“O - - - - wot- - 04a opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing progr”
“against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: !. 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“c SUBJECT. Considermtious for 58 Folicy Tor 2 Cuia aml Latin Anerica 3. US POLICY OBJECTIVES Current 1. 35 policy toward Latin America ir to Increase the stability of the area, to atmosthen friendly delic gowraveats, and to prevent the cutablishment of Castroise sad Rati-Us regis”
“13-00000 TOP SECRETC. Nlsrrrve— which could be used as a pretext for such action. UNCLASSIFIED . (2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage un organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military force”
“operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“13-00000 0 TOP SECRET ernm UNCLASSIFIED A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA 1. Problem. To -provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acc”
“operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: % 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“- 7... ASERN United States Policy A ' -' ■ 7,Le Ahdaltimate objec LLVOAXMt *480 '. the overthrow of the @astro/Communist Its replacement by one - tible with the objectives :f U/Ps S2Siilet as g the aims of 3 Are Was t Atyr t2 8 objccve,.the U.S. Government will apply inc”
“the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: ”
“13-00000 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET Aoms the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These ac tions would include: . (1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba. (2) Prompt introduction of small groups of ”
“outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: %. -15-”
“13-00000 LILO ONIY VEC LNi CEPDFT OL03L1 16 March 1960 A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME 1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of”
“outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: % -15-”
“ther assistance. : : 5 NW 66000 Docld:32204488 Page 4 COPY PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY We believe that the situation has cot yet schwi the point where w nad drastie action to remove Contr ia Justified. The present and fuzediately prospective situations, therefore, t”
“0 B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal con ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteractio”
“' TOP SECRET PEiC 23 JAN 63 ’MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE . ■ . NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (Prepared.for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.) FROM . Department of Defense Representative on the Inter departmental Coordinating Committee on Cu”
“13-00000 MIMIL TOP SECRET- (+) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of por tions or all of CINCLANT CPLANS 312 and 316. d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support t”
“7. Maximizing the political isolation of the *09 ^^^•' •'•Castro 'regime • from other 'free world states, and especially from states of the OAS; 08.. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of ' appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variet”
“SECRET -11- %NATOR*GIE COMMENDATION I recommend approval of Alternative I.: STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. ”
“d - 19 - guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to bes 2 strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by 4e the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting a PTF against increasing odds. , , 30 D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts Ne”
“W SECRET *11* COORDINATOR’S RECOMMENDATION I recommend approval of Alternative I. STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE I do not concur in the policy recommended by the a Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the ”
“ei rotaliatury measures for specifte acts of aggression or sub version committed by the Castro regi. 3. The discovery and exposure of the Cuban aras ache in Vobozuola and other evidence of Castro intervention in the internal affairs of a number of intia American countries Dow pro”
“SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1053, 10 a.m.) FROM « Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations 1. U. S. Policy Objectives The following are t”
“B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal icon- ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed' by Cuban counteraction ”
“SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1033, 10 a.m.) FROM Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations 1 1, U. S., Policy Objectives The following ar”
“evidence of internal discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be 1exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are mat. 6. The Coordinator should arrange for up-to-date surveys of the following:”
“13-00000 ■ ( 0 B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal con- ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by C”
“) I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, command and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, it undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli gence more difficult and shoul”
“MF SECRET -2- Objectives Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are: 1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintrodu”
“RON .%1 Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the — . possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime .. from the Bloc. Coordinator’s Recommendation I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. . The objectives stat”
“zuelan efforts Lo xo the Castrן אנושי הor plots and aggress: תס agulast latia American Covoraseats.. 2. Contiaן מוhe current policy of collaborating with the Sited Kingdom to bring about the downfall of the Chedot Jugan Goyersent ribish Gizea. Costro La providing the Jagan goverm”
“7 0 D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Tyva Operational Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such oper”
“if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country. 3. Leadership: : It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the ou”
“13-00000 ( 0 D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertakin”
“PSEGRET TTTEEP 0il oUDUL ; ■ ■ To the extent feasible, U. S. military, forces employed ■ - 00 against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained . si 7 free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. ”
“such rev olt. 6 . Any r evolt we are able to generate within a reason- able time after the expirati on of Phase I of the current plan, although possi bly substantial in size, could not be conside red a reall y full scale revo lt in the se nse t hat i t alone could o verthrow th e”
“larly in the military, to carry out a coup and elialente Castro and the Sovint presence in alba, II. PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES 2. The situation in Cube io characterized by centoric bagpatios, depressed living conditions, the loss of revolu- tiomry impotas and the d”
“13-00000 > D TOP SEGRET -SITIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 49 IN REPLY REFER TOi .mASSIFED FAS DEC s 3 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUBJECT: ■ A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S) Reference: JCSM 809-63, Subject as ab”
“accommodate - 1 changes to the international situation. 2 • In any case, at crucial-' points along- the way, -it will 4 be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to .review the actions already taken and those contemplated and : to assess the advantages of continu”
“nsiderations for 78 Policy Toward Cuia al Latin America 1 Cecembar 1063 SCALLOLERO LOCKS Σ : Current 1. 05 policy toward Latin America in to Incrmine the stability of the area, to atmogthen friebely demlic govoraneats, and to payeat the outablizuzent of Castroise and anti- regime”
“6. rv I SECRET x-9- to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. 9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section- 107 of the Foreign Assistance A”
“%SECRET -2- Objectives Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are: 1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduc”
“rising are vory 160 NW 66000 Docld:32204488 Page 5 3. COPY PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY 2. Continue to casounge offorts by Jatin American Coverasenta to develop and to taprove arthurements wong 70s for the control of the zOVOLNIRE of arms a of es capocted of subversi”
“flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation. . In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued ”
“14-00000 7 A $ D, Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: 3 Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of unde”
“Docld:32423491 Page 12 EVED CLY 1 if such opportunities develop and can be exploited, this is likely to be a long and involved operation with marginal chances of complete success. 9. Even if the current operational plan attains maximum success, it is our firm conclusion that it w”
“• SECRET E J 3 o 9 Producing comprehensive intolligenco related to the above objectives. A Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible 0 car with the objectives of the U. S. a”
“13-00000 ( 0 I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli- gence more ”
“some form of recognition to the Provisional Government. e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy af-■ fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below. - - (1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale-* invasion of Cuba (ex”
“SECRET -< iblezeamatazal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of 'Castro/ Communist Cuba.”