“great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 0001012 F TEL”
“Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. - 2 0001012 S”
“briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as con cern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6) (2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO. (3) During the ”
“particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that 0001197 37”
“and states that concern for his safety, as well as con cern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6) (2) Office of Security files document a period in. 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO. (3) During the above period, NOSE”
“NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as con cern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6) (2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO. (3) During the above perio”
“NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as con cern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6) (2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO. (3) During the above perio”
“briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as con cern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6) (2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO. (3) During the ”
“14-00000 SECRET "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies. non”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“osexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear- cut contradictions in the story he has told us. 3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi”
“06 in the MORONE case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that G001197 37 SECRET hed 6/BR”
“after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.) 324 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy”
“14-00000 SECRET H. IS THERE ANY EVSAENCE 7 THE CONTACTS CF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1950 TH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE "RGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR .OR RGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFE”
“had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964. Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that h”
“not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of,."we could do so if we had more personnel. " According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the . 0001176 i 0:16 ”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“0 1 TOP SECRET is alleged that NOSENKO did not indicate the sources from which he obtained the information regarding the cases. During current interrogation NOSENKO provided sources 18X44) DJA or logical explanation for his knowledge in sixteen of the K nineteen cases”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. 0001152 5”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form. In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, 17 : 0001177 SECRET”
“to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the 0001”
“14-00000 F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGS DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY11 IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB? I ca? 1 :Exc^J fra ctm| i 0001078 SECRET 1 si 1”
“several hours after HOSENKO was in custody of CIA. 687.5 Reese 324 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ——— ‘n ' . dots - ‘ 497”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“14-00000 LAGS (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usu”
“V TOP SECRET 11 IV. NEW CASES AND NEW OR CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION 74 Information set forth above regarding the cases discussed in the CIA paper has clearly indicated that the current series of interrogations of NOSENKO in 1967 and. 1968 have been much more thorough and ha”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“14-00000 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a sign”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”
“and playing it effectively, 19 ( and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO- iSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors! as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, ”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“14-00000 new **>Titwr y eonerenew* tftoto.rtareshart €% 0*06 St* ********** ***7*0*17 "tiol-paengyoGneerz Page b. NOSENKO’s Conduct in Meetings 626 c. NOSENKO’s Behavior Under Interrogation 627 (i) Introduction 627 (ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627 (iii) Evasion, I”
“Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgrounds Gna-e, however, is not known to have stated specifically that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961. TUP S”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form. In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, 17 0001177”
“prior to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected to be a KGB agent.O SEVERN has not visited the United States since 1961, and he has not been interviewed by the FBI. NOSENKO’s information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in”
“1 4-00000 J^ 1 • Mi 1 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in. March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel 1 report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes, are cons”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“Vovs Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a ( Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not nece”
“has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com promise operations. The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on al”
“case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with ZUJUS, nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of ZUJUS since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section. 0001187 27”
“consideration, since he had, on previous occasions,, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the polygraph testing if confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Con sequently, i”
“1 4-00000 P W R ! ^ y w , '^ First Section, First Depar ent. s inform On Was pepornegsy.ver-nerecegg furnished to NOSENKO pri arily because of his friend 2 with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENXO learned of certain v. de casts or was”
“portant new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation. Method 4. Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our r”