“of Operation AMTHUNK VII, AMTRUNK-13 will have received the following training: (1) Three weeks of tradecraft training ' (2) One week maritime training sukaiegiw,1 (3) One week of survival training " - (4) One week of PM training accenting map and compass and weapons firing”
“4 4) So tor, this has been treated with a purely commercialthepoint of view advantages ove in our work many: a) All equipment may be carried frow country to country in one small foot Locker or suit case. May se set up and operating in 48 hours by one man - no labar prob”
“14-00000 Yer 7.• .NCTTT TACTICAL AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR) TYPICAL I/K TEAM ARFA DEPLOYMENT ’ cu ARTA orN wrftote Son/n ATCIE T "A 2i A, X at Ar oka fivelwan . ARES sorrr * or, DPP nit m 15o from AREA .AREA ----- . WEST - EAST’ / RTA er pro ”
“of appropriate U.S. combat olomento and/or logiotical support, the wido variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; ■ o ■ *0 SECRET 2 HY 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 31”
“C. Provide advice and support for Station's CP penetration program.I % 46. TraihinG osincO, AT MAST TRAINING »M otievt You ^O „,( GW,„The near Stytnadveang None 05 202 :2791433 SECRET”
“Office of the President and the Foreign Rinletry. 3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc. a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers. D. Recruit or obtain the willing collabor”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424017 Page 8 5 SECRET”
“OPERAT ION OF THESE FAC IL IT IES. . D. PROVIDING-DESIGN ENGINEERING Preus FOR AN EMERGENCY COMMUNE- CAT TONS SYSTEM, AS WELL AS THE PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION, A.N5 CHECK-OUT OF THE SYSTEMS E. FOR WISHING PRE-FABRICATED MODUL A? STR UCTURES TO BE USED AS INTERIM”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424016 Page 8 5 SECRET”
“SECRET freed in to travel T 61 l + etrecuse Legal; operaditigonaCeenot morale prolfinue. Khotihlser cone hical'senough. 1) Maximum security + within Hubarke only (e.g., hownuche does Siragusa now huow?). Limitative on number code derhe for enciphering + deciphering Guise o”
“I cfciL of 1.11 inter/killerd : 0.11 - iff ive and vift teai r-ion and with- % *....... t. 3. ceil rerations: ter/diller T’cams will operate .in tive order areas and villaer complexes in order to operate directly nitlin the population against and within ■ which _ .anist”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW-66000-Docld:32424696-Page-8- 5 SECRET”
“productive project which helps fulfill a Priority A-1 Station requirement. The FI Staff recommends approval. Attachment Project x Cathie El on Foreign Intelligence”
“professional and highly ualifief ailitary technicians, backed by appropriate support and resources. that will be fully capable of executing this plan 1 to the complete satisfaction of the Royal Thai Government. T -1- 2,12 p A.”
“been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly we11 placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number" of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, ”
“QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED. FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS NATURE IS THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED CONSTRUCT”
“Legal, ettica(>morale, operational problems; political: non-attribute- 1belite 4 a) Our onn experience (Bangkok) (+eflect on DDP) and experience W/KGB (Crossup, Bandera group, Khohhloo) -> profesuinial, proven operationally competent, ruttilere, stable require most CE-exenie”
“Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry, 3. collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc. a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies, to obtain advance information on travellers. 29 D. Recru”
“'3. Instructors: * The training instructors utilized were Alexander. V. DECLIPPEL and '. Iden C. IUPACAN PDO’s provided training as to cargo sling operation, rappelling and operational capabilities of special equipment. 4. Training Areas, Utilized: Training was conducted ent”
“U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies 1 that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; OR SECRET 2 NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 46”
“targets of opportunity. f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation. OCADET /1A00 I te onor a ««• •”
“is clearly marked FOR EX-2AL u3z o:LY. 09 5. According to the operational plan, the Dase to agent SI: pesseges will be prepared for the Area Division by KURIOT at Headquarters. The Area Division will pouch the G pesseges (as "blank" sheets of stat onery to the appropriate Fie”
“four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number' of these contacts for periods ranging up to t”
“14-00000 9, • SECRET PAGE, THREE 16 January 1000-1200 Mission Briefings - A Management Control REUTEMAN DECONBAIDD 7400-1800 Commando Raids 1900-2300 Analysis of an Infiltration (Operation ZAMKA, None-ni. Case History) 17 January ,1000-1200 Management of Maritime Ass”
“meetings are always hold at nights. All movement in : and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Acenta is done" in ears ostensiblyoined by the base agents, except in the case of. LIV CEY, where the agents are too old to drive. One of the local 1- amenta is usually u”
“FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS HMDRIG mNINSD MIO CONTA) ALL., FOR Fol SP-2 ALM 3/12 ____________________________ I 101 31 pels” pAS NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 311”
“the only| communication with the principal agent is by secret writing. There 1 uW is nevergenough room in an S/W message for both the positive intelligence reporting and the supporting operational details, and it is the latter | that suffer. S/W communication also inevitably”
“PHASING A. PREPARATORY PHASE 1. Principal Objective# To acquire current CI information on opposition services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence operations and through recording CI information. SECRET”
“14-00000 L-L-C-S-L-X TRAIMIG ERFOR? ESBry OF RATES SDAR m. 1 vee •—- ova everssa-o-cuiseventece wpo-p-g - worse - a. Nano Dates Of Courro MIIFR, Scott (Sou paragraph II, below) Staff or Division Ponsent Fesition FE/China In charge of LCRARVEST Program 2 I. SETCAR OD”
“1 9:0441 ESC 6 Tis-st er n.rl umist terrorist ilva:: 0 lan. cutralizatiou of Cortaunist Terrorist Threat in anailan: iSKfflK The scope of this program encompasses a .!t:l1,, five se operation as follows: Phase 1 Planning, preparation, Cente inase II Selection per”
“basically designed to achieve a PE, or rosi stance, objective but the implementation of the project requires the initial application of techniques and standards which are designed to collect information a positive or FI sense and which require a major CE effort for the protec”
“purposes. e. Information Support : (1) To supplement available normal news sources, broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material upon intelligence -5-■ SECRET HW 50955 DocId: 32424022 Page 9”
“€ SECRET 10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia. 11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities'. (OSS archives.) 12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc, for each selectee. 13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience. 14) S”
“Coordination, communications channels and liaison requirements will be established. In this regard, Ji = it is antici pated ' th at a period of from two to three wee ks will S 1 - be required for this initial planning and the establishment of basic and detailed joint oper”
“deliberation.: 4. This is clearly an effective, well-managed operation serving an important need. We recommend renewal without hesitation. Attachment Project Part E. Ninkin Foreign Intelligence f --”
“services activities. 2. Operational Tasks: a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.”
“2 preparation for adranceddraining in these three importanioastivities which will be dealt with in greater detan further on in the training program. INTI!I.UGHNCE Underground warfare, as we customarily think of it, cannot succeed unless it is supported by a well developed ”
“cleared with. . appropriate civilian end military officials, with whom high level liaison is maintained in the field. . 4. A major criterion of OPC activities is that they not be directly attributable to the U.S. government. Hence they fall into tyo classes: a. Those conduc”
“cover sensitive targets without revealing Station interest”
“ung Americans that are anxious to actively participate in the fight against International Communism. "First, let me state that we are an Independent and self supporting organization. Our primary mission is to provide qualified instructors for all legitimate organizations actively”
“- DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WCH WILL EFFECTIVELY DIS- . ASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES—PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY AND EFFECT COVER -RETAINS O”
“Id Ue enjc n =P rohi hi te d from itste any .<4 at tracti t. whatsoever. ;_ •urili entitional palitse , (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, * dtl, 3nd "t i " personnel voted follow closely so i/ic activities en conduct with their :5nr counterparts. continuous evaluation of: to activit”
“mounting of a sabotage program at the earliest possible moment. Coincidentally, planning and thought should be given to the topics of cover, recruitment, training and establishment of those facilities necessary for a ‘ rapid expansion of the group if a full scale operational ”
“the tray in a manner C/C) where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)" (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a Ic/: ______ ’*____________ comfortable temperature is maintained. (It”
“attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican. 5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and ”
“aieotinatl 1 1, 1 11 1 :I 1 1 1 SECRET/KAPCK -15- made only in great emergencies. b. Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents. c. A”
“literature. (J3) Analyze their propaganda literature and forward it to your regular mail drop along with your comments on how this particular organization promotes commu nist objectives. (C) Send a note to let us know what research specialty you feel best qualified for an”
“a"leader"i (Lieutenant) and an"assistant leadori (Sergeant). These men shall be given special training by the Secret Army Organization at "leadership seminars". h. Team "marshialliug points" should be selected in advance and be well defined. Practice"alerts" will determine t”
“undertaking (+) upon the completion of specialized trainin; All studies, including a plan for using overt or covert means ce PErve a re- Stlind institution oi the Caradian supply to the USSR, will be submitted by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to”
“intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above. 3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desis”