“FIUAL DRAFT 6% 341:) E&hAW% No R948 TRUJILLO Agreed to by drafting subcommittee on Summary August 28, 1975* Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on May 30, 1961. Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Ad”
“FINAL DRAFT 1.5 6 GAa7• to w.s, A KS R948 TRUJILLO Agreed to by drafting subcommittee on Summary August 28, 1975* Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on May 30, 1961. Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy”
“ople if such activities become known. In our judgment event ual disclosure is inevitable. Th e proce dures of the CIA should be modified to re- quire the concurrence of the Department of State before weapons, ammunition, explosives, and similar items are transmitted by diplomatic”
“The Dominican Republic 1. Summary and Conclusion ! In late 1960 and 1961, the United States, having abandoned its policy of nonintervention in the Dominican Republic, sought to bring about the overthrow of the regime of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo and the establishment of a mod”
“the required coordination, NW 66000 Docld:32112922 Page 3 -72- ! 7 There is no evidence of any Both consumed about two weeks. effort during this period to recover the weapons or other- wise interfere with the assassination plans. The policy statement was cabled to the Dominican R”
“-47- Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed' from the country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station in 'the Dominican Republic to destroy ”
“-47- Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station in the Dominican Republic to destroy a”
“-145.- ,E y. idM fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt.” The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on Ma”
“TERO ^T EN I"36107% 67 -34- 29 The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a sensitive operation t”
“14-00000 5002 cis? CROFT Lalu U-Js.za i There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo as she time that the U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters. Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty. many of the details care cut. Norman Call,”
“% ; -45.- fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt." The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, ”
“, the United St ates, having abandoned its polic y of noni ntervention in the Dominican Republic, so ught to bring about the overthrow of the regime of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo and the establishment of a moderate successor government. To accomplish this result several measur”
“ir own; and they did the detailed plan ning. They were never subject t o American erican supervision or control, NW 66000 Docld:32112922 Page 2 -71- On the other hand, CIA and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the”
“-16- 98 attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and this information was relayed to the coup leaders. b. Schneider We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized”
“/ .. 4 11 j - 45 - fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt." The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President ■ Kennedy, was sent to Dearbor”
“@934.0 37420 g "rd T 7 *0*hycet Trujillo had been killed and that it was time for Roman to make his AC move to take over the government. Roman knew only that there had been a shooting involving Trujillo and that Trujillo was missing. - He did Staderte not know whet”
“I. Background Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States. Trujillo’s rule, alwa”
“to train a member of the group in the use of explosives to ki ll Trujillo. As a gesture of Ame rican support, three revolvers and three carbines, along with limited supplies of ammunition, were passed to the plotters about two months before the assassination. One of the carbines ”
“"Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo." (6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding the coup and for the period following it. iro n e d Farland stated a need for "minizum but key cooperation" from Dominican military dissidents. He added: "One of the ”
“an rm I. Background Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States. Trujillo's”
“I? M -34- The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the D”
“- : PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY : 5 2.(Proposed) General Conclusion and Recommendation The Commission concurs in the position taken in the We have concluded that there was an policy statement. improper level of American involvement in the death of That is so even th”
“d they did the detailed planning. They were never subject to American erican supervision or control, NW 66000 Docld:32112922 Page 2 -71- On the other hand, CIA and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assassinati”
“on May 29, the d ay before the successful assassi natio n attempt. the Consul General and the CÍA St ation Chief in Ciudad Trujillo promptly protested this change in the policy which they had followed in the belief it had been approved by appropriate authority. Before these cable”
“W ry . stMertGBAe i : % •ger V ui Ii ■J 9 to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records, re Ph we think it, unlikely that they would be dole to add significantly 198% to the quite complete record that appears in the EMDSED operational files. ”
“APA.7 0 L. CEY gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked .food, cans, which were later turned over to the conspirators. Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being prepared. However, ”
“oposed) General Conclusion and Recommendation The Commission concurs in the position taken in the We have concluded that there was an policy statement. improper level of American involvement in the death of That is so even though the assassins Generalissimo Trujillo. might have b”
“9,-. I ! of wwE lin/haln Wh Mann solicited Dearborn’s comments concerning plans under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn replied in a detailed letter which concluded: "One further point which I should probably not even -make. From a purely practical standp”
“. ‘ I "-‘-*** as TOP SECRET 4 44 Phone (A rea 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 161 1 Y to the Domincan Republic, either two or three days prior to the ” Lameness 2 actual assassination of Mr. Trujillo? 3 Mr. Bundy, I have no recollection of it, and when I saw ‘t those”
“\-25- 20 % vise a advised that the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican government could not be overthrown without the assassination 'of Trujillo. Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection of the d”
“SECRET -2- In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted op position leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver copy to them. If you ”
“6 00.P C.3J73 C -X- 3 CERRET ER60.5AT - 1 July 190 ICKORAEDUN FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director (Plans) SUBJECT Clandestine Delivery of Arna to Opposition Loadership 20 the Dominican Republic.. 1. This nezorandun racomanda action by th”
“2 0 0 0 1 13 most difficult thing2 of all to do. r He Jas heavily guarded and or • protected, ordinarily. They know more about than did. And when that happened, which we favored that happened, democratic regime 22 1because we felt that the establishment of 410 Faron $1”
“lingering illness. (Dearborn to.Mann letter, 10/27/60) C. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo into relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dom”
“-9- C-IX-28 Letter, Dearborn to Mann, October 27, 1960 C-IX-29 Memorandum of conversation re assassination, May 3, 1961 C-X Trujillo II (3) C-X-1 Transmittal letter/Knoche to Gray re: CIA documents concerning Dominican Republic, June 17, 1975 C-X-2 Agency Memorandum:”
“-16- 3.1 attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and this information was relayed to the coup leaders. . b. Schneider We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authori”
“14100000 7 p-rn n’t V: 0— DID) Jil 31 May 1951 Received in Headquarters Signal Center at 0341 hours, Washington time: FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO NUMBER 1. APER 2. SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (c). X SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS L”
“illness." (Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60) C. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo into relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican R”
“-26- 1 5 60 0-2056% the th Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo elements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective positions”
“TNFedisa “NAG CTAi -35- 07130 0date ra was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group agreed to the "limited supply” of small arms, did not mention assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential" and stated that there "would be no thought of”
“12922 Page 10 -79- PHOTOCOPY FROM THE-GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY™ In March matte rs took an active turn. In a cable on March 4, a letter on March 16, and an airgram on March 22 the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans : - for Trujillo's assassination were coming to a”
“assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to. Under Secretary Merchant, which at HW 50955 ”
“1 /a l 4 ‘ 9 gr-y MAT :»: “ 7 14 AMC-1 car A 1960 (co n t ’ d) Issues and Questions December 29 At a Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert . activities directed against the TRUJILLO 1 ”
“gww Q0 Eim Waalbni Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn replied in a detailed letter which concluded: "One further point which I should probably not even make. From a purely practical standpoint, it”
“F41A 7^BA -35- V- *8 was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group agreed to the "limited supply” of small arms, did not mention assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of ”sabotage potential” and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the [go”
“detailed plans, by the dissidents to assassinate Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group NW 50955 Docld: 32423539 10 Page 412”
“5-27-; 5S' 8s ^Nemo J arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell, 7/29, p.80). Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that: "... it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the t”
“reflecting President’s views with regard to the Dominican Republic. 9. May 25, 1961. Minutes of the Special Group meeting, this date. 10. June 5 or 6, 1961. CIA Memorandum for J.D. Esterline entitled "@DACID (State Department)views on passage of arms. ft 1(B) 11. June 7, 196”
“the dissidents to assassinate Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group, 1R9 9 9U. NW 50955 Docltl:32423525 Page 51”
“orate. : PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY NW 66000 Docld:32112922 Page 6 -75- b. The Rifles In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican Re- public returned to Washington for consultations. Both State Depart- ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents”