“continuation of Project JMATE, the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred did not set the criteria for the continuation or dis- solution of the project. This air drop was a complete (footnote continued on following page) - 112 TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET rather than in direct action programs against Cuba, representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter- intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire a vessel which for its acquisition, operational maintenance, crew, including incentive bonu”
“price. To questions as to whether either type was in existence, NY. Scripps replied that he was bound confidences. general, however, he did not foresee any technical barriers. ..4 When asked how he could finance his proposal, Hr. Scripps said vis that he would begin with priv”
“the on the high seas. Floating base Northern Fleet. Some of the ships would be vulnerable in TOP SECRET TRINE Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68”
“Navy. "(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period. 2 HW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 123”
“tried to give this ORW program to the FAA. That Agency, however, would not accept the program, and, therefore it was terminated by CIA.— SECRET SENSITIVE 7 NW 50955 Doold:32105622 Page 8”
“stipula tion that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles rather than 10. The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed. Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British re”
“The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which.made its report on November 2. At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of ”
“‘ with the Navy and other information pertaining to the development of the Swan Island facility is contained in the sources listed under Reference 14/. -215 - TOP SECRET”
“will provide some antisubmarine reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5 capability in the ocean approaches TOP SECRET TRINE Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68”
“c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints. I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions, about the rea”
“joint program. At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted.proposals which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced,that either of the new proposals met the Navy's requir”
“concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact,. Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was prema”
“capabilities of the Navy and the Air Force. The General Dynamics proposal resulted in minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate mission of the Navy and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial, savings 311 NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 153”
“land at i secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met g the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilo”
“developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my inte”
“To.assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of 'the proposals in the areas of techni”
“Director NRO and manager of OXCART project. 5. Question of use of Air Force officers versus civilians must be decided by higher authority, likewise the question of operational responsibility between that of CIA or DD/R or personnel seconded from the Air Force versus direct A”
“covered with radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be relaxed. (2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars associated w”
“hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send. a U.S. warship on this route. The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's positio”
“contracts to both Boeing and General Dynamics, as suggested by the Evaluation Group. 11 HW 50955 DocId:32424709 Page 132”
“would show operating costs in excess of $83,000, plus an additional $60,000 for transmitting equipment on a C-54, and a cost of $250,000 if the C-54 were lost. 7c/ 210 - TOP SECRET”
“and land at i secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met y the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The ”
“maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal received a slightly higher rating over-all. It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in Mr. Gilpatric’s letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that t”
“The Air Force Council, chaired by the. Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice .Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be ”
“Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single ”
“TOP SECRET I ..................... . — ......... 1 -• 5.4 178-10004-10053 10 December 1962 J MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. THE WHITE I..i)i. sir page sei 2 SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 7 December 1962 1. After concludi”
“enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves. 4 NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 125”
“"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war. "(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with”
“Subsystem and Aerospace.Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had.an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera bility at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system. For deceleration,, it uses dive bra”
“13-00000 /,—specialists, * fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however (164, oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile 2 installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear to a startled ”
“to a drone. * b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying . aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Egl”
“faportant to the success of the operation and it is a great shame that they spend eo much of their time and energy trying to out-mansuver and checkmate one another. I would not "give up" Bob Lang on this in talking with Mr. Shepardson -- but simply make this as a general ob ”
“was little, if any, knowledge or interest in the " experimental plane." All the operators were aware it flew "high and far - beyond our scopes," but it never registered with the radar crews anyway, so no one paid any attention to it. Stout explained further that all military airc”
“TOP SECRET TRINE No Foreign Dissem wartime, but ballistic-missile operation in the USSR. A navi submarines operating from such gation satellite system cur bases south of the Azores, for rently being tested may permit example, could remain on-station Soviet submarines to deter”
“at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his norm”
“attention of the Board. The last CORONA flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these installations in 18 separate places. He noted that these complexes ranged from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that 18 launching pads were”
“See Volume I of this. history, Air Operations. - 113 - TOP SECRET”
“14-00000 waoake i Essculve Ct 1 2-7861 8 April 1952 MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS) DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: Letter from Admiral Miller 1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to ”
“4 © STATE DEPT DOCUMENTS: DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1974 / SUBJECT: PATTERSON CORPORATION (CENTRAL AMERICAN AEROSPACE) CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL NO FILE # GIVEN (DOC #: SAN SALV. 0568) DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1974 SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT (PATTERSON CORP.) CL”
“Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change. A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recommended that further w”
“(DPD 3505—60). Memo for DPD/AS from D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub: Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60). - 375 - TOP SECRET”
“program is.to follow. There is no future price commitment for this pro- duction program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research a nd development contracts,, the. price of the production program,- which for all practical purposes would be committed to the devel”
“was primarily, although not exclusively, with the U. S. Air Force."* There were management problems in terms of the maintenance aspects of this operation. This originally, stemmed from the fact * The LST and barge which had previously been used for maintenance purposes beca”
“Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people, unit sized groups. And no decisions had been • reached at that time. It was only that 201 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 / / PAS E6E SECRET The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150 launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate. Dr. Langer aske”
“13-00000 A 0 11 July 1963 WE MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963 PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, *****kpetx*yxan Mr. William Bundy and Mr. McCone Colonel Steakley was present for Item 1. Mr. R. Jack Smith was presen”
“13-00000 esmmessimneur D -2- 3. 98 I Revised January 'Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule. The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended. No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula, ■Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Eve”
“to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited? . The entire group would later be returned to a stag ing area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation. - 158 - TOP SECRET”
“Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a.joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the Source Selection. Board preferred the Boeing:submission. The qualified% • 13 HW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 134”