“SHELBURNE:ms1 TOP SECRET 81 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 2:17 3 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D) 4 The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. 5 Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning . 6 It will be understood that the oath”
“Page 14 "I have no recollection of briefing those two gentlemen except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member." (Bissell, '6/11/75, p. 27). As mentioned above. (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his br”
“"never discussed" executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22). As for Bundy, Bissell’s final testimony (after telephone con- 4 tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy about the capability after it had been created (Bissell”
“might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were . the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that thei”
“. -8 - In his initial appearances before the Committee oh June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" ■ quotation of Harvey’s notes in the Inspector General’s Report, ”
“discussed" executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22). As for Bundy, Bissell's final testimony (after telephone con tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy ‘ about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75”
“AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10004-10138 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION RECORDS SERIES : INTERVIEW SUMMARY (EXCERPT) AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Date: 07/01/94 Page:1 ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO: TITLE : EXCERPT OF INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM HARVEY DATE”
“-8- In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" *quotation of Harvey’s notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bis”
“initial testimony, Bissell, said that: the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the : Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still' later he said: "there is little, doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p”
“Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel is,, as you say, a friend of 20 i yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours? Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is. 22 Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did 23 have gradations within it, ended up saying that 24 he believed either you ”
“-16- attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa- tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts against Castro had ”
“in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any; specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated -- * A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination effort”
“I-seat 25. TOP-SECRET V86 ** 10 seed Phone (Area 202) 544-6000? 0 1 the CIA to develop such a capability? 2 Mr. Dundy, I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is 5 only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any 4 impediment after I was briefed. 5 The Ch”
“in his initial testimony, Bissell said that 1 the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the 18 Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still later he said: there is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/”
“_ 9 - such conversations occurred .. . . . I do believe they did occur is that during the entire - autumn I suppose I must have spoken to Mr . Dulles practically daily about some aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually certain that he would in one or another ”
“-10- actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/ 22/ 75, p. 31) Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the executive action capability to the President.- (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 3”
“in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall, any specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey’s notes,, and stated * A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination efforts ag”
“capability was "undoubtedly" initiated-within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). . He had acknowledged onhis first day of testimony that this'would not have been unusual: .it was the normal practice in the. Agency and an impor tant part of its mission to create various ”
“-16- attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa- tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly'in. OR withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts Bunry ACTED ag”
“go STOP SECRET ¥ .. at %.% tila ;oh 2.... aV* 10,1 %. - 27 da 41 Phone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 544-6000 1 Mr. Bundy. ' ’ Mr. Bissell may not recollect that T did 2 not give him this instruction, but I do, Mr. Chairman. 5 The Chairman. Did Mr. Bissell at any time during the 4 per”
“did not recall any specific 22 conversation. , • he said, after having reviewed 23 i certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's © note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey 25 in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to ”
“capability, I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." , - (Bissell; 6/11/75, p..51). Bissell and Bundy both testified, howe”
“reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of 'bad words ' emphasized to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation." (I.G. (I.G.,, p.18 ). p.18 ).- Bissell testified that "I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from . that -meeting-—and the”
“-10- actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken- by the- CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite certain” that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the . executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p”
“NW 50955 DocId: 32203774 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO Page 26 DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 1/- ~-9% Le PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES; CATEGORIES: { HARVEY, William” 26 Jan. 1961 EXECUTIVE ACTION PSIEVER, Arnold! BISSELL, Richard OCCURRENCE: ”
“dn5 Phone (A rea 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 53 1 to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until 2 after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962. 5 Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably 4 with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developin”
“capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have been unusual: it was the normal practice in the Agency and an impor tant part of its mission to create various kind”
“410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D C. 20003 19 cribed to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in 20 this enterprise would come in the first instance from the am 21j; Kennedy Administration. The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the 23 Bissell testimony”
“Page 4 Again as part of his "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60) that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a "‘circumlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using "rather general terms." Bissell repeatedly cou”
“re whether Bissell had indicated whether it was someone in the Kennedy White House or the Eisenhower NW 66000 Docld:32202027 Page 5 ron errDET 1. ERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 8. of YOP SECRET White House who had made the request. Again, he has the impression, although he can r”
“(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9). ..O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis cussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 45-46).. * Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa- tion in any way. He did not recall why ”
“conflict with Harvey’s testimony as to whether such ’’urging” had in fact been given to Bissell. = ■ * Harvey’s notes also contained a phrase which suggests his con cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (R”
“- 18 - Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meeting. After reading the reference to "direct positive action," Bissell said "I find it difficult to understand" (Bissell Tr. 7/17, p. 18). He was then asked "Q: Do you, in light of the November 3 minu”
“"in train" for "approxi- mately two years or perhaps -18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54). Although his "net impression" was that both the "exploratory project" and the specific operation" were "fully authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that "speci”
“QUKAFIINU SUBUUMML 11EEJ TOP SECRET -- FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE ONLY 8/29/75 c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided here”
“that Bundy, in addition to ex- - pressing no unfavorable reaction, to the project, might have, actually given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28). Bisse11 testified that he might have interpreted Bundy’s reaction as approval for the executive action c”
“"approxi- mately two years or perhaps -18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54). Although his "net impression" was that both the 1? exploratory project" and the '’specific operation" were "fully 8 authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that 11 specific ”
“-11- •was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy’s) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that but this is a matter that probably someone list”
“-11- was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that, but this is a matter that probably someone list”
“Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO. Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS. Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have known about them. Gray said ”
“operation (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9). O’Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis- cussion with Bissell, he departed, for the Congo (O’Donnell 9/11/75, pp. 45-46). * Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa- tion in any way. He did not rec”
“was. Mr. Daron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you ri directly that Sidney Gottlieblwas involved in developing poisons that might be used for assassination? Mr. Tweedy. I don’t recall that at all. © Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about 10°, the ”
“conflict with Harvey's. testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to : Bissell... *Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his con- - cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (”
“-7- The following testimony regarding the relationship - : between "the White House" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee: Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indica ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an e”
“5 ttft1 Bissell further stated that although he believed that Dulles "probably" talked with President Eisenhower: "the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance and there were much more important matters to talk about with . the President." (Bissell, 7/”
“-15- was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a F1 specific recruitment ■ (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59). , ' (d) The Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected to Any Actual Assassina”
“e — 2 TOP SECRET 15 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that. 2 The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself? 0 Mr. Bundy. It surely might have been. The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that 5 briefing, you have”
“-18- bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the- White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61). Although Richard Hel”
“-5- discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,' might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). had -- or”
“-5 - discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). had —”