“KI SECRET SuE SANEI2ED 1 06RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked I”
“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“SANT16P vL If 16\ d. 5/11 6 SECRET CIA June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization 1 submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. On balance, CIA’s record has p”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yot. to the yeare since, CIA has, to effect, ‘made’ policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even bean targets of CIA attempts at overthrow”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency shouldEoVa nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the yesra since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte ef the world. A number of governments 111! in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 0% overthrow •”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“I UE ULUMLI Fud 3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordina- tion. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets of the whole intelligence community, ' an”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 178-10004-10115 REPORT' TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission: In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique ”
“effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly. I cl . 1 ° * : % Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all W. S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual fi”
“congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that, would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further more, we were under i”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have zething to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte 0 the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 2% overthrow ”
“14-00000 6 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities 1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the working group which you established in January to consult with y”
“■ SECHA 8. (the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the ugo of Steto Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. Th* Dullen-Cerrea-Jrckeon report stated in 1948, "The CIA should ”
“other agencies of government? What have been the prac tices and procedures .for liaison, exchange of informa tion, joint operation and mutual support between the CIA and other governmental bodies? To what extent did CIA coordination and cooperation with other government ag”
“-6- . relating to that investigation was destroyed upon its completion.* A final deficiency in the evidence stems from the 12 doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed from the world and performed in such a way that if they were discovered, the role of ”
“DCI."L/ The memorandum went on to sa y: b. c. It is obviou s that a compilation of Special Group ap provals in no way reflects the totality of signifi- cant CIA activities carried on over the past 15 years. With respect to overall DDP activity, it does not include any mention of ”
“memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. " AR THE ORIGINAL Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many IBR parts the world. A number of governments still la power know”
“. Washington, O.C. 20003 19 i have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders 20 1: in the field have wanted. Some of this has to do with priorities that are imposed 21 22 on the CIA representatives from Washington. Some of it has ‘ S hw iis sa g Otr ”
“CIA id higher salaris Ieven * EKE perhapa scause Allos one pro-.0 H tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA able t and hold YT OF . a large number od able independent-m a DB added brilliant i ctivist its staff, the n 9p038tions developed, and the greater role it pl”
“Senate CIA Committee Says White House Stalls on Data By George Lardner Jr. Church said he did not jected round of public hear- Washington Post Staff Writer know “what the hang-up is” ings this summer. The House The Senate Committee on since White House aides have has also ord”
“-• is %{ 96 I think -this would not srouest that that cailing be public figure but that the Congress establish a manpower ceiling for that, just as it has there other services that serve in the field of national security. Now I know Charley has some reservations about ”
“iIn volume the most material and according to CIA analysts p most of that information. a large proportion of that is keyed to their report an’ yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carrie d out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a s”
“operations. The Committee intends to approach the issues of the CIA’s domestic activities with a broad perspective, realizing, as I am sure you agree, that the' threats to United States security and the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence, as well as CIA inst”
“6 SECRET 7. I has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because cf the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann’s re”
“perspective requires, at the na tional level. The discussion consists of four parts; The authority under which CIA conducts counterintelligence activities. The nature of those activities. 10 (edm youm QFA01T J LA, 2LiG1 fl i J in 9) Nil 50955 DocId: 32112721 Page 11”
“CONFIDENTIAL 4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between ”
“IC. .to” 8. (the other 2200 BTC presumably under military OF er —State official cover). Oridnally the us of State Departs r for CIA personnel W38 supposed 3 trictly limited as The Dulles-Correa- ackson report stated 1948, e CIA should not use State Departtuent cover is a ”
“State/CIA relations, he said that he felt this relationship had been codified to the extent that this was possible and that it was now a matter for Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station to work but their own individual arrangements. He hopes that we will be able to find some way”
“CREr Z. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggs sta ways in which some cf those prob- lemns can perhaps be alleviated 1. CIA Autonomy • CIA conducts three main forms cf secret work; clandestine intelli- gence collect”
“14-00000 handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro priate Congressional committees on these matters. We are par”
“59 B. Effect on Other Potential Opera- tions 173 : C. How CIA Worked to Defeat Itself 175 Chapter XI Methodology and Leadership 177 • ... A. Lack of Counterintelligence Methodology 177. B. Influence of Chief, CI on Methodology 178 • C. Impact of Faulty Counterintelli- gence on Po”
“) ) Question 28 MR. DIRECTOR, WHEN YOU WERE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE LAST YEAR WE ASKED YOU TO OUTLINE FOR US THE PARTICIPATION IN THE WATERGATE BURGLARY AND THE SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT TO COVER UP WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT IN THAT BURGLARY AND YOU DID SO VERY WELL. HAS ANYTHING BEEN UNCO”
“FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DI”
“SECTET 5. 14, peralloom and Policy wertd-on < iilium,■ to we vuewe teewww semew vowon tone, who Minim Clandestine activities abould 20 acneaned net only in the context of their relationship to an open society but *le® in tito catsext of their ralzticnebip to United States”
“of 5,662. As a result CIA could not meet its counterintelligence responsibilities adequately even at this peak of on-board counterintelligence strength. It is our view that the Operations Directorate ought to devote no less than 10 per cent of its manpower to counterintel”
“%Au VERom J OLNVOlEIVE them intimately and to keep our knowledge current. Our performance falls too short. core A lack of communication and inter- action between the Director of Central In telligence and CIA's counterintelligence unit. The present Director lacks counter”
“agencies or private companies and CIA’s assistance to them; CIA management of its investments; CIA use of proprietaries, notional organizations and devised facilities; CIA experi ments with drugs on unwitting U. S. citizens; CIA detention of individuals within the United St”
“0-2* &s 31 So it isn’t really lush a question. I would argue. 2 of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter of looking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiry 1 and saying, in fact, this- is going to be an impediment and it 5 is my personal opi”
“Sttmtl 8. 0A % wdlothan220,0 freprempu / under military or other 'mitato 3Eficial cover)." Originally the uge of Siste Department cover for 0° Moe personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. be bullen-Correx-Jackeon report stated in 1948, "The CTA should ”
“- 13 - C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori- zation and Control In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates”
“SECREI 9. the uighot of €9 Conerols’ revnst ia Algerl?. pe$*ezo-by noted with amnueemznt that the top floor van ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to ascora entrance that night to the CIA offices cely with difficulty.) . CLA 10 moparently d”
“SECRE[ J. For ikn part, CIA Lias developed A whale series 01 functions poral- .lelinng already existing functions of the State Department, and cf the Defense Department as well. Today it bas its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign servi”
“DLL 2l 7. .w • la It has meant too the the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its ater stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operatic as already mounted because the alleged evil consequences as exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's ”
“Special Prosecutor are continuing to be supplied. d. Requests for Agency documents and files for the Special Counsel of the Impeachment Committee are being honored. Our search has not revealed the participation of any CIA personnel not previously identified. 1IGG”
“which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the 21 military services, the Department of State, and all other -22 agencies concerned.< 23 You are going to have to have a perception of the real problems and what is involved in counterintelligence in order © 24 25 to o”
“-2 - 1) Clarify CIA’s mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to' reflect: --that included in the proper functions 6f the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter- ”
“by the U. S. Government if they were presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government. CIA Personnel Under State Cover The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various allowa”