“1 NY 185-229 / There follows the results of the interviews conducted with the UN Security Force: % / I” « a / # -12- io. NW 88296 Docld:32989574 Page 77. ! • 1”
Searching the archive...
“1 NY 185-229 / There follows the results of the interviews conducted with the UN Security Force: % / I” « a / # -12- io. NW 88296 Docld:32989574 Page 77. ! • 1”
“instructed our officers co these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet , officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of - the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. A”
“the western GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED: sponsors of the provision claim with Bonn Chancellor Konrad i +46 sraboard. Extending along the Never a clear point, this vaguely that "other purposes" provides an Aderaner in Paris. They approved| length of the twisting line is a worded item ”
“20003 him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt. 20 I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized. 21 But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this 22 was a way of getting out. 23 And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and ”
“COS.REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT REGRETTED THAT MR, WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS ■ALSO PO INTED OUT THA T STAT IO”
“c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 3 CLASSIFtU TOP SECRET SPCNL-IANDHNG- NOEARN”
“13-00000• fTOP SECRET DINAR ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA ___ - - 7 Armed Forces Minister Messmer’s visit in early Jan- uary is designed primarily to strengthen French in- fluence in the wake of Sihanouk’s call for an end- to the US”
“the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for the interests of the Free World generally. TOP SECRET”
“delegate Provident to spend up to $100 mil- munits channels? German membership in the N. A. time the peace is finally signed. proposed that each side prepare Kon out of military aid funds "for Last week the Western Big 1. 0. before 1553. Rat fiea by a plenary session of the lat”
“d to the WII Division by BREIT in detailed dispatches. Results of Interviews with Prabassy Parscanel 7. In order to detersino whether or not BNTT has been indio crest as allowed, the following officers of the US. Babassy Cindad Trujille were interviewed: William T. PEEIFFER, Amba”
“receptivity of CON (GOB) to an CAS resolution authorizing use force. Ambassador should proceed on assumption report CAS investigation committee strongly aTole-” winovtermoot”
“14-00000 SECRET -2- i 1 SECURITY INFORMATION of the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.H. but the timing and use of t”
“Sarefore, on 21 March, sent it through chanroln to the DD/ P and* their official approval." ThomasW. Broder THOK AS ... Chief . International Organizations Division OCT wt. I SECURUi IrOnATON”
“resoonsibiliti 21. . 28 which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented Part of our problem with this decision is, as hn: been 13 I stated and noted non ryf !•)■-» rrntimgt: of former lTr ie against the background of tiro pre: ent situation. ‘le rest of”
“obtained for arms And ammunition resupply missions to the Meos. It ‘ was agreed that this was matter for consultation between the Department £ State and CLA, and need not be referred to the Group for decision. 4 1 NW 50955 DocId:32204599 Page 3”
“regime from being used to destroy the peace and security . of the hemisphere. * - The Secretary noted that the United States was simultaneously asking the U.N. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: "The threat ■ is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsib”
“is taken to avoid exposing the U.S. support; and that he considered that the collateral, independent groups were not safeguarding it; so wa are losing the now as you (U.S. Agencies) deal with each of these groups. Are we must not lose, we must win. oran-T Stead i”
“indicated that he also had a report Hr. Joyce’s dis- cussion dth the Foreign 0.fice, and that the former had found little British desire come involved the ters of exiled /roups. He surrested that the British considered this 36 an oxtreubly complicated and undesirable situation wh”
“14-00000 the Department in the hope of getting a better deal directly with us. This in the more my Depression since if the British "swcotness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit — then the State Department hed Letter bo got into lire ”
“fact, and the right to strike is protected in law and in fact also. After almost two hundred years of its national existence there can not bo found in the US one trace of the colonial practices which characterise Soviet rule over its satellite colonies. Condon asks that if s”
“subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Oirtain emigration to take the line of early rope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed for”
“no chance for success of en 5 4 armed movement. “It was agreed that even though the Committee 4 3. 3 2 2 1 1 Lrnge 1 triveis s.e wi-sot. teonvelns ord SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM - tele-t-ci-at STATE -QtA JAAMY NAVY INA AID OCA FBI #3 CINCSO #- USIA I*We (Niote. Fold du”
“should not reach any agreement in regards to the exchange with the Diplomats. i-memenr--- :...... * ----- - .............. ...”
“( ( 9 (06 1 0 A TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY -4- 10/30/63 such as removal of key personalities or relay of information. In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be eit”
“13-00000 CONCLUSION Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it appears that the U. S. should immediately undertake to implement this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change th”
“on the changes for an internally inspired revolt become increasingly more remote. Barring a major political schism in which major elements of the security forces are split, there is little promise of an internally sparked revolt of suf ficient magnitude to permit the U. S. t”
“to which the US Government is a signatory. With reference to efforts to strengthen world peace the US, as is generally known, has endeavored in every practicable way to work stop by step, in accordance with the deep interests of the American people in permanent peace and in ”
“reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this matter. Your ideas will be useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall sale a synthesis of the reports so sscombled - adding thereto the thoughts of the French”
“that way in all areas or not, but if they do then.It seems to me it would raise a very serious question as to whether or not the H troops are getting the right orders. "Senator Huddleston. And going beyond that would require that some 50 "Mr. Gilpatric....I thought there ”
“FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE V.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION has OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON S. EC R E T”
“the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational.task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular ”
“business. 'terms of the Jordanian scene. We are week and the whole question of a joint ther stronger than anything that can be lev- delegation is still very much in question. not Newsweek, March 7, 1977 Newsweek, March 7, 1977”
“then I have not been advised countries, I will continue to advocate have a deleterious effect on our peace rece about its suspension, either officially or fruitful and mutual cooperation. efforts, but I plan to persevere regard- sam unofficially. less of attempts to sabotage a ju”
“either side, without authorization from Washington. b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY”
“with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions 6/25/75”
“foregoing, 1s to sokothe United States for as high wits to picsible for the oliefnatica 08 the undesirable features of tha Cohen Revolution. In particular, the Counnists start to gain by provoking us into armed intervention, or otherwise teting interventionist actions in vio”
“JubAAR L. O 0: 42 was done and a comprehensive program of suggested action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval it should probably then be discussed with him. . It was stipulated that in any case no action should t”
“ABOUT BY THE REGINE OF PRESIDENT JEAN-CLAUDE D UVA L I ER. BEFORE SUCH A TRIP COULD BE MADE, 5 5 j 4 JOSEPH SAID, POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD HAVE TO BE RELEASED. ALSO,: 4- 3 3 ; 2 2 : 1 11 .SECRET- rela.nlertioi NO FOREIGN DISSEM tduisem erite i t L t vet”
“appear that the Chi-: arrival is receiving more pub nese were opposed to the African- licity than the Chinese guests. sponsored expansion plan because they insisted that any change I It has become increasingly in the UN be tied to Peiping’s apparent that a major objective o”
“Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable. JEC Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Acting Director SFONET EYES LIY”
“country as evidenced by the regime’s own admissions and the reports of refugees. NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 29 SECRET b.”
“-51- self-preservation type of an impulse,on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this. Then let’s make the military establish- ment serve the country in a much bigger way than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It’s usually the organization that”
“country except in coordination with the local government. Therefore., even though you assure us that General SOMOZA knows and approves this activity, we would have to have a direct re- quest from him before we could cooperate with you in any kind of an official capacity." Thi”
“According to a military informant most of the armament has not been delivered, but is expected in the country before the end of the year. • end - 19 44 52. 1 1 a •0*1 U YES C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L $ YES The denomination of this document is limited to civilian emplo”
“-51- self-preservation type of an impulse on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this.. Then let’s make the military establish ment serve the country in a much bigger way . than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It's usually the organization ”
“status, but this reads a little bit as though it woro putting on the trappings of national sovereignty. THOM: • W. ERADFN Chief International Organisations Division Attachments ‘s stated. CIO:TWB/mf Distribution: Dux Orig - Addressee (CPP) 1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI 1 cc ”
“r cums of stability, and to retomimties of disidents to remove ikea, void romain, reover, a Cura :.: would, om for tim to cow, ס אוracterized wsנסבלס על מנ than progre, you we would have to commit ourselves to very ס ויגגעבןanoxic and other assistanco. NW 66000 Docld:32204457 Pag”
“Let's go back on the record. 22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, t me Senator, /’ Paragraph A -- I am no' ure whether his interpretation of 24 i instructions, r at least in specifics, seems to be clear. 2s ! lle says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms ”
“friends and Allies, that the USA sees to it that Agreements - . made with them must be kept and that they allow no doublecrossing and ’ •’ deceit.. cc Ministry for Foreign affairs, Washington. V U.S.A. Embassy , London..”
“will be given to 29 possible utilization of the Vatican. .5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime 2 assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and .q.”