“"never discussed" executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22). As for Bundy, Bissell’s final testimony (after telephone con- 4 tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy about the capability after it had been created (Bissell”
“might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were . the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that thei”
“discussed" executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22). As for Bundy, Bissell's final testimony (after telephone con tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy ‘ about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75”
“Page 14 "I have no recollection of briefing those two gentlemen except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member." (Bissell, '6/11/75, p. 27). As mentioned above. (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his br”
“SHELBURNE:ms1 TOP SECRET 81 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 2:17 3 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D) 4 The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. 5 Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning . 6 It will be understood that the oath”
“initial testimony, Bissell, said that: the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the : Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still' later he said: "there is little, doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p”
“in his initial testimony, Bissell said that 1 the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the 18 Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still later he said: there is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/”
“capability, I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." , - (Bissell; 6/11/75, p..51). Bissell and Bundy both testified, howe”
“capability was "undoubtedly" initiated-within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). . He had acknowledged onhis first day of testimony that this'would not have been unusual: .it was the normal practice in the. Agency and an impor tant part of its mission to create various ”
“-8- In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" *quotation of Harvey’s notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bis”
“. -8 - In his initial appearances before the Committee oh June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" ■ quotation of Harvey’s notes in the Inspector General’s Report, ”
“I-seat 25. TOP-SECRET V86 ** 10 seed Phone (Area 202) 544-6000? 0 1 the CIA to develop such a capability? 2 Mr. Dundy, I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is 5 only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any 4 impediment after I was briefed. 5 The Ch”
“-10- actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/ 22/ 75, p. 31) Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the executive action capability to the President.- (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 3”
“AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10004-10138 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION RECORDS SERIES : INTERVIEW SUMMARY (EXCERPT) AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Date: 07/01/94 Page:1 ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO: TITLE : EXCERPT OF INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM HARVEY DATE”
“410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D C. 20003 19 cribed to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in 20 this enterprise would come in the first instance from the am 21j; Kennedy Administration. The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the 23 Bissell testimony”
“-11- •was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy’s) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that but this is a matter that probably someone list”
“reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of 'bad words ' emphasized to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation." (I.G. (I.G.,, p.18 ). p.18 ).- Bissell testified that "I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from . that -meeting-—and the”
“-11- was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that, but this is a matter that probably someone list”
“-7- The following testimony regarding the relationship - : between "the White House" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee: Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indica ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an e”
“-10- actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken- by the- CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite certain” that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the . executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p”
“Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel is,, as you say, a friend of 20 i yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours? Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is. 22 Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did 23 have gradations within it, ended up saying that 24 he believed either you ”
“capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have been unusual: it was the normal practice in the Agency and an impor tant part of its mission to create various kind”
“did not recall any specific 22 conversation. , • he said, after having reviewed 23 i certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's © note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey 25 in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to ”
“that Bundy, in addition to ex- - pressing no unfavorable reaction, to the project, might have, actually given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28). Bisse11 testified that he might have interpreted Bundy’s reaction as approval for the executive action c”
“-16- attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa- tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly'in. OR withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts Bunry ACTED ag”
“dn5 Phone (A rea 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 53 1 to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until 2 after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962. 5 Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably 4 with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developin”
“NW 50955 DocId: 32203774 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO Page 26 DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 1/- ~-9% Le PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES; CATEGORIES: { HARVEY, William” 26 Jan. 1961 EXECUTIVE ACTION PSIEVER, Arnold! BISSELL, Richard OCCURRENCE: ”
“-16- attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa- tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts against Castro had ”
“Page 4 Again as part of his "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60) that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a "‘circumlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using "rather general terms." Bissell repeatedly cou”
“_ 9 - such conversations occurred .. . . . I do believe they did occur is that during the entire - autumn I suppose I must have spoken to Mr . Dulles practically daily about some aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually certain that he would in one or another ”
“-5 - discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). had —”
“-15- was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a F1 specific recruitment ■ (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59). , ' (d) The Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected to Any Actual Assassina”
“in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any; specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated -- * A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination effort”
“-4- that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not.urging by Bu”
“"in train" for "approxi- mately two years or perhaps -18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54). Although his "net impression" was that both the "exploratory project" and the specific operation" were "fully authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that "speci”
“in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall, any specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey’s notes,, and stated * A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination efforts ag”
“-7- The following testimony regarding the relationship between "the White House" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee: / Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indica ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an exe”
“"approxi- mately two years or perhaps -18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54). Although his "net impression" was that both the 1? exploratory project" and the '’specific operation" were "fully 8 authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that 11 specific ”
“-5- discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,' might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). had -- or”
“e — 2 TOP SECRET 15 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that. 2 The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself? 0 Mr. Bundy. It surely might have been. The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that 5 briefing, you have”
“to ex pressing no unfavorable reaction to the project, might have actually given a more .affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28): Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction: ■ as approval for the executive action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75,”
“-5- discussion of. executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the'timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). had -- ”
“QUKAFIINU SUBUUMML 11EEJ TOP SECRET -- FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE ONLY 8/29/75 c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided here”
“go STOP SECRET ¥ .. at %.% tila ;oh 2.... aV* 10,1 %. - 27 da 41 Phone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 544-6000 1 Mr. Bundy. ' ’ Mr. Bissell may not recollect that T did 2 not give him this instruction, but I do, Mr. Chairman. 5 The Chairman. Did Mr. Bissell at any time during the 4 per”
“re whether Bissell had indicated whether it was someone in the Kennedy White House or the Eisenhower NW 66000 Docld:32202027 Page 5 ron errDET 1. ERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 8. of YOP SECRET White House who had made the request. Again, he has the impression, although he can r”
“TOP SECRET 40 a Phone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 1 We then .went on to a discussion of what it was. “And 2 we agreed that whatever else it was, it was not an operation 3 plan, and it was not targeted against anyone. 4 Mr. Smothers. What was his reaction to your comme”
“-15-' was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a specific recruitment." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59). (d) ' Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected to Any Actual Assassination Pl”
“-‘1- that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bund”
“conflict with Harvey’s testimony as to whether such ’’urging” had in fact been given to Bissell. = ■ * Harvey’s notes also contained a phrase which suggests his con cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (R”
“conflict with Harvey's. testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to : Bissell... *Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his con- - cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (”