“MISSION, AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS, THE EVALUATIONS OF The NI0 SYSTEM REPRESENTS SECRET”
“the out standingly successful U. S, 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of he Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla o”
“14-00000 SEOPET OCuliLI SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 - (Continued) intelligencejtargets, especially the intelligence services of the non-Communist world. SPECIFIC DUTY No. 5 - (Continued) opments in the USSR, and Communist subversion. SECRET sows”
“See Aea zed ths w#pogpizut Ura C*$ (ae w-24 TRAINING PROGRAM INTELLIGENCE A We are faced with a dangerous enemy who has repeatedly boasted of his plans to destroy our Constitutional Republic and to enslave our people. For more than fourty years they have been infilt”
“13-00000 / AKNSX B It is the judgement of the Coordinator that this annex covering intelligence and covert actions should be submitted separately after the Executive Committee reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological program and the attributable activities set fo”
“example, a few weeks ago. CIA made available to our Laboratory, at no cost, a portable unit designed for making radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc. ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT Through assistance a”
“possible way in which he could arrange an adequate defense against you. Exactly the same situation exists between ourselves and our communist and socialist enemies. Our success will be directly proportionate to our knowledge of them and inversely proportionate to their knowle”
“agent’s sensitivity of the opt ration should be indicated—e.g., observation, special suitability to the cover suggested and, or the special ad spotting and reporting only; case officer for established agents; vantages of the cover vis-a-vis the target. SECRET SECRET”
“PAGE 2 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS: 6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT. END. *— to .03 NW 88296 Docld”
“operational intel licence support role, he at this point had never been cut in a plans. Of course, Chief of Station Jid not knew whether he would be willing +nc along with th:: set up of not. Mr. Baro:. The Chief of Station here is considering an TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 C SECRET and ships with trained crews are adaptable to infiltration and exfiltra- . tion missions. DoD stocks of arms, foodstaffs and equipment along with DoD’a ability to sanitise, package and ship for aerial or suvfaceve, -) delivery quantities of supplies ie a s”
“radio operators or saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, you must request 0955 DocId: 32423505 TOP SECRET 234 7 Page 94”
“14-00000 4. optT PALBLl • I “ These agents work voll together and it is ay personal fealing that" with proper considerations or call it "agent handling", thoy willihm -accomplish their assigned mission. ofoo..fot C-i-yr-md aM-Mrel do roconmerd, once the type of Maps an”
“go TOP SECRET-NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING # Gen. Harris; Economic (limited deception). Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. Mr. Wilson; Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions f”
“sentiments. (USIA) To provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime. New words to a favorite song, a new tune, a visual symbol for wall-painting, a hand symbol as easy to do as "V for Victory," are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call ”
“to be the most skillful and dedicated that the world has ever known. There is only one kind of member that can qualify for such an army - the very best! This will require intensive training and practice. There is no short out to perfection. By drawing on the talents of severa”
“established with appropriate Thai military and para military border control ■ units. Te this Eim SIGNICS advisor y and tecnnical pe rsonnel - would be working closely with appropriate JSOPG opposite numbers in order to insure proper employment of the teams It is important to”
“a thorough assessment of this asset‘s capability and subsequently trained, motivated, and handled him effectively before turning - SECRET”
“overt co llect ion of positive i ntelligence h as ind icated that the Bureau can strengt hen its pos ition by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. This particularly applies to those”
“is clearly marked FOR EX-2AL u3z o:LY. 09 5. According to the operational plan, the Dase to agent SI: pesseges will be prepared for the Area Division by KURIOT at Headquarters. The Area Division will pouch the G pesseges (as "blank" sheets of stat onery to the appropriate Fie”
“3 3. Espionage.1 sinvolves the placing Or recruiting of agents within the enemy personnel where they can learn the enemy ‘s plans first hand, steal the enemy's documents or materials, influence or misdirect the enemy’s plans or policies. Suppose you had a chance to seosom? ”
“s***** SENSITIVE . 577 - ■ T-t 11449% “amounts of equipment, ■4. d/m 199 2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to wet raqulip ■ **6 * .mints levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military ■ FaeNf" dec Where internal assete exe ceatingeney plans. 1 • not available, assets may ”
“SECRET 7 13 ner mended I) Vomer recitone personnel offer presilitition, (ASS ardiinnPeres)iod of testing, surveil ance, eto. for each ay Bolt dech pone el minded shall done some cr selector experience 14 PBlasth-08+ stable Me s) What are limits on team or individuals s”
“SECRET PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE. 1. This is a new, experimental version of the Personality Assessment , Questionnaire' (sometimes informally called the PRQ III) which has been in use for several years. This new form is largely a checklist and thus requires - for”
“......................................... ■17 . Communist Theory..... . 18. Soviet IS..................... 19. Psychological Warfare ........ . :: 20. Political Warfare............. 21. Economic Warfare................................... 22. Sabotage........................”
“professional and highly ualifief ailitary technicians, backed by appropriate support and resources. that will be fully capable of executing this plan 1 to the complete satisfaction of the Royal Thai Government. T -1- 2,12 p A.”
“either in operation or planned for the near future. 4. The actual identity of enemy agents, fellow travelers and sympathi zers along with details regarding their work, place of residence, cover opera tion, means of transportation, travel pattern, personal appearance, menta”
“ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DECREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF”
“S 30 December 1970). -- - 2e*s*Cour--"6- Spot, develop, assess, and recruit agents to obtain i watiN LETTER .intelligence from the decision-making level of the communist parties (particularly the Maoists) and thoir main front organizations. P seddine Darrjea, •. . • ! Lery”
“Legal, ettica(>morale, operational problems; political: non-attribute- 1belite 4 a) Our onn experience (Bangkok) (+eflect on DDP) and experience W/KGB (Crossup, Bandera group, Khohhloo) -> profesuinial, proven operationally competent, ruttilere, stable require most CE-exenie”
“aieotinatl 1 1, 1 11 1 :I 1 1 1 SECRET/KAPCK -15- made only in great emergencies. b. Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents. c. A”
“HAS RESULTED. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, TREBLING THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING OVER THE PREVIOUS SIX MONTH PERIOD. AN ADJUNCT TO THESE DUTIES 15 THE HANDLING OF ONE U.S. CONTRACT AGENT whg HANDLES A PENETRATION OF THE CRTOCga COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS CONTRACT AGENT SECRET”
“2 preparation for adranceddraining in these three importanioastivities which will be dealt with in greater detan further on in the training program. INTI!I.UGHNCE Underground warfare, as we customarily think of it, cannot succeed unless it is supported by a well developed ”
“each of you for the Tuesday meeting: Mr. Harvey: Intelli V’olitical (splitting the regime, , I honomic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilita Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the Mr. Hurwitch: Steterd Objectives, Political, and Economic. Als”
“of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal / agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for process log at a laboratory equipped for that purpose. After the film is ”
“V. ‘CONCEPT OF Ori.RATIONS A. General Concept The purpose of this program will be to strike 8 the Communist insurgents where they are most vulnerable and to mesh the operations of selected Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams into present Royal Thai Government ongoing Co”
“security reviews of operational activities. g. Coordinate double agent operations. : E 2 IMPDET CL BY 055431 ’J cpordt wi. ..l”
“14-00000 erpoty Spratt case officers, instructors, advisors, or consultants; and capable of developing indigenous forces, creating operations, and personally participating ia operations, tha training envisioned normally would include, but not be limited to: 9, Language ”
“one career agent and one secretary in planning and conducting Station CA activities and intelligence collection activities on Mexican government Support and conduct operations against other priority Station targets to. TRAINING CESIRCD: INDICATE RHAI TRAINING sou BELIEVE YO”
“additional technical surveillance devices in the target in the form of concealed radio transmitters. 0004094 NW 65924 Docld:32361431 Page 4 3 PAGE COPY NO. of 22 SECRET/KAPOK -2- D. Operational Assets (Personnel)”
“OA a. Penetration • Penetration of legal and illegal networks, identification of intelligence personnel and targets; collection of information regarding methods of operations; collection of positive intelligence. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 25 10-15-74 NW 88321 D”
“desired, we would have to offer some kind of a career with a starting salary of somewhere between the OS 7 and GS 9 level, plus travel and allowances. Without attempting to even estimate this cost one can see that the figures for a team of fifteen would run into six digits. ”
“Political Warfare .... . 21. Economic Warfare ..... 22. Sabotage....................... .... 23. Counter-sabotage................. '24. Resistance Force Activities 25. Guerrilla Warfare .......... 26. Evasion & Escape • • 27. Weapons ............. 28. Demolitions.........”
“ed and that it was strictly an infil1- tration procedure and not a commando type bit and run action. This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distribute”
“and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high- level reconnaissance of denied areas. Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means 3. Proposed "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK 98 Mr. Jorgensen ”
“Vwslwdy J MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations /1 SUBJECT : Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activitics jn.(Xs) Jf-6)() JPkGSCZ) 1. Counter Intelligence Staff,[Police Group (CT/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy ”
“Security- - - ■ 19. Psychological warfare - 2. Cover - - - - - - - 20. Political warfare - - 3. Observation & description - hit 21 Economic warfare - %. Intervlesing 22. Sabotage : 5. Interrogation 23. Counter-sabotage - 6. Surveillance 24. Resistance force activities - 7. ”
“13-00000 f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee. E. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miami to brief trainer on his assignment. h. Quarter trainer in training site. 1. Advise FRD representative to purc”
“:SECRET Security Information problems concerning bases and management, and requires relatively - small investments and expense. It would be advantageous beyond the immediate PP field. ■ In such a post an agent could observe communist infiltration, spot forthcoming political”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW-66000-Docld:32424696-Page-8- 5 SECRET”