“14-00000 SECRET E. GAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/ OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSEN KO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 0001C65 UROUP 1 5 Excluded fro”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“14-00000 we SECRET A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL, TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 620:2 1 . Excluded frem aslomatic 0001025 SECRE declassification downgrading and!”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“14-00000 SECRET t B.---- - THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE? he ti^5? cutomatic) 0001042 SECRET declassification J”
“14-00000 08 explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the 49J cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964. ( « 0001248 5 • we. i •. 6‘e —Lus’ 4* •* EPDCT IB”
“1 4-00000 wide SECRET .. V • ecrurdl: E. CAN THE INFORMATION FCI SHED BY NCSENKO BE CONSIDERED :N TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIEL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR,HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 3 q J 3 ”
“14-00000 supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the' questions, but it is the only method possible at this time. ”
“how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible, A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. 0001152 5 QCAP—T ofun •J”
“(Retracted.NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret C°py _”
“14-00000 SECRET € A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON lei. WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 7/ 6R9.P fir-nnimirl- 0001025 4* Enctetestren azit lit SECRET declassificationicf. ‘' CSungrading and .1 Ilsesmo 1 2* spot . fs d”
“14-00000 co ( explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the 49 cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964. 4 sielilss 0001248 5”
“14-00000 SECKEI F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KCS 1 CEPTION CR "GIVE A IN INFORMATION FURNISHES BY NOSENXO WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENMO WAS DISPATCHED BY THZ KGB? * •. (E.9 ! I Entlztes tris tatmoati 0001CT8 SECRET I fowl mate *2 f-*... J 1 ti”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“14-00000 F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGS DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY11 IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB? I ca? 1 :Exc^J fra ctm| i 0001078 SECRET 1 si 1”
“has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com promise operations. The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on al”
“not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of,."we could do so if we had more personnel. " According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the . 0001176 i 0:16 ”
“14-00000 SECRET C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION THROUGHOUT THE. 1953 -.1955 PERIOD AS HE CLAIMED • / 0001139 SECRET”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“14-00000 SECRET A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IX THZ NAVAL RU IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND TIMES HE CLAYED *' r 0001120 . 1 " excluded trim aztematic downgrading and - SECRET declassifter’len■ J 0229,”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“1 4-00000 • -.* supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at thi”
“statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. 0001152 5”
“14-00000 • v. annex A - Statements o: Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex 2 - Sun. ■ e O. Cases No: Examined in Text Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers % 3 G0010C5 ( FORET 1 oLuRI-1 \ .J”
“w/attach) NW 65990 Docld:32397035 Page 3 TOP SECRET EVES CITY TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 24 October 1966 : 1. This is an interim report on progress to date in the new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. A”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”
“That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB]. ♦See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it. = TOP SECRET”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate. 1 363 TS No. 197124 2 Top Secret Copy 10”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MIS”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“14-00000 .cr.r LT -11-1 intelligence information is not a significant factor in & determination of his bons sides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intellig”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“14-00000 OLURLI intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence inter”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“14-00000 Annex Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text Annex - The Cherepanov Papers 0001005 3”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“14-00000 SECRET E. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IX THE SECTION DURING THS % PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic) 0001160. ( aherzat 1UMMIMM*.- • GRDSP 1 Excluded tron automatic : te rati**ng enand”
“1 4-00000 SECRET-- , / D. L IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA ( 'CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABBY COMMENSURATE -M L WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER? e-eu?1 0001059 SECRET . Excludes •.- - - „, ILowngre.rns - 1grclas”
“zUnEAy , The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March. 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the . bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was ”
“14-00000 SECRET / II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CAS^ SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 - 6300P 1 Excluded from automatic C001010 SECRET downgrading and declassification”
“supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva. 2 0001080 scexwprk SECRET”
“before received any "reports or commentaries on NGSENKO’s ne escape". wa 0-0074L9 lollies i-tic-H-eB-n (09 we’***-*.--X Trendas. ’SMEET 509 dlryoindany—.wernvrn.An-aCn-rmuwrS"MILBE Maac-sorar-cmettres =-= HEXYOAMIRWEXRSJ 422502 - Sa-seincka GRWAuresiusurs 385 X - ”
“13-00000 February-March 1964 -eolllas egaxe ''Jce7a e0*7, sics IS eyhomm CE-iass serves extaissinet According to a sensitive source: "27,83049 Ssap/gujir shigat. A KGB commission a 5 in the process f studying tl the scale loss tl [caused by NOSENKO’ defection] to the”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”