“robably produce two mig aircraft which would be brought to states by one Czech and one Cuban pilot." NW 66000. Docld:32271623 Page 5 SECRET CB90FFFF”
“urged the following: ■ 1. That the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day. - 192 - TOP SECRET”
“navigation and blind bombing : without the use of ground' communi I The North Koreans have re- cations which would betray the di • cently expanded their radar--- rection of the flight and the tar-) get designation. (TOP SECRET DINAR) 27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ”
“September photography had resulted in a CIA study dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September. -10- Photocop”
“cancelled because of weather. The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mis sio”
“1 3-0000^^^^^/^^ math. r cnDET SUNE TVCQ ON1 V C.120 0:11.8 9 May 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone Dr. Scoville was present for Items 1 and 2. -J Ca”
“13-00000 wake F 22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK Qsyotan kixcmina S. AL 40 eo s 100 a20 HC ti /. I I X INORTH .Tous "Tre WEnas : cee-sme. Swe-way A X earenrs” 2 oC f. • AST SIEmAN 2. Se S FINLAND sea. _3-e.S-eut• 72.9, LoY (LAPTEV 7 ,—L %y 1 1—”
“14-00000 waoake i Essculve Ct 1 2-7861 8 April 1952 MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS) DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: Letter from Admiral Miller 1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to ”
“shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960. - 93 - TOP SECRET .”
“Page 29 laylor states that the Special Group and the Sencial Group Augmented considered a proposal by JA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic REpublic of Vietnam. This had been prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State arid Defense. DocId: 3242”
“22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK wltin. 609 %$78 van? 13 AM / go A- why TE +- 2 .0 *Ange Minsk - No 2’201 --" Smolensk| 0,PLESETSK Averknnyansha> Moscow. o"fil"s Kiphmevt 1Oree/ ""IMPACT XQdessa is —.."Irovsh aktrei Lev veronagh Gerkiya Ruor e AREA %”
“13-00000 . B AS - « H gum wad God fod WEG CW wed ;c. Design requirements call for the delivery of a 1,600-pound / warhead to a maximum range of 300 / miles with a CEP slightly in excess / of half a mile. A conventional war- / head would not make military sense / under th”
“(DPD 3505—60). Memo for DPD/AS from D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub: Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60). - 375 - TOP SECRET”
“See Volume I of this. history, Air Operations. - 113 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 esmmessimneur D -2- 3. 98 I Revised January 'Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule. The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended. No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula, ■Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Eve”
“flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites. On .September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central por”
“14-00000 16 pter describes some battle problems jets from were allowed a recor iss Over (p. 227). President authoris cover from Boxer, but the time was fouled up and the Brig a down before cover arrived (p. 230) 6tXinanoning : • s IP. SECRET EYES ONLY”
“had the benefit of preliminary results of the 29 August U-2 mission, concluded that the introduction of sur face-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet mis sile activity," and that such missiles would be a serious threat to aerial reconnaissance, but not to "”
“3. JOf* DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C. Tares of 28 March 1963 U17, 171/P-2 SUBJECT: Missile Crisis. Section of the President’s Draft Report.to Congress on US'Participation in the UN During 1962 TO: General Counsel Department of ”
“Government sources have reported that P/ a twin engined plane was shot down in Iranian ter Jun ritory restenday by Soviet jet fighters who violated Iranian air space. The Iranians say that the plane by was on a photographic mission in connection with the (Cont’d) For The”
“DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE .fi. at DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. STATES of P 28 March 1963 U17,171/P-2 SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President’s Draft . . Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962 TO: General Counsel - Departmen”
“CONTINUATION OF : J & C hB T DISPATCH IRYBA? EUT-1-004, 11 January 1962 8. The eisdor uf ALMARK maintaining in the European area at least one :1el installation having 02818206 It personnel representing wodly mpetencies necessary4 U4 intelligence unierlakinga been recu.firme”
“without such support. Even with respect to such operations, however, it should be remembered that tike percentage of successful night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great 1 . to justify the risk, B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against chose”
“Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people, unit sized groups. And no decisions had been • reached at that time. It was only that 201 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 NOTES A. Cuba The U-2 which flew yesterday's mission over Cuba crashed while returning,about 40 miles north of Key West. Air and sea rescue craft were sent to the scene. An air rescue unit sighted an unopened parachute, a life raft, and oil slick in the crash ar”
“drone..... - b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly •J into an auxiliary field at Eg”
“tried to give this ORW program to the FAA. That Agency, however, would not accept the program, and, therefore it was terminated by CIA.— SECRET SENSITIVE 7 NW 50955 Doold:32105622 Page 8”
“oned "Distribution of Weapons Received from Communist Bloc Countries" (1 page) (serial 64-47156-51). NW 66000 Docld:32319662 Page 6 -3- SECRE”
“13-00000 - 4 - friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organiza tion and”
“in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manne”
“*. ( v-d. 3 .1 veto SECRET 29000 ay. Dispatch No. UAP 0101 Da te 2 2 JUN 1965 205 TO : Chief, KUCURL FROM : Chief, IUPACAN SUBJECT : WITHIRUSH Helicopter Training and Familiarization in U7G3B1" . ‘3i 235 1. The two PBRUMEN pilot trainees arrived in Iden A ons May ”
“Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk. - Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no . recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos - (ABLE MABEL) until after the results of t”
“13-00000 d. As is usual in these cases, the villagers began to trickle back - once the Viet Cong left. e. This episode aside, we see • a number of indications that the Communists will try to sustain the - higher level of military activity 'they have kept up since the cou”
“to a drone. * b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying . aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Egl”
“broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no ,means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use / of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point |where the track had been "lost". In addit”
“Chinese Nationalist aircraft or personnel except possibly Chinese pilots in sterile aircraft, with South Vietnam credentials. State plans to balance very carefully the risks versus the potential gains, DD/I is to prepare the same sort ci assessment on the North Vietnain opera”
“Mr. - Califano Col Patchell 7 March 29, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President’s Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962 Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached ”
“BRUSSELS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS A NEW PURCHASE AND THESE PLANES WAVE NOT BEEN DELIVERED.) (FIELD COMMENT : NO OTHER DETAILS KNOWN.) 2. FIELD DISSEMI STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT FIND OF MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL Mtn ARMY/AGSI NAVY AR J65 SECBEP NSA NIC UNA ”
“complex. Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command Post Was established. 128/ 138 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 / ‘ SECRET EYES ONLY - 2 - 98 provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successful low-level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to have a USIB paper prepared on this subject. The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will”
“provision of. more advanced jet fighters, surface-to- air missiles, and modern radars, or even the pro- vision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers... It 6 6 -2- 4 TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALI Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library 1”
“4-00000 ( SC-02164 58 2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware - of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which i”
“departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area. Additionally, the flight will, according to Home, go closer to the coast than the RAF is allowed to 80. He was willing to agree to the mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and on the stipu”
“this was a one- shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission. He said th”
“to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited? . The entire group would later be returned to a stag ing area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation. - 158 - TOP SECRET”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET - EDER HESS SC-02164-58 2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a s”
“measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings ”
“dodge or a convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use 1 of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point where the ”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET DINAR A CHINA c : CHONGIN KIMCHAEK NORTH 02 4 TUU i KOREA SINCHANGNI •NAMS—------------ C.SA-MCHAM *HONGJU. T * ONDOK iPUKCHANGNI 40 P +aONcA KOREA M,. Du net US-O/g SUNAN 1 WONSAN &BAY-T ./ TAN RsBzie, Pyongyang •PYONGYANG OF,IAPAM ONCHO”
“intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.. They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM’s would play an important part in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti- ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highes”