“initially. And I had to write a special memorandum to try to convince the powers that be in DDO and in personnel and in the Director's office that the things I had done which were not overseas — I didn't have enough to qualify. I had to explain and get their approval for the ”
“Hill. And that became an industry all of its own. I'm sure, I mean, just without even having been there, I know enough about the bureaucracy as to how it works. And it had to be. And it was a continuing operation. And it creates a hell of a lot of trouble among the troops and ”
“statements done under oath before the Senate Intelligence Committee, or the Church Committee really, where at least it's being discussed. I don't see how anybody, on any of this stuff, particularly after the Bay of Pigs Operation, dealing with the Agency, I don't think anyth”
“that most of the foreign policy was coming out of Henry anyway. But with Nixon's support of course. And he had Nixon's chops to do what he had to do or wanted to do. But by and large we worked very closely, as an Agency with Kissinger. We provided all kinds of support, assets,”
“of an operation, you don't go into details of your sources. The only guy that ever did that was Des. That was 1963. His final report to Des was simply, You guys are shooting yourselves in the foot. This information is very good, not just good but very good and you are maskin”
“came from. They knew it was a Presidential directive. Nothing was hidden from them. Oh, no question about that. This was a part of the Johnson presidential requirement. What he was looking for was evidence of Soviet or domestic upheaval in the United States. We couldn't find ”
“13-00000 SECRET that. Bissell was a one-man operator and Helms knew exactly what to expect from Tracy Barnes. BL: But the complaint is that, I think, in the IG report, Kirkpatrick's complaint about Helms is that Helm's did not ring the alarm bells. SH: He should have. ”
“saw a piece of intelligence that was worth the life of anybody. I differ with him about that. There was some intelligence which I think was worth more than the life of a person. I can give you an example of that later. But, the committees, I think, deliberately didn't want to”
“added it up and you guys didn't. That's all. Everybody was using pieces, using the magic figure it appeared was made up some years ago. Times have changed. The enemy has doubled its strength right under our very noses." That was my one nice big session with Bill Colby. That's”
“want to look at it, from about 1970 on, we had been in the war in Vietnam, for five years by then. The recruits, the new people coming in, who passed all the tests and what have you, and been through the first training courses and what have you, and they were on their first a”
“13-00000 SECRET SH: We solved that problem. BL: Because the IG report criticized the Bay of Pigs Operation because of the poor coordination/communication between Miami and Headquarters. SH: We did it without knowing that. We set up our organization without knowing wha”
“and I've seen him on television and what have you. But even when the House Committee, the Intelligence Committee, after the brouhaha of John having left, when the House Intelligence Committee examined the situation to see whether Bill Casey actually did cook the NIE as was al”
“13-00000 SECRET that I had made in doing the study on DCS, that come what may with my report, whether it was a good report or a lousy report, I didn't want people to assume that once I made the report that I would move in and take over DCS, you know. Being charged with ha”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET was in it, to what extent he was not in it. Therefore, from time to time, he would protrude ... sometimes, saying that he was sorry to protrude; and then he would retract; and then he would be in; and then he would be out ... that's as a person. Then”
“everybody. But anyway, tnat was my relationship with Bill. I knew him well enough then. He's just a different kind of a guy. A nice guy. Easy to talk to, easy to get along with, but very opinionated, very firm in what opinions he holds, he holds, period. And it's a hell of a ”
“Washington within minutes. And I think you know that my relationship with Des is such that he will at least listen to me — he may not accept what I am telling him — but he will at least listen. And I know in the meantime you can say, 'Get the guys with the white coats and wha”
“got out of there. And that night I see Frank Church on television telling about all this stuff they had just heard. Not once, he never mentioned my name. My name was never mentioned except, I was told later, in the late edition, a late city edition of The New York Times in Ne”
“ol and I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterint el li ge nc e Sta ff. I said I would offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence doctrine, he could stay working with us. He did not have to 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 25 Photo”
“anything we could do. There wasn't enough evidence one way or the other and when you had Postmasters General who testify. Some testified it was totally illegal. But some say it was perfectly legal. Nothing wrong with it. We knew what was going on and we agreed. And that's got”
“stuff. My answer was simply, "He's the boss. You've got to give it to him. And if you don't, you might ruin your job. Okay the stuff, just give it to the Rockefeller Commission." There was a Presidential Commission reporting to the President. The documents belong to the Pres”
“closely together with them in terms of planned operations against various parts of Japanese held territory. And we wrote all kinds of papers for them and pulled together all kinds of stuff, and the question was in those days we felt more like we were all part of OSS and OSS w”
“middle '73 with Schlesinger and Colby. But the program by and large continued in a slightly reduced fashion and a different terminology and with much more emphasis on doing that over there than in the States. I think it's the kind of thing that, you know, you're damned if you ”
“13-00000 SECRET ■ SH: I hadn't told him. I must have never told him the name. He's got a note to that effect; a footnote on that same page where he talks about this operation in the book. If you've got the book around I'll show you. In terms of assassination plots, first ”
“-103-. over where he was by some people, arid I' 5 noticed at times that' he wasn’t aware that . he was. turning around and. asking a guy who) minutes before Rusk had come in to him was2 Lithe Department called him A among his comrades just, "This stupid jerk, It and so ”
“13-00000 SECRET the desk on Indonesia, Jeanette Marr.. I knew he r from OSS days. I used to call her up and we double-talked xY I used and I kept her fully informed of anything that might' suddenly appear on the horizon without going into tKe^, details of our operation o”
“Congress in those days. And their concern was: a) not themselves getting to know too much of the secrets that went on; and b) they felt largely, you pick good people, you give them a job to do, you give them the tools to do it and don't muck around with them. Particularly, in ”
“I understand our problem on the collecting side. And so, but gradually, I don't know what the system is today and how it works, but anyway we began to break it down, but it took, well, it began in '47 and took until '67. 20 years. What you've got is two different worlds. And ”
“know - maybe he wasn’t l there - but anyway II get ' the-draft. If they had said but anyway the President wants you_to such and such II might to do such might)-) answer..:Ike’s got a good7 different answer have given him a different military background, better than mine,—”
“So I mentioned this a couple of times to Bill and he kind of said, "Okay, okay." I thought, "This is crazy." And I finally wrote him a letter, and I sent it to his home, not to the office, because I know what the hell happens with paper shuffling. Because I've done enough of ”
“staff, even by June, is just beginning to get their feet wet on something like this. And they were looking into other operations. One was an Indonesian operation which was brought under Eisenhower's aegis. And I think they were hoping to use that again as another example of a ”
“t S tre e t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , O .C. 2 0 0 0 3 A Right. 20 Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, 21 gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the 22 traditional skills, is that correct? 23 A. - That is about right. 24 0 So I”
“had a "701 Program," it was called, one of them I remember. And several others from time to time. You had reduction programs and it was bad in those days. But nothing like '73. Absolutely nothing. All hell broke loose. INTERVIEWER: Bad in the sense that he was going to cut a ”
“-103-. over where he was by some people, and I 9 noticed at times that' he wasn’t aware that . he was. turning around and. asking a guy who) minutes before Rusk had come in to him was2 Lethe Depretment call«A him, / among his- comrades just, "This stupid jerk, it and so ”
“lot more, at least I would have felt more comfortable, in knowing that we weren't going to face some of the problems that Jake Esterline had faced. One of the things we didn't have to worry about, and Jake did have to worry about, is this business of the air support. We were”
“SECRET! "4. Could Source obtain employment on a Congressional Committee on either side of the Hill which would give him access to the areas of interest? "Source has exceptional connections on the Hill and it is believed that through these con nections he might obtain som”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET going business of the DDP office, be cause this was taking a great deal of my time. Question: This was a tacit agreement, this wasn't a session in which you and Helms Bissell: Let me say this was probably not that explicit. I would make an observ”
“You are going to find all kinds of references to 'as we discussed' and 'why don't we talk about this' and, you know,' let's see what we.can do about this', 'why don't we talk about this sometime in the future'. You are going to find very meaningless comments." And the guy said”
“blast at one of his troops 1without himself, in effect, taking out of his guns and . shooting the SOB who did it. I'll give you a perfect example of that. I was on a telephone call to J.C. King, and J.C. was chewing me out on the phone about something I wasn't even involved”
“tre e t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 20 for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department, 21 or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by 22 the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor, 23 he was then a colonel, at the”
“13-00000 SECRET it. And I told them what I was doing. I told them I wasn't going to reply to the thing, I didn't need to as far as I was concerned, but I left it up to each individual that talked to me to make it up in his own mind. I don't know how many did or didn't, but”
“13-00000 SECRET long after, without even being able to do my own paperwork, because my door was always open, everybody knew it. And people would come in at all hours, particularly after hours, and they'd want to sit and talk. And I was told more things about things I shoul”
“I'm all over the Church Committee Report. I'm listed as the "Executive Officer to" or the "Executive Assistant to" or whatever phraseology. And that has been blown by Tom Powers and God knows how many other people. I didn't blow it but a lot of other people did. So, it doesn'”
“to do with intelligence. And that's why I think that it was irresponsible, and I think that statement is an absolutely good statement and is absolutely correct. And particularly as far as the Pike Committee is concerned. That thing was a shambles. And those kids were running”
“13-00000 SECRET BL: This was a DI person? Milton Brown? SH: No, it wasn't Milt. I know Milt. No it was somebody else. Gray-haired gentleman. Elderly statesman kind of thing. MW: But a Cuban expert? SH: Not really, no. He was just a good analyst and a good estimator. ”
“13-00000 SECRET was going to be problems in terms of the two Hersh articles. And Seymour convinced several of the powers that be in the Agency, including Bill, and then he finally convinced me to come on back to the Agency to help out, pulling together the stuff, because t”
“fear they'd show up McNamara. SH: It was worse than I thought it was. This is ridiculous. You don't run an operation that way. 6 SECRET”
“13-00000 SECRET is coming off of the Executive Branch. Somebody is trying to get some kind of yea or nea. Or some pluses. And you can't run it that way. I'm sorry. I'm not looking for an Official Secrets Act, but something that has a better control over who says what, how”
“specialization, whether it was foreign intelli- 22 gence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether 23 it was paramilitary activities. I spent a lot of time with him. 24 personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making 25 progress in the coll”
“they were also attacking Sid through me and they knew I was a good friend of Sid's. And I was trying to defend the point as I did just a few minutes ago with you. They wouldn't listen. And these were old friends. Go way back. I mean, a part of my generation. It was just someth”
“13-00000 SECRET on the Committee staff. She arranged a dinner party with several of the new staff types - this is the Church Committee not the Pike Committee. Seymour Bolton called the Pike Committee guys a bunch of young whippersnapper, snot-nosed kids. Really. The staff ”