“major CIA project. Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Decep tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this. Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popu”
“… mit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it can …”
“submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February, RFK PAper e 5 SENSITIVE TO”
“. 5. Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA) These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have pur - poseful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support t”
“S-E-C-R-E-T - - ' EYES ONLY - i icover and deception operations by that date. 7. Task 7, p.5. Byl February CIA will submit an opera- 1 tional schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance move- t ment inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities select”
“… ore risking their assetsete o)" -the 0.S.". (00180-00187) SOIROR a ----- h Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 STAFF: on the Cuba Project (00180-00187) di Genova FILE: DATE: June 30. 1975”
“SYCHOLOGICAL 6. Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (STATE) To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public. This has been a normal”
“Lie Communist regime through broadcasts (st witch would appearTO COTTO from local dissident groups activelyplanning to harass the regime. 1300 2). Task 10, CLA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castros failure to the uban population via balloon with a view of p increas”
“13-00000 CC FOR FUTURE present -/ ) TABC 20 April 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR, Chief, WL/4 SUAJECT 1 CI Progra for JMATE Project 1. C jectives1 vs ,in sration 4* sen Per 0 1v LOUR fi assault on ba, will ■ lstert duris ays.“It te anticipated cuas DOT - candida”
“some carping and pro tests from dissidents can bo anticipated with the usual security - hazards whenever the decision is made to terminate this project. These possibilities can hardly justify the indefinite continuation of this enormous expenditure of funds which to date am”
“13-00000 CVro nall LILS UNLYV SECRET ■2 Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan. and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalti”
“J2 ack 23, Counterfeit Currency to increase Cuban economic oblems is considered feasible within 30-6A days upon a mited basis and in considerable scale within six months. LA asks the Group approval before proceeding with this tion.— Other Tasks. I note here that CIA does ”
“- 3 - 6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures t”
“Leap U.t-i -4-' Chapter III (commencing at page 34) -Inden 1. As in Chapter II, here again Hamilton’s distaste for ., der comes through. The difference is particularly one of their political philosophies -- r Hamilton being quite conservative and Bender being a liberal, die.”
“e of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere. NW 66000 Docld:32424944 Page 5 TASK فية TOP SPECIV PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS PAGE -5- PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued 8. Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors, as dramatic witne”
“… you?’, before risking the.ir_as Sets to help the U.S . (00180-00187) SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 STAFF: on the Cuba Project (00180-00187) di Genova FILE: DATE: June 30, 1975”
“representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the - cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. $100, 000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by th”
“… you?' 9 before risking their assets to help the U.S.". (00180-00187) SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 STAFF: on the Cuba Project (00180-00187) di Genova FILE: DATE: June 30, 1975”
“53 CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN 97132 SECRET - (When Pulled in) NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS -3/556,052 PAGE 27 V.I 1 . OTHER EXILE GROUPS WILL AWAIT REACTION OF UNITED STATES. BEFORE DECTDING THEIR OWN COURSE OF ACTION. 2. NUCLEUS/SUCH A BASE WOULD BE DRAWN FRO”
“l is given, to begin to prepare these assets for an organized revolt of substantial proportions. Thi s additiona l time will be required since un der exist in g limitations we are not permitted to prepare the teams or cadres from their inception for any concerted revolt nor, in f”
“4-00000 9 * SECRET Subject’s cover fer this assignment is to gather material for a book she 1 plans to write on the Cuban Revolution. The questions themselves are not intelligence requirements and reputedly are along the lines of "vast vao your role in the invasion atte”
“Removed from Project Art 9- II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE 1 2oBe08-496/16 es Classification: / The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among.. Pold: high level military and civilian leaders of the ”
“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the development of the paramilitary operation”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET involved in establishing this Agency activity on the island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected with the United States Coast Guard in order that there be no interference with maritime activities; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was”
“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”
“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”
“four people charged with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietiza tion of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc, ■ -- much of which has been hitherto classified -- putting this information into : readable, popu”
“s, and the Children's Institute, as well as the Special Con-1 sultative Committee on Security. 2. 12 Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban wor”
“… e yourambefore risking theirlassets to help the U.S." (00180-00187) SOURCE; STAFF: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187) di Genova FILE: DATE: June 30, 1975”
“SECRET Aruba THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON July 8, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD GOODWIN . SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) "an island-wide resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal assets under clos”
“13-00000 •SECRET -5 - Specific programs to carry out this kind of approach to the Cuban problem are submitted in Annexes A and B. ,4 Audiences and Targets ■ The psychological program should be directed at the following primary audiences or target groups: 1) the Cuba ”
“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the development of the paramilitary operation”
“… h British wantoto want to- »4 C1OTeFTlS wo eru.S.". (00180-00187) SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 STAFF: on the Cuba Project (00180-00187) di Genova FILE: DATE: June 30, 1975”
“9 Athtc-71, TOP SECRET 36 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 collecting this intelligence, an assessment could ba made based to on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro. In other 6 words; the difference here was that people thought that the Bay of Pigs operation”
“SECRET-SENSITIVE -9- —that the cumulative psychological and political 7 I impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations i a is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our- mission. 6. Support of entoromous enti-Castro Cuban exile coo groups. These operations ar”
“1 - Incident 21 GuantanamoOCCURICU 26 May when a light Cuban aircrait lancer there. Three Cubans had forced the pilot. .t pistol point, to land them at our Naval Ease, kith State’s con- currence. Defense acted: the Cuban pilot flew home, the 3 Cuban escapees stayed on the”
“invasion site was never secured. (C) The AMWORLD Project, begun well after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and after the release of Manuel Artime Buesa and other Bay of Pigs veterans from Cuban prisons, was designed to support and unite several Cuban exile groups u”
“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”
“S-E-C-R-E-T ■ - EYES ONLY - 17. Section D, p.3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus. have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by l February. 18. Section”
“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the development of the paramilitary operation”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET If not particularly successful in projects other than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack of imagination. Among other projects, it was proposed that the Office of Medical Services' psychiatric study of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the p”
“e place in the future with respect to our relation- ship. All agreed on the need for tight security. 3. After lunch we drove to the Hotel Court and from approximately 1330 until 1730, we discussed the prospectus. Using Mr. Barnes' out- line as a general guide, I stressed the impo”
“transfer of responsibility must bo accomplished harmoniously, without adverse press reaction, or support of this work would be withdrawn. Col. Wendell Johnson was hired and will ba placed in contact with Dr. Miro prior to 1 October. Re will function as the day-to-day contact”
“is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational asset for Operation Mongoose. At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban peop”
“counterrevolutionaries. We would hope that such activities would keep the movement together, give the members practical experience which would eventually be useful in Cuba, and in the meantime, would render useful results in countering problems of insurgency in Latin America.”
“action organization within Cuba which will be respon sive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned. to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be cr”
“. Gale Mr. Ponder Mr. Rosen Mr. Tavel Mr. Walters Mr. Soyars Tele. Room Miss Holmes Miss Gandy PROC. 2. (S) The essence of our letter was to suggest for your considera- tion and analysis an operation targ operation targeting the Cuban Intelligence Service S (CubIS). The basic sce”
“This is merely the first phase of the projected comprehensive economic program. Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in the Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and Reports) and the surfeit of government economists fa miliar with Latin America, WH/4 though”
“13-00000 NUlUAN The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida.(real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent ”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City. Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castro publications launched in the area of Miami. Para military programs initially called for th”