“14-00000 1 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person”
“confirming his KGB status, there is nevertheless a distinct difference between GOLITSYN’s opinion about him and the statements by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NOSENKO to be a KGB-dispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was a genuine defector. ***That thes”
“1 4-00000 .2 gEpour 0103-2 select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter-• act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO € was dispatched by the KG3, it would appea”
“757. source According to NOSENKO was in "Intelli- gence." His defection brought about the recall of a KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer f scse 60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the dismissal of KGB personnel including NOSENKO’s friend GUK, who”
“attending NOSENKO’s defection, ever mentioned him by name or in connection with the KGB Second Chief Directorate. On 19 March 1962, prior to NOSENKO’s first contact with CIA, GOLITSYN was shown HOSENKO’s name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo - the Disarmament Confere”
“14-00000 SECRET select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter- act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for ”
“14-00000 A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the. value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. ”
“The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN’s defection, the date of ABIDIAN’s visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSO- LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all ti”
“sourcee € CA-01140, (from various unnamed KGB officers-Aamlvmc lmis : The consensus amongAKGB employees Ceistur-ser.Aswn” is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO’s escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more i”
“14-00000 ‘. *QET A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOL”
“14-00000 he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.) In 1962 -1963 a number o”
“14-00000 he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the AGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question . t concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.) In 1962-1963 a number”
“sale dismissal of those responsible including GRIBANOV (although in fact they may have routinely retired or may have been removed from the main stream of KGB Headquarters activities!, and by making general announcements within the KGB,ero t tre "loss" nourred cy the defection”
“Top Secret [ (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB”
“stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member a. of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens. 33 GOLITSYN on 11 February 1'964 raised the possibility of his participation in efforts to "break" NOSENKO, and at this time he ■ was given; some background on th”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET 835. H. Evaluation The conclusion that NOSENKO is on a KE mission could carry damaging implications to the Amer ican intelligence sources wno have supported his bone tides. Unless tpeir statements or. NOSENKO can be convincingly explained as innocent ”
“13-00000 I 1 (Annex A) 29 June 1969 (continued) Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN’s photograph an”
“adamant that the trans- fer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he asserts occurred in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions in the Seventh Department., he.cites directing five agents whom he brought from the American Department. In his initial capacity a”
“fully conscious how I must suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know one can get used to almost anything." At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 Febru ary was selected for the defectio”
“to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presenta tion which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anyt”
“13-00000 % Top Secret % (Annex A) November 1964 (continued) Comment : GAMKRELIDZE is suspected f having connections with Soviet Intelligence because f his statements, actions, and nusual freedom f solitary ovement while n visits t the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuf”
“100 N 822. 3. NOSENKO’s Knowledge - Damage to tie KGB (Gh-AG-rtst has mentioned NCSENKO’s disclosures to the Americans concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy - her only reference to information he might have provided - on each occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO, S”
“1 4-00000 cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO’s above claims are impugned by fact or probability. or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is ”
“English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic. The following relevant ques”
“13-00000 (Annex A) 10 February 1964 (continued) Comment: w® The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO’s defection was by error not that f NOSENKO 1. t of a sensitive source Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom-omes and NOSENKO >th identified as a "clea”
“have to explain ", me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't re- fuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on”
“’During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel ligence matters because h”
“65990 Docld:32375412 Page 2 TOP SECRET EVES : ! 104-10210-10015 TOP SECRET EYES GALY 24 October 1966 1. This is an interim report on progress to date in the new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. A”
“instances NOSENKO had delivered his infor- mation by rote: Statements like "I don't remember what I told you before” when queried again on a particular case; detachment and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets who, like himself, had cooperated with Amer”
“14-00000 OLV. G* cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NO”
“good memorization ofdetails. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the exceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short per”
“any, light on that area of our Interest. ■- - - : : * : 7. The possibility that NOSENKO’s defection was de- .: .1 signed to wrock the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction chat, the Soviets would not have chosen such ”
“13-00000 % (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) .Soviet Officials* Statements About NOSENKO The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coin- cides markedly with NOSENKO’s self-description. According r the comments ”
“14-00000 f D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section. E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervi”
“judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of. NOSENKO’s bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO ‘s accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be establishe”
“said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of grea”
“iques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi s first pha se has enabled us to confirm our analyses of key aspects of this case. More important is the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive. areas and this is worrying him be”
“14-00000 7 TOP SECNEl 631. r**/ In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked whether GOLITSYN had reported to CIA that Finnish President KEKKONEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he”
“13-00000 *V7G According to a sensitive source. in.# response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that MOSENKO’s defection was not a "”
“seriousness of of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added new reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regime, his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, an”
“k Top Secret 5 (Annex A) November 1964 (continued) Comment: GAMKRFLIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. CAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a ”
“% . Top Secret ■ (Annex A) 29 June 1960 (continued) Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section In ■ it • 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until I960, when he returned to the Embassy Section ae Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not • Identify COLITSYN’s ”
“pertinent ques tions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to [my] direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volun teered to American Intelligence. “Subject, who before and t”
“take place on the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption. On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection”
“14-00000 ■ J jw r w fw w s w r a ^ ^ NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to eeeireey be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was no”
“back a year, to early 1952. During the interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates, NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two dif- ferent reasons for this change of dates (whi”
“14-00000 SECRET PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been gi”
“Top Secret (Annex A) 10 February 1964 (continued) - —7 . Comaent: eancazueseve renpbrb . The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO’s defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of a sensitive source Vladimir SHUSTOV, 00,50988 and NOSE”
“nt of the KGB; 2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information. PROCEDURE Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's compr”
“and that his responses reflected only personal opinions. Because of his two assignments to Geneva with the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground testing, Soviet efforts in the fields of chemical and biological ”