“KI SECRET SuE SANEI2ED 1 06RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked I”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 178-10004-10115 REPORT' TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission: In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique ”
“congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that, would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further more, we were under i”
“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“SANT16P vL If 16\ d. 5/11 6 SECRET CIA June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization 1 submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. On balance, CIA’s record has p”
“requests from any committees of the - O M Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the M U T White House. At the present time, the consensus of those A IED persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release 2 ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN - ”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yot. to the yeare since, CIA has, to effect, ‘made’ policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even bean targets of CIA attempts at overthrow”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency shouldEoVa nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the yesra since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte ef the world. A number of governments 111! in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 0% overthrow •”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“IC. .to” 8. (the other 2200 BTC presumably under military OF er —State official cover). Oridnally the us of State Departs r for CIA personnel W38 supposed 3 trictly limited as The Dulles-Correa- ackson report stated 1948, e CIA should not use State Departtuent cover is a ”
“. Washington, O.C. 20003 19 i have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders 20 1: in the field have wanted. Some of this has to do with priorities that are imposed 21 22 on the CIA representatives from Washington. Some of it has ‘ S hw iis sa g Otr ”
“-6- . relating to that investigation was destroyed upon its completion.* A final deficiency in the evidence stems from the 12 doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed from the world and performed in such a way that if they were discovered, the role of ”
“iIn volume the most material and according to CIA analysts p most of that information. a large proportion of that is keyed to their report an’ yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carrie d out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a s”
“INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 19 f___ 21 jaw an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. "Cixthe n got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation. Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluate”
“in your para. a.) 4. The remedy which is being developed as a consequence of this investigation is the re-definition of the responsibilities of CEA and authorities of NCFE and the development of new procedures for the conduct of relations between NCFE and CIA. These definitio”
“operations. The Committee intends to approach the issues of the CIA’s domestic activities with a broad perspective, realizing, as I am sure you agree, that the' threats to United States security and the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence, as well as CIA inst”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. " AR THE ORIGINAL Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many IBR parts the world. A number of governments still la power know”
“effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly. I cl . 1 ° * : % Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all W. S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual fi”
“Agency efforts abroad by publishing lists of CIA personnel in specific Stations; revelation 28 of office of Communications)personnel in every Embassy abroad; the Agency role in countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking and training provided other services to counteract thes”
“14-00000 Her We believe the DCI’s office should also review all assign- WT ments in the middle management echelon with particular reference 7 to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training and suitability. Public Relations We recommend that the p”
“Sttmtl 8. 0A % wdlothan220,0 freprempu / under military or other 'mitato 3Eficial cover)." Originally the uge of Siste Department cover for 0° Moe personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. be bullen-Correx-Jackeon report stated in 1948, "The CTA should ”
“exposed to the HSCA. There is, therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the Report's being made available. 11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain”
“Committee.i Six months earlier my letter of August 141, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the . Industrial State." .It concluded with the startling premise I am now propared to prove to the Senate: "It is my firm p”
“■ SECHA 8. (the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the ugo of Steto Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. Th* Dullen-Cerrea-Jrckeon report stated in 1948, "The CIA should ”
“FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DI”
“by the U. S. Government if they were presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government. CIA Personnel Under State Cover The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various allowa”
“of 5,662. As a result CIA could not meet its counterintelligence responsibilities adequately even at this peak of on-board counterintelligence strength. It is our view that the Operations Directorate ought to devote no less than 10 per cent of its manpower to counterintel”
“SECREI 9. the uighot of €9 Conerols’ revnst ia Algerl?. pe$*ezo-by noted with amnueemznt that the top floor van ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to ascora entrance that night to the CIA offices cely with difficulty.) . CLA 10 moparently d”
“14-00000 6 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities 1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the working group which you established in January to consult with y”
“- 13 - C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori- zation and Control In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates”
“DCI."L/ The memorandum went on to sa y: b. c. It is obviou s that a compilation of Special Group ap provals in no way reflects the totality of signifi- cant CIA activities carried on over the past 15 years. With respect to overall DDP activity, it does not include any mention of ”
“13-00000 CON FIDENTIAL B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and main”
“Special Prosecutor are continuing to be supplied. d. Requests for Agency documents and files for the Special Counsel of the Impeachment Committee are being honored. Our search has not revealed the participation of any CIA personnel not previously identified. 1IGG”
“%Au VERom J OLNVOlEIVE them intimately and to keep our knowledge current. Our performance falls too short. core A lack of communication and inter- action between the Director of Central In telligence and CIA's counterintelligence unit. The present Director lacks counter”
“confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain • within its legislative charter. ' I am arranging for the published * transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific. direction made ”
“- 13 - 0B Lutz & C.- Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Author!- zation and Control In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion ”
“SECRET analysis, for FBI personnel. • In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Cur”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison abroad be improved through a judicious aug- mentation of exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing with the common advers”
“.- ta APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CW HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 23 October 1962 00 10/255/62 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: After Action Report on the Findings of the Working Group This is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April 1962 which”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have zething to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte 0 the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 2% overthrow ”
“agencies or private companies and CIA’s assistance to them; CIA management of its investments; CIA use of proprietaries, notional organizations and devised facilities; CIA experi ments with drugs on unwitting U. S. citizens; CIA detention of individuals within the United St”
“I UE ULUMLI Fud 3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordina- tion. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets of the whole intelligence community, ' an”
“0-2* &s 31 So it isn’t really lush a question. I would argue. 2 of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter of looking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiry 1 and saying, in fact, this- is going to be an impediment and it 5 is my personal opi”
“other agencies of government? What have been the prac tices and procedures .for liaison, exchange of informa tion, joint operation and mutual support between the CIA and other governmental bodies? To what extent did CIA coordination and cooperation with other government ag”
“4-00000 SEUNLT Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated. Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an importan”
“14-00000 handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro priate Congressional committees on these matters. We are par”
“instance) widely blamed for ,developments which it 1s wholly innocent. " The argument of this memorandum is that CIA’s trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency ha ............. n permitted to operate 1-5 : and that this autonomy is dno to three main ca”