“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964. Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that h”
“purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn’t say". or "didn’t comment" o”
“tho 7. NOSENKO’s exact statements and meaning on various specific sub- jects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled 7. 48 and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particul”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”
“zUnEAy , The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March. 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the . bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was ”
“time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 • 9 SECBET i”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“1 4-00000 wide SECRET .. V • ecrurdl: E. CAN THE INFORMATION FCI SHED BY NCSENKO BE CONSIDERED :N TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIEL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR,HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 3 q J 3 ”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“14-00000 new **>Titwr y eonerenew* tftoto.rtareshart €% 0*06 St* ********** ***7*0*17 "tiol-paengyoGneerz Page b. NOSENKO’s Conduct in Meetings 626 c. NOSENKO’s Behavior Under Interrogation 627 (i) Introduction 627 (ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627 (iii) Evasion, I”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“14-00000 supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the' questions, but it is the only method possible at this time. ”
“portant new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation. Method 4. Our basic approach has been to question HOSENKO in specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our r”
“portant new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation. Method 4. Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our r”
“• ngthcng : >Tyan —Ay 2. a's *1-960. P. Jk"g5 Y* 0 3 ". 94 P € th st 4. 2 JIP J A. D. 447 F !*A tanue tr yh 3 I! W*: 1. et. % (L-hn't ophs. were sub cuent Loion ERSA fice and in the office of the Mi Counsellor. has reported that both were bein to”
“Vovs Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a ( Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not nece”
“That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB]. ♦See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it. = TOP SECRET”
“desertion, self-inflicted wound in * There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO’s life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the cir cumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next. II ?! TOP-SECRET”
“14-00000 F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGS DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY11 IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB? I ca? 1 :Exc^J fra ctm| i 0001078 SECRET 1 si 1”
“is operation. Method 4. Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific terms on selecte d and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our renewal of the interrogation, nor has he asked for any. Our questions have been pointed”
“the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He -06- has- never suggested any connection with ZUJUS, nor is there reason 2- -06 to assume that he could be referring to the experience ox ZUJUS|since - - this took place in the summer of 1962,. after.NOSENKO had left the American Em”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”
“14-00000 .cr.r LT -11-1 intelligence information is not a significant factor in & determination of his bons sides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intellig”
“*% TOP-SECRET 5 605. 'wod T34xdt 6 Bo .% 2. Reports by Psychologist 8. Psychological Testing Results A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions rai”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“1 4-00000 • -.* supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at thi”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. . The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in SECRET 00010C8 2 ? L”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“1 4-00000 J^ 1 • Mi 1 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in. March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel 1 report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes, are cons”
“not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of,."we could do so if we had more personnel. " According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the . 0001176 i 0:16 ”
“consideration, since he had, on previous occasions,, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the polygraph testing if confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Con sequently, i”
“w/attach) NW 65990 Docld:32397035 Page 3 TOP SECRET EVES CITY TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 24 October 1966 : 1. This is an interim report on progress to date in the new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. A”
“with a pass obtained at the Pass Office, was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on the pass. 0001339 69 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10”
“has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com promise operations. The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on al”
“how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible, A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. 0001152 5 QCAP—T ofun •J”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate. 1 363 TS No. 197124 2 Top Secret Copy 10”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the 0001”
“14-00000 SECRET t B.---- - THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE? he ti^5? cutomatic) 0001042 SECRET declassification J”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“and playing it effectively, 19 ( and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO- iSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors! as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, ”
“c. tec !.;s to KGB Residency ana AValiabirity “TO CPA’, Ornngseen. 1 . 1* d. Timing of 1962 Contact 752 £ ■ 7 e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753 f. The Recall Te legram 753 g. Remarks 753 w ib ia ii G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 756 1. Introduction 756 aet 2. C”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”