“DERYABIN in August 1965 that the order accompanying his award had read: "For ex ceptional performance of mission.' When asked what mission was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for good work in general. TOP SECRET”
“under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a ■ "glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN’s questioning- covered this part of NOSENIKO’s life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July ”
“CrODET OLURE, 11110530 FILE: NOSENKO INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT REEL # 3: 28 JULY 1965 (DERYABIN) COMPLETE TRANSCA TTON OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIFT P.3 WAS IN KOMSOMOL 1943-1954 la AT END OF 1953 ELECTED SEC . OF PARTY ORGANIZATION OF SECOND CHIEF DIRECTORATE 23 RE NOW HE BE”
“tho 7. NOSENKO’s exact statements and meaning on various specific sub- jects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled 7. 48 and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particul”
“had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964. Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that h”
“portant new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation. Method 4. Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our r”
“That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB]. ♦See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it. = TOP SECRET”
“14-00000 SECRET H. IS THERE ANY EVSAENCE 7 THE CONTACTS CF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1950 TH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE "RGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR .OR RGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFE”
“14-00000 new **>Titwr y eonerenew* tftoto.rtareshart €% 0*06 St* ********** ***7*0*17 "tiol-paengyoGneerz Page b. NOSENKO’s Conduct in Meetings 626 c. NOSENKO’s Behavior Under Interrogation 627 (i) Introduction 627 (ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627 (iii) Evasion, I”
“14-00000 ORODET *1 SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IX NOSENKO CASE SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to .zd NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO ”
“is operation. Method 4. Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific terms on selecte d and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our renewal of the interrogation, nor has he asked for any. Our questions have been pointed”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“Vovs Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a ( Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not nece”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“1 4-00000 J^ 1 • Mi 1 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in. March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel 1 report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes, are cons”
“time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 • 9 SECBET i”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“zUnEAy , The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March. 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the . bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was ”
“*% TOP-SECRET 5 605. 'wod T34xdt 6 Bo .% 2. Reports by Psychologist 8. Psychological Testing Results A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions rai”
“14-00000 supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the' questions, but it is the only method possible at this time. ”
“It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would . have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but 14. G001174 V eM am DemPDFT ‘ 1 :L 1 ‘ *ie A 3”
“c. tec !.;s to KGB Residency ana AValiabirity “TO CPA’, Ornngseen. 1 . 1* d. Timing of 1962 Contact 752 £ ■ 7 e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753 f. The Recall Te legram 753 g. Remarks 753 w ib ia ii G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 756 1. Introduction 756 aet 2. C”
“1 4-00000 • -.* supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at thi”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“1 4-00000 wide SECRET .. V • ecrurdl: E. CAN THE INFORMATION FCI SHED BY NCSENKO BE CONSIDERED :N TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIEL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR,HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 3 q J 3 ”
“this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments. hiytai * *”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”
“14-00000 F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGS DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY11 IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB? I ca? 1 :Exc^J fra ctm| i 0001078 SECRET 1 si 1”
“13-00000 February-March 1964 -eolllas egaxe ''Jce7a e0*7, sics IS eyhomm CE-iass serves extaissinet According to a sensitive source: "27,83049 Ssap/gujir shigat. A KGB commission a 5 in the process f studying tl the scale loss tl [caused by NOSENKO’ defection] to the”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”
“purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn’t say". or "didn’t comment" o”
“osexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear- cut contradictions in the story he has told us. 3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi”
“portant new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation. Method 4. Our basic approach has been to question HOSENKO in specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our r”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“f 14-00'000 '‘ t or mwwirany P lse t aniney s ‘ta 1 ‘, 4 nyey; Y R Vis .eaU M i ^ bait -crabrenal NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to %- 1 1 request permission to board the vessel. % ** In February 1965, KOSENKO did not recal”
“w/attach) NW 65990 Docld:32397035 Page 3 TOP SECRET EVES CITY TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 24 October 1966 : 1. This is an interim report on progress to date in the new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. A”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Em-”
“by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.)”
“14-00000 that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary. GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re t ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. 1 In ea”
“14-00000 that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary. GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. 1 In eac”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“14-00000 SECRET "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies. non”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“SECRET C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964? GROUP 1 - 0001050 SECRET Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification”
“Western Intelligence, even if the . 1 - information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, "inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his 0 . having provided such i”