”
“adamant that the trans- fer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he asserts occurred in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions in the Seventh Department., he.cites directing five agents whom he brought from the American Department. In his initial capacity a”
“expected to. be sbla to shed much, if -any, light on that area of our interest. --p" :. 7 + 7. The possibility that NOSENKO’s defection was da-’ .' signed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. . The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that, th”
“14-00000 :Ur C-99- C77R 01. , -2-.. 5. During these most recent meetings NOSENZO announced his desire to leave tho USSR permanently and seek his future in the West, tie claimed his new work in the XG3 (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance ”
“13-00000 Top Secret (Annex A) 12 February 1964 (.cctrtinued) At simultane UN press C onrerences in Bern and Geneva the Swiss rejected these aCCU- tlong n- tio nd noted the Soviet delay in advising the police otf NOSENKO NOSENK ’s disappea rance and Soviet failure to ”
“fully conscious how I must suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know one can get used to almost anything." At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 Febru ary was selected for the defectio”
“incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs s that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family, ^PRECHE^ asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO’s recent ly publicized defection, b”
“00000 37. authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or ear on the 6th. NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February • and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immedi ate”
“sab. Top Secret [ 0 Summary of Case 1 The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A Soviet official approached an American diplomat with the suggestion that they get togethe”
“152 HT C 5/ ., 00 DNLY * CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . WASHINGTON 25, D.C 19! ■ , OffICE Of DEPUTY DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELUGENCE CM Man de . : 12 February 1964 HENORANDUN FOR: teexed c United States Intelligence Board Members. SUsJctsi.m Yuri Ivanovich NOSENK”
“difficulties and repeated his offer "to sell the two specified items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Sovi”
“14-00000 / . extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation — compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual of group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of t”
“1 4-00000 C 4 ‘4 C C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? D. . Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi zation reasonably”
“to notify CIA via an accommodation address when he came to the West again. i NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964. Since last meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieu tenant colonel and had bec”
“He said he would not consider defecting except in cir- cumstances in which his personal security was endangered, citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed mother’s dependence on him, and his love of”