“c SUBJECT. Considermtious for 58 Folicy Tor 2 Cuia aml Latin Anerica 3. US POLICY OBJECTIVES Current 1. 35 policy toward Latin America ir to Increase the stability of the area, to atmosthen friendly delic gowraveats, and to prevent the cutablishment of Castroise sad Rati-Us regis”
“O - - - - wot- - 04a opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing progr”
“- 7... ASERN United States Policy A ' -' ■ 7,Le Ahdaltimate objec LLVOAXMt *480 '. the overthrow of the @astro/Communist Its replacement by one - tible with the objectives :f U/Ps S2Siilet as g the aims of 3 Are Was t Atyr t2 8 objccve,.the U.S. Government will apply inc”
“MF SECRET -2- Objectives Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are: 1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintrodu”
“ther assistance. : : 5 NW 66000 Docld:32204488 Page 4 COPY PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY We believe that the situation has cot yet schwi the point where w nad drastie action to remove Contr ia Justified. The present and fuzediately prospective situations, therefore, t”
“SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1053, 10 a.m.) FROM « Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations 1. U. S. Policy Objectives The following are t”
“SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1033, 10 a.m.) FROM Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations 1 1, U. S., Policy Objectives The following ar”
“%SECRET -2- Objectives Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are: 1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduc”
“13-00000 LILO ONIY VEC LNi CEPDFT OL03L1 16 March 1960 A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME 1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of”
“13-00000 TOP SECRETC. Nlsrrrve— which could be used as a pretext for such action. UNCLASSIFIED . (2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage un organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military force”
“against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: !. 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“13-00000 0 TOP SECRET ernm UNCLASSIFIED A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA 1. Problem. To -provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acc”
“operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“0 B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal con ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteractio”
“' TOP SECRET PEiC 23 JAN 63 ’MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE . ■ . NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (Prepared.for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.) FROM . Department of Defense Representative on the Inter departmental Coordinating Committee on Cu”
“SECRET -11- %NATOR*GIE COMMENDATION I recommend approval of Alternative I.: STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. ”
“the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: ”
“13-00000 UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET Aoms the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These ac tions would include: . (1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba. (2) Prompt introduction of small groups of ”
“7. Maximizing the political isolation of the *09 ^^^•' •'•Castro 'regime • from other 'free world states, and especially from states of the OAS; 08.. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of ' appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variet”
“larly in the military, to carry out a coup and elialente Castro and the Sovint presence in alba, II. PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES 2. The situation in Cube io characterized by centoric bagpatios, depressed living conditions, the loss of revolu- tiomry impotas and the d”
“nsiderations for 78 Policy Toward Cuia al Latin America 1 Cecembar 1063 SCALLOLERO LOCKS Σ : Current 1. 05 policy toward Latin America in to Incrmine the stability of the area, to atmogthen friebely demlic govoraneats, and to payeat the outablizuzent of Castroise and anti- regime”
“operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: % 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action. -13-”
“outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: %. -15-”
“RON .%1 Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the — . possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime .. from the Bloc. Coordinator’s Recommendation I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. . The objectives stat”
“W SECRET *11* COORDINATOR’S RECOMMENDATION I recommend approval of Alternative I. STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE I do not concur in the policy recommended by the a Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the ”
“ei rotaliatury measures for specifte acts of aggression or sub version committed by the Castro regi. 3. The discovery and exposure of the Cuban aras ache in Vobozuola and other evidence of Castro intervention in the internal affairs of a number of intia American countries Dow pro”
“outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: % -15-”
“) I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, command and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, it undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli gence more difficult and shoul”
“d - 19 - guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to bes 2 strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by 4e the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting a PTF against increasing odds. , , 30 D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts Ne”
“zuelan efforts Lo xo the Castrן אנושי הor plots and aggress: תס agulast latia American Covoraseats.. 2. Contiaן מוhe current policy of collaborating with the Sited Kingdom to bring about the downfall of the Chedot Jugan Goyersent ribish Gizea. Costro La providing the Jagan goverm”
“-7- ALTERNATIVE II United States Policy 1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. ; To achie”
“B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal icon- ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed' by Cuban counteraction ”
“PSEGRET TTTEEP 0il oUDUL ; ■ ■ To the extent feasible, U. S. military, forces employed ■ - 00 against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained . si 7 free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. ”
“SECRET -2- 11. and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military, invasion of the CA island.” x */ 6 * 6s dg A Objectives Accordingly, the objectives of U. S. policy with ad’te respect ”
“rising are vory 160 NW 66000 Docld:32204488 Page 5 3. COPY PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY 2. Continue to casounge offorts by Jatin American Coverasenta to develop and to taprove arthurements wong 70s for the control of the zOVOLNIRE of arms a of es capocted of subversi”
“DRAFT TOP SECRET 3. "7. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (NSC Action Ho. 2413-gt Kamo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961) A. Agreed that the political objective of U. S. policy to- ward Cuba is to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime. b. Agreed that the United States”
“• SECRET E J 3 o 9 Producing comprehensive intolligenco related to the above objectives. A Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible 0 car with the objectives of the U. S. a”
“ing the use of Presidential blatements to further this objective are contained la Tab A · attached.) 11. In addition to an early policy statesent on Cabs, we recommend the following actions: The President and his representativesput the Sovieta on notiop via diplomatic chuanela sa”
“Docld:32423491 Page 12 EVED CLY 1 if such opportunities develop and can be exploited, this is likely to be a long and involved operation with marginal chances of complete success. 9. Even if the current operational plan attains maximum success, it is our firm conclusion that it w”
“13-00000 ■ ( 0 B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal con- ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by C”
“accommodate - 1 changes to the international situation. 2 • In any case, at crucial-' points along- the way, -it will 4 be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to .review the actions already taken and those contemplated and : to assess the advantages of continu”
“if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country. 3. Leadership: : It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the ou”
“ularly 18 the military, to carry out a coup and allalante Castro and the Sovint presence in aba. 11. PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVISO TIESE OBJECTIVES 2. The situation in Cube is characterized by economic Bragmatics, depressed living conditions, the 1080 of rovoli- ticary inpoina and the ”
“13-00000 MIMIL TOP SECRET- (+) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of por tions or all of CINCLANT CPLANS 312 and 316. d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support t”
“P-4 SECRET -2- being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States; 8. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime; h. Maximizing the political isolation of t”
“13-00000 ( 0 I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli- gence more ”
“some form of recognition to the Provisional Government. e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy af-■ fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below. - - (1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale-* invasion of Cuba (ex”
“6. rv I SECRET x-9- to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. 9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section- 107 of the Foreign Assistance A”
“evidence of internal discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be 1exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are mat. 6. The Coordinator should arrange for up-to-date surveys of the following:”
“such rev olt. 6 . Any r evolt we are able to generate within a reason- able time after the expirati on of Phase I of the current plan, although possi bly substantial in size, could not be conside red a reall y full scale revo lt in the se nse t hat i t alone could o verthrow th e”